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ABSTRACT 
This study is an intervention in postcolonial theorising through a critique of technologies of 
representation. It examines the effects of technologically-mediated representation in a 
postcolonial condition that the Philippines has exemplified. New media technologies are 
mechanisms of representations that embody the logic of spectrality presented in Jacques 
Derrida’s later work. Spectrality, which brings doubts, ephemerality, and instability to 
dominant discourses and modes of representation, provides a chance for change. 
Spectres are effects of technologically-mediated representation that articulate the infinite 
demand for justice under conditions of enduring inequality. As quasi-transcendental elements 
of deconstruction, spectres are not reducible to either human or technical intervention; they 
express the relation of humans to technologies, in which representation is central to the 
mediation of political authority. This technological representation is the condition of what 
Derrida calls “iteration,” or the transformation of hegemonic authority through the very 
repetition of its fundamental terms of identification.  
The examination of emancipatory new media technologies in a postcolonial condition is 
inspired by the work of Jacques Derrida, in his deconstructive reading of Marx’s spectres. 
However, the writings of Habermas and Adorno have offered an implicit appraisal of the 
ontology of spectres. Habermas’s theory of the public sphere and Adorno’s negative dialectics 
are discourses that unwittingly solicit spectres. The account of the postcolonial condition in 
the Philippines works through the questions of universality, subalternity, and the right to 
theory that are raised by the project of Western critical theory.  
 
  
 
 
 
The already-there is the pre-given horizon of time, as the past that is mine but that I have 
nevertheless not lived, to which my sole access is through the traces left of that past. This 
means that there is no already-there, and therefore no relation to time, without artificial 
memory supports. The memory of the existence of the generations that preceded me, and 
without which I would be nothing, is bequeathed on such supports.  (Bernard Stiegler, 1998) 
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INTRODUCTION                                                                                                            
THE POSTCOLONIAL CANON AND SPECTRES 
A scholar, says Jacques Derrida, is someone who dares speak to spectres while a scholarly 
work is an engagement with phantoms (Derrida, 1996, p.39). Scholarship deals with 
conjuration, of speaking in absence, death, and mourning. It allows ghosts to communicate 
with the living – an analogue of research (Appelbaum, 2009, p.4). In his examination of the 
possibilities of archiving and writing in Archive Fever, Derrida suggested that writing within 
a disciplinary canon is spectral, or representing a presence that is never fully achieved, and to 
believe otherwise is delusive (Derrida, 1996, p.94). Derrida was less concerned with 
preserving privileged writings, or the canon, than with how such conservation closes off 
writing from that which may animate it (Derrida, 1996, p.40). It is then better for a scholar to 
be hospitable to the anxiety of spectres than adhere to an imposing presence of the canon. 
Similar to an archive, postcolonial studies have a reserve of suppositions and methods, so that 
any attempt to re-invent and renew them is in equal measure subject to trepidation and 
resistance. This tension arises from the prevailing politics and academic attitude. Take for 
instance the designation of the work of Edward Said, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, and Homi 
Bhabha as the representative of postcolonial canon (McLeod, 2007, p.10). Their ground 
breaking work on literary texts have become so dominant that any work of postcolonialism 
that does not reference them is deemed deficient. However, if we bring back Derrida’s 
arguments, privileging certain kinds of writing actually weighs a discipline down. For that 
matter, as we shall see, Derrida’s desire to transform the canon is the task that I take as a 
challenge.  
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So, what is a canon, who privileges it, and why? Can there ever be a postcolonial canon? A 
canon is a body of work regarded as universal and enduring but, at the same time, it is also 
criticized as elitist and exclusive because its confirmation is done by a select few. A canon’s 
authority is at once proof of its fixed identity and ambiguous superiority (Kolbas, 2001, p.58). 
Adorno, for example, spoke against turning a cultural artifact into cult to serve the 
imperatives of certain kinds of politics. It is also on this premise that he and Horkheimer have 
examined the strains of domination projected onto the canonical myth of Odysseus in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment (Kolbas, 2001, p.93; Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979, p.51 -61). 
Adorno suggests that the institutional consecration of art amounts to reification, which means 
its artistic decline (Adorno, 1977, p.111). Thus, if some postcolonial theories are invested 
with similar standing, they become reified, while opening up the canon to accommodate other 
voices would perpetuate the fetish (Kolbas, 2001, p.138).  
A canon deconstructs itself, or at least it is replete with possibilities that undermine its cult 
image (Caputo, 1997, p.10). For Derrida, the canon should not be consecrated, preserved, or 
copied; rather, it should be picked apart and stripped of its totalizing tendency. To read the 
canon is to locate the “tensions, contradictions, and the heterogeneity” within the body of 
work (Derrida in Caputo, 1997, p.9). Consequently, it has to be opened up to “new works, 
new objects, new fields, new culture, new language,” as well as fresh tensions and aporias 
(Derrida in Caputo, 1997, p.11). A canon anticipates its subversion, or to become different 
from what it purports. It is then best to heed Derrida’s counsel that a canon is an aporia; it 
does not guarantee anything as it opens itself up to the “hospitality of a difference from itself 
or of a difference with itself” (Derrida, 1993, p.10).  
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I do not intend to register an aversion to postcolonial theories, even the “canonized” ones. I 
acknowledge the cogency of various critiques that invigorated postcolonial studies, and the 
discussions in the following chapters will bear this out. The point is the so-called postcolonial 
canon cannot fully account for emerging knowledge, approaches, and critiques, and there are 
aspects in culture that do not figure in postcolonial theorizing. One of them is the relationship 
between technology and representation that bears on the media through which texts are 
imparted. The textual approach in postcolonial theories generally delved into the text as an 
interpretive strategy, and not on the very condition of the text, to include its technicization and 
the interfaces through which it is conveyed. I maintain that the text, per se, cannot be a stable 
object of postcolonial inquiry nor it should alone define the limits of the analysis. Text is 
produced out of specific historical conditions, but which cannot be fully apprehended without 
the mediation of technology that re-presents writing, or inscription, and discloses the power 
underlying social institutions and relations. Thus, textual analysis has to consider the 
technological analysis of writing that includes the condition that provides the text with its 
indeterminacy and possibility.  
This study offers another way of thinking about postcolonialism through a critique of 
representation, which is instantiated among technologies of representation that are termed 
“new media technologies.” The latter are mechanisms, or interfaces, of representation where 
one can read off the differential rhythm of a postcolonial society. New media technologies 
exhibit the consequences of some larger cultural processes that, in turn, also illustrate the 
transformation in society. The Philippines, which is the context of this study, exemplifies the 
concept of uneven development, which names a social formation that has several modes of 
production existing simultaneously (Sison and De Lima, 1998, p.25). This unevenness 
manifests the absence of accretive growth of capitalism, backwardness of agriculture, and the 
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dominance of money capital accumulated from speculative rather than industrial and 
manufacturing activity (San Juan, 1999, p.3-5). In this growth pattern, colonialism, which 
inserted capitalism into the indigenous modes of production, is implicated in the particular 
development of forces of production, social relations, and structures of power. The cultural 
expressions and practices of these material conditions are so syncretic, ambivalent, and 
multiplicitous that they are best understood in relation to the history of their emergence, 
differentiation, and imbrication (San Juan, 1999, p.200-201). New media technologies have 
developed alongside cultural, economic, and political transformations since colonial times, 
where possibilities of change have been rife, given the shifts, regressions and advances of 
social conditions that gave rise to new subjectivities and effects. New media technologies are 
vehicles of formal and aesthetic representation; they also mediate representation to conform to 
their technical convention and interpretative resources. New media technologies’ contribution 
to social transformation lies in their articulation of persistent demands of subalterns and in 
precipitating or sustaining a public sphere, even under conditions of extreme inequality. This 
study looks at their social, economic, and political effects in the Philippines. 
The effects of new media technologies emerged from the process of representation, which 
concerns rendering presence of something that is absent. In Spectres of Marx, Derrida 
assigned to new media technologies the capacity to construct virtualities, which name other 
modes of representing reality (Derrida, 1994, p.212). Representation presupposes 
technologies that make something absent appear to be present. Representational technologies 
provide new ways of overcoming time and space as well as storing and retrieving memory so 
that the process of representation becomes illimitable. Their effects, for instance, manifest 
modification and multiplication of representation, or its possibility of being repeated infinitely 
(Derrida and Stiegler, 2002, p.115). The effects of new media technologies are called spectres 
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(Beardsworth, 1996, p.147). Spectres are not reducible to either human or technical 
intervention because they express the relation of humans to technology, or the process of 
technicization. The latter refers to the technological mediation of meaning making, where 
meaning is part of the process of constructing a collective memory (Stiegler, 1998, p.10-13; 
Beardsworth, 1996, p.147). Given their effects, new media technologies allow representation 
to realize its possibilities.  
Derrida’s engagement with “spectres” is probably his most controversial work, not only for 
his exegesis of a Marxian problematic but also how he deconstructed Marx’s work in order to 
make it more flexible, timely, and prescient (Jameson, 2010, p.127).  In Spectres of Marx, 
Derrida extended the boundaries of Marx’s spectral theme, to include the return of the dead, 
capitalism’s capacity to conjure up the means of alienation, and globalization as the time of 
unbounded speed, connection, and reification. Across these themes, spectres proliferated in 
aporias where they disrupt the existing order, be it text, technology, tendencies, and thinking, 
and provide a space for rethinking this order. Spectres are also traces of representation that is 
being repressed and effaced. This is where the element of justice can be seen as a possibility 
inherent in spectres. They are a challenge to the idea of presence in representation because 
they disturb the established dominance that sets the hierarchy of value and commensurability 
(Derrida and Stiegler, 2002, p.132-133). I contend that the force of spectres lies in how they 
extend the boundaries of thought into the unknown, as the turn to the phenomenon of spectres 
involves seeing the unforeseeable within the calculable and the apparent.  
I am interested in spectres as effects of new media technologies, especially their role in 
political transformation in the Philippines. This indicates my years of engagement with new 
media technologies as a journalist who has witnessed and written about social change, but had 
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never explored what the stories illustrate about the transformation of the Philippines. My 
study aims to think critically about spectres as possibilities of new media technologies in a 
postcolonial context, which refers to the period and problems brought by colonialism and its 
aftermath. My account of spectres goes hand in hand with the examination of new media 
technologies that can be apprehended in many forms throughout history – the beginnings of 
print media, the emergence of electronic broadcasting, and up until the rise of the Internet. As 
instruments of colonization and elite domination, new media technologies transmitted 
representations that glorified the colonizers’ culture and role of the native ruling elite in the 
Philippines. These imaginaries not only fix the limits of representation, they also sustained the 
asymmetrical relations of power, by the way they mobilized symbols that induced fear, awe, 
and alienation (Wayne, 2003, p.174). On the other hand, it is also true that new media 
technologies are mechanisms through which subalterns discovered the emancipatory potential 
of spectres. Spectres are instantiated in political and aesthetic practices, while the technical 
modes of representation have made their infinite iteration possible. Spectres destabilize the 
logic of technological rationality and seriality inherent in capitalist production: with the 
disruptive potential of spectres, the functions of new media technologies exceed hegemonic 
agendas and provide a space for their subversion. 
My examination of new media technologies informs an approach to a wider exploration of 
historical modes of modernization. The possibilities for theorizing are plentiful, but current 
media scholars have cautioned that many theories have struggled to keep pace with the speed 
of technological growth and that they have ended up less critical than intended (Lovink, 2011, 
p.77). At present, new media technologies are assigned under Web 2.0, a periodization 
characterized by the profusion of user-friendly, socially interactive, and self-broadcasting 
computer interfaces, partly aided by avant-garde designs, a range of applications, and the 
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rapid spread of high-frequency wireless (wi-fi) signal (Lovink, 2011, p.5). Given the pace of 
the development in digital technologies, attempts at theorizing have the tendency to play 
catch-up while the suppositions, which tend to be positivist and linear in their approaches, are 
bereft of “critical-theoretical capacities” (Dean, 2010, p.2). The remedy, it was suggested, is 
not to match the momentum of technologies as they speed toward obsolescence, but to opt for 
a “slow-down,” and the use of critical concepts that can “migrate from one generation of 
applications to the next” (Dean, 2010 p.3; Lovink, 2011, p.7). A slightly different approach 
was offered by new media theorist Lev Manovich when he argues that each stage in the 
history of technology has its own research paradigm that includes aesthetic opportunities and 
goals. The challenge is to highlight the paradigm’s distinctiveness and relevance when it is 
combined with other paradigms (Manovich, 2001, p.8).  
I believe that apprehending new media technologies in a postcolonial context, using spectres 
as a framework of analysis, offers a fuller understanding of their role in the economic and 
political logic of globalization. The ways that spectres relate to history should be seen in a 
continuum that Derrida termed as the “living present.” The latter attends to the “immediacy of 
(the) present moment,” but negotiates with “life and afterlife,” as one indivisible whole 
(Derrida and Stiegler, 2002, p.51). This suggests that spectres provide a transhistorical way of 
discovering and constructing narratives that brings disparate elements of immediate 
experience to bear on the existing whole. New media technologies embody a particular 
expression of power, and it is in this light that they must be understood, and not merely for 
their ubiquity or instrumentality. This perspective is the basis of my account of the potential 
of new media technologies to undermine established knowledge and practices, and enable 
new ways of perceiving reality.  
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Another way of using spectres to analyze the effects of representation is seeing them as a 
metaphor that discloses a relation of language with reality (Derrida, 1974, p.5). Metaphors, 
according to Derrida, are “trope(s) of resemblance,” that presuppose continuity and do not 
signify congruence, but a “notion of wear and tear of language” (Derrida, 1974, p. 13). The 
latter means that metaphors bring mutations, breaks, and detours that operate by 
simultaneously adding to and diminishing the cachet of a term. Derrida regarded metaphors as 
supplements that negotiate sufficiency and deficiency with the subject, hence the process can 
never be closed because it anticipates the instability of the idiom (Derrida, 1974, p.18). 
However, despite the freedom in positing association, Derrida argues that metaphors are not 
“imaginative or rhetorical ornament(s)” because they articulate philosophical truths (Derrida, 
1974, p.23). The strength of spectres as a metaphor lies in the way they act as an analogue to 
the process of transformation. The metaphor introduces something new but, at the same time, 
it bends back to itself to reflect on what could be refashioned from what exists, which are the 
possibilities for truth.  
I have used concepts in the preceding exposition that need more elucidation: these are 
“spectres,” “representation,” and “new media technologies.” Given their importance to my 
thesis, I will say a little more about them here. I will not supply normative definitions, rather 
this short discussion foregrounds the complexity and nuances of their meanings.  Spectres are 
effects of new media technologies; they are also the articulation of an ethical demand within a 
particular space and time. The logic of spectres exceeds the opposition between being visible 
and invisible, rationality and irrationality; spectres are absent but they register traces whose 
absences are marked in advance (Derrida and Stiegler, 2002, p.117). Neither dead nor living, 
present nor absent, but at once both, spectres register presence that is never sufficient, stable 
and absolute. Spectres defy the logic of technological rationalization because they solicit 
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differentiation and alterity. Representation shares the logic of spectres in two domains – 
formal and aesthetic – and it expresses the spectres’ capacity to shape discourses and activate 
agency (Derrida, 2007, p.98). Formal representation also means direct representation, which 
denotes a presence that stands in for oneself or someone. This form of representation is often 
in its political sense, as in being voted to public office, as a representative of a constituency, 
or participating in the public sphere. On the other hand, central to the aesthetic, or symbolic, 
notion of representation is how social identity is constituted, which is to say that it is as 
political as direct representation. Mechanisms of representation, such as new media 
technologies, crucially configure discourses, naturalize ideologies, and help to formulate 
identities. Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism, as a construction of the exotic “other,” is an 
example of such identity-forming representation that is alienating and dominating in its 
depiction of a reality (Webb, 2009, p.113-114). But in both formal and symbolic mode of 
representation, there is a common idea of return or repetition (Derrida, 2007, p.106). 
Representation allows the possibility of re-presenting or returning to render presence. This 
implies that presence is also absence because the latter can have virtual presence. Given the 
diversity of the modes of representation, there could be no single way to bring a presence or 
absence to affect a reality, and any attempt to posit a dominant presence simultaneously 
invites its subversion (Derrida, 2009, p.106-107).  New media technologies are mechanisms of 
representation that intensify the logic of spectrality. Technologies solicit spectrality because 
their effects counterpose doubts, ephemerality, and instability against the dominant discourse. 
Another way of apprehending spectres in new media technologies is to look at how they have 
extended representation by repetition, which involves the process of transmission. The latter 
may happen in “real time,” which often means the transmission of an event as it happens. 
However, mediation defers instantaneity even if the time lapse is reduced considerably 
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(Derrida and Stiegler, 2002, p,129-130). This means that deferrals and delays exist in a 
technologically mediated representation, and this technicization is what inscribes upon an 
event a memory that anticipates iteration (Derrida and Stiegler, 2002, p.129). The interval 
between repetition and deferral generates effects with unforeseeable consequences, while the 
acceleration of the process of re-presentation multiplies presence-absence. This is how 
spectres work in new media technologies; which is also to say that new media technologies 
have made it possible for us, the living, to exist with ghosts.  
The concept of “new media technologies” itself needs a little more explanation. The phrase 
“new media” often refers to digital technology as differentiated from obsolescent analogue 
technology, while “technologies” designates an assemblage of techniques with social uses. 
“New media” is often the preferred term for digital and Internet-based applications, while 
“technologies,” or “technology” acquires modifiers like “digital” and “tele” to convey their 
material constitution as machines or devices. Lisa Gitelman wrote that the term “media” 
presupposes the use of technologies while appending “new” to “media” to signify digitization 
seems like erasing the past and the representational function of the media (Gitelman, 2006, 
p.4-5). For Gitelman, new media is “never entirely revolutionary” as the term does not signify 
epistemic breaks but how media are embedded in society (Gitelman, 2006, p.6). Gitelman’s 
arguments resonate with Carolyn Marvin’s; the latter notes that “new technologies is a 
historically relative term” (Marvin, 1988, location 23, e-book). In her book, When Old 
Technologies Were New, Marvin considers “new media” as a rhetorical proposition to signal 
that the preceding media or technologies are to be challenged, technologically and 
discursively, by the emerging ones, in relation to the novelty, change and progress that they 
precipitate (Marvin, 1988, location 31, e-book). In his survey of the history of the term “new 
media,” Benjamin Peters said the latter has to be understood beyond digital technologies 
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because media are renewable and combinable (Peters, 2009, p.13, 22). Corollary to that, 
Bernard Stiegler argues that a technology is “ancient,” and could not be a product of a 
singular epoch, because it embodies the specificities and reproducibility of the antecedent 
technological innovation (Stiegler, 2002, p.155-160). Drawing on their arguments, I contend 
that the composite term “new media technologies” can thus sufficiently express the social and 
technological aporia of each term, their place in history, technical constitution, 
representational function, and spectral possibilities. 
My work is an intervention in postcolonial theorizing through a radical critique of new media 
technologies. In the following chapters, I will provide the account of the political effects and 
possibilities of new media technologies in the Philippines. Chapter One constructs a 
genealogy of spectres, showing how spectres are configured in the theories of Marx, 
Habermas, Adorno, and Derrida. Of interest here is how these theories seek the possibility of 
agency, independence, and transformation through spectres – of class, difference, culture, and 
so forth – that emerged from the regime of capital. Chapter Two analyzes the relationship 
between technology and culture through spectres as the effects of techno-representation. I will 
argue that spectres arise as destabilizing impulses from within the resources of political 
hegemony, and they open up possibilities of resistance that are multiplied by the networks of 
new media technologies. Chapter Two offers an analytical framework to foreground the 
examination of new media technologies as interfaces of representation that have contradictory 
resonances and unforeseeable consequences. Chapter Three examines colonialism as a 
solicitation of spectres that haunted the subsequent historical periods, social relations, and 
representations. Colonialism brought the beginnings of capitalism to the Philippines, along 
with the rationality and arrangements of power that justify the economic system. Colonialism, 
conjoined with capitalism, has profound effects on the representations, imaginations, and 
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bodies, to this day. Chapter Four is about postcolonialism, both as a historical period and 
matrix in which to understand the possibilities of new media technologies after the nominal 
termination of colonial rule. This chapter foreshadows Chapter Five, in which I offer an 
account of how an authoritarian regime uses new media technologies to justify its rule as the 
route to modernization. Chapter Six juxtaposes globalization and neo-liberal regimes with the 
growth of new media technologies. It examines the possibilities of new media technologies, in 
the era of networked communication and globalized markets, and in the light of Derrida’s 
deconstructive politics of spectres.  
Finally, let me make one concluding comment on postcolonial canon that opened this piece. 
For a canon to maintain the hegemonic position, it has to continually adapt to the shifts of 
circumstances, taking in new ideas and bringing them closer to its interest and the agenda it is 
aligned with (Wayne, 2003, p.178). It is for this reason that a canon has to be rendered 
hospitable to the “other,” and also undermined as a canon, in order to provoke other thoughts 
and possibilities for the emergence of other canons.  
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CHAPTER 1                                                                                                             
SURVEYING THE SPECTRES IN THE POSTCOLONIAL TERRAIN 
Introduction: The Subaltern’s Right to Theory 
Instead of an anecdote, a quotation, or paradox, I will begin with a ‘disclosure’ that explains 
my discursive stance and the use of some European theories to render my position. In other 
words, I will give an account of the way I speak and write as a postcolonial subject, and this 
includes declaring my intentions. Do I wish to settle a score, redress a wrong, or bring back 
the phantoms of the colonial past? And, above all, speaking as a subaltern (with apologies to 
Spivak), do I have the right to theory?  
These questions are not rhetorical; they are issues that have pre-occupied postcolonial studies. 
In the latter, one does not only attend to the economic and cultural realities of colonialism and 
its aftermath, one also locates a speaking position in relation to such realities -- a move that 
bestows on postcolonial writing some kind of academic glamour. Not really. It is akin to 
being asked to stand trial for radical action, or an impassioned belief, when defining one’s 
politics using the provenance of Western theories. I believe that the same dilemma was 
farthest from the colonizers’ mind when they appropriated knowledge and other discursive 
resources of the colonized for imperial ends.  They acted as if they have an exclusive power to 
inventory and describe reality in the colonies (Boehmer, 2005, p.15-16). This system of 
defining a reality was termed Orientalism by Edward Said; it is also the title of his book, 
which is regarded as the seminal text in postcolonial studies, and a model of ‘writing-back,’ 
that stakes out a politics of resistance (Ashcroft et al., 1989).  
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In his introduction to Orientalism, Said underscores the “personal investment” in the 
interrogation of European views, by quoting (and amending) the Italian Marxist Antonio 
Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks: “The starting point of critical elaboration is the consciousness 
of what one really is, and in “knowing thyself” as a product of the historical process to date, 
which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, . . . therefore it is imperative at the outset to 
compile such inventory,” (Gramsci quoted in Said, 1978, p.25, amended line in italics). Said’s 
notion of the “personal dimension” in theorizing Orientalism also speaks to postcolonial 
theory, where it is paradigmatic and formative. Through Gramsci’s words, Said 
acknowledged how Orientalism is overdetermined by the historical processes and social 
formations that it has given rise to. Said’s mention of “infinite traces” implies an erasure 
while the call for their inventory suggests that Orientalism is not a metaphysical but historical 
structure. To transpose Said’s argument to postcolonial theorising is to say that theorising 
should not only look at the colonial traces in the present, or confine the narrative to the 
hegemonic intentions of colonizers, but also include the struggles that eroded their hegemony. 
It is from this position that I claim my right to postcolonial theory, for even if aspects of the 
colonial experience that I drew from have been forgotten or foreclosed by Eurocentric 
historiography and theories, their traces can be conjured up and included as resources for re-
presentation and honing one’s subjectivity.  
Postcolonialism is not an excuse; it is a tool to foreground understanding of a form of 
colonization that continues long after a direct foreign rule has ended. Postcolonialism needs 
no apologies for illuminating political questions. As the “discourse of the colonized,” 
postcolonialism ranged beyond a designated colonial period and looks at the enduring forms 
of colonial oppression and anti-colonial struggles (Ashcroft, 2001, p.12-13). An engagement 
with a particular history does not make postcolonialism exclusive, or less relevant in the 
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larger context, anymore than a sweep of histories makes the analysis encompassing. In other 
words, the abundance of theoretical resources offers a diversity of approaches, such that no 
ideological position or canon should appropriate postcolonial discourses. One has to simply 
concede that within postcolonialism are unknown areas and untapped resources for theorizing 
that are as numerous as the known ones, if not more so. However, even more important is the 
idea that appropriation of Western theories does not mean complicity, but an act of 
transgression. 
The interrogation of postcolonialism, as a discourse and a range of material conditions, 
provides the matrix in which to understand the possibilities of new media technologies in the 
Philippines. The experience of colonialism, which inserted capitalism into pre-colonial modes 
of production, is a ghost that haunts the modern-day social relations and political practices in 
of Philippine society. Throughout history, these relations and practices have undergone 
changes, but the latter are unimaginable without the presence of new media technologies. The 
latter can foreground the change that the colonized could imagine.  Think, for example, of 
books, newspapers, and the Internet as spaces of free expression and resistance. Thus, what 
orients my inquiry is this question: What are the possibilities of new media technologies 
within a postcolonial social formation? There are also two supplementary questions: What is 
the logic of technology that supplies new capacities for political transformation in a 
postcolonial society? Given the transformative orientation of postcolonialism, and the 
emancipatory potential of new media technologies, what role do they play in political 
change? The aim of this study is to examine the political possibilities of new media 
technologies in the context of the Philippines. It attempts to document their development and 
provide a theory of their effects. It will also highlight the emancipatory potentials of these 
technologies to become, what Ithiel de Sola Pool termed “technologies of freedom.” The term 
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does not connote the instrumentation but the transformation of technologies that are subjected 
to control when authorities sensed the onset of change (Pool, 1983, p.14). 
Thinking about new media technologies in a postcolonial context is a novel approach to 
postcolonialism. New media technologies are inextricably linked with the conditions of 
postcoloniality, both as tools of domination and weapons of anti-colonial resistance. They 
also offered ways in which anti-colonial sentiments were expressed, and it was through their 
different genres and modes of representation that the struggles were inscribed, understood, 
and sustained. The development of new media technologies can be tracked throughout 
history, particularly how they transformed a colony like the Philippines.  Capitalism started 
out in the era of primitive accumulation marked by plunder, exaction of tributes, and long 
distance commerce that deprived the colonized of whatever little surplus from subsistence 
modes of production (San Juan, 1999; Abbinnett, 2006; Constantino, 1975). The production 
of crops for export to the industrial centres of Europe allowed feudalism’s integration into the 
capitalist mode of production, and this arrangement sealed the Philippines’s fate as peripheral 
to the growth of industrial and financial capital in Europe and United States. From this 
process of accumulation, social hierarchies were created out of the predominantly indigenous 
stratification system, built upon symbolic ties and custodial authority over communal lands. 
Class also draws on the racist ideology of the colonizers, who transplanted the notion of racial 
superiority over colonial subjects, by some physiognomic criteria, not the least of which was 
skin color. This differentiation participated in reifying economic and social relations. Racism 
is conjoined with the construction of classes in colonial society, but what makes this 
particular interplay of class and race revelatory is that it opened up the experience of 
“labouring bodies,” where abstract labour – especially the kind which relies on the affect -- is 
neither solely defined by economics nor by physiognomy, but both (Gibson-Graham et. al, 
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2000, p.1-2). In other words, thinking about the colonial “other” in the Philippines brings 
complexity into concepts of class and race that anticipate their neoliberal configuration.  
The so-called decolonization provided some relief to the most inhumane forms of economic, 
class and racial oppression because of formal freedoms allowed by post-independence ruling 
elites. About the same time, the cultural dominance that colonialism engendered had 
intensified, with the culture industry providing capitalism with the virtual space to expand by 
conjuring fantasies and desires, in order to stimulate commodity consumption. In the time of 
the accelerated expansion of capitalism (also called globalization), class domination, racism 
and resistance retained their cohesion although they are slowly being dissolved into other 
domains like culture and technology, to be disguised or aestheticized. Globalization has been 
inflected by a postcolonial discourse that bears on practices and meanings in all spheres of the 
social, but especially on the technological sphere. The omnipresence of the discourse makes 
globalization a virtual space where anti-colonial spectres are summoned. The solicitation of 
spectres is an articulation of the demand for justice in a postcolonial society. Spectres are 
effects of the iteration of such a demand in which new media technologies are presupposed, 
affirming the unconditional demand for justice that subalterns would like to attain. 
The preceding discussion of Marxist categories foregrounds the deconstructive turn of 
postcolonialism as the anti-colonial critique that opens up concepts to contestation in order to 
intensify their spectral effects. The engagement between postcolonialism and deconstruction 
enriches both fields, contrary to what Marxist critics have said that it neutralizes the agency of 
the colonized (McLeod, 2007, p.161). Deconstruction, which is associated with Derrida’s 
work, demonstrates how seemingly inconsequential things, such as the trace, supplement, or 
spectre, could challenge interpretation because, as protoconstructs, they account for 
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conditions of possibility and impossibility in discourse (Gasche, 1986, p.154). They constitute 
the irreducible heterogeneity in concepts, and are behind the emergence of differences, 
aporias, and ambiguities in discourses. In deconstruction, a preeminent presence (hegemony) 
is possible because of exclusions, and this implies that difference, or the “other,” is 
constitutive of an inscribed beginning. Racism, class, exchange value, as well as other reified 
and undifferentiated categories are opened up by deconstruction in two ways: first, it reveals 
the binaries where one category subsumes and dominates another; and second, it brings to 
light the trace or spectre that is disruptive of that relationship (Spitzer, 2011, p.xviii; Gasche, 
1986, p. 192). Not only does deconstruction reveal the Manichean logic of colonial thinking, 
it also undermines the foundation of such logic by exposing its fragility. Thus, the kind of 
postcolonial critique that deconstruction offers goes beyond the negation of reified categories. 
By exposing the reification of categories, deconstruction hopes to provide a space to rethink 
them in a new way. In all, the conceptual tools of postcolonial critique gesture toward the 
realization of seemingly inconceivable justice for the “other” (Spivak, 1999, p.7).  
The preceding arguments intend to create a space for deconstruction and Marxism as an 
approach to thinking about postcolonialism. The two strands of postcolonial thinking are not 
meant for fusion, but they can interpenetrate each other and allow the co-mingling of their 
aporias, in the same way as true adversaries gauge each other’s strength and weakness.  
Marxism has supplied the major issues – imperialism, capitalism racism, and so forth -- which 
shaped postcolonial studies and which one cannot simply disavow (Bartolovich, 1999, p.3). 
Deconstruction also worked with similar issues in postcolonial studies, not so much as a 
counterpoint to Marxist systematization of preeminent categories, but in another stream that 
potentially could become a ‘supplement,’ to nuance the analysis. The engagement with both 
linked two forms of politics – difference and identity with equality and social justice. This 
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means rounding out Marxist critique with what deconstruction has to offer, and using Marxist 
analysis to question essentialism in cultural theory (McLeod, 2007, p.186-187; Parry, 2004, 
p.26; Bartolovich, 2002, p.10-11).  Meanwhile, let us turn to the question on Eurocentricism, 
with some postcolonial theorists raising the issue against Marxists, and the latter also accusing 
the former of favoring texts produced in the West and elevating them as canons of 
postcolonial literature (McLeod, 2007, p.187). The exchange, according to Crystal 
Bartolovich, betrays the unequal relationships between the centers, which are the main 
producers of knowledge, and their satellites. The imbalance is the result of a disproportionate 
production of knowledge that is entangled with issues like access, standards, and exclusions 
(Bartolovich, 2001, p.12). As a solution, Bartolovich suggests that cultural works should be 
referenced for their specificity that also includes the conditions of their production and 
circulation (Bartolovich, 2002, p.14; italics by Bartolovich). To attend to the ‘specificity’ of a 
theory, therefore, is to be aware of the inequality underlying the act of theorizing, thus it is 
necessary to be conscious of the asymmetries that emerged when using concepts whose 
genesis is essentially Western. 
Asymmetries are conditions that solicit spectres. For this reason, colonialism and 
postcolonialism, as time and conditions for the emergence of asymmetries, which are 
considered the matrices of spectres. One of the aims of colonial conquest is to eliminate 
primitive irrationality and superstition that are incompatible with the ‘rational’ European 
mind. For example, the insertion of capitalism and, to some extent, monotheistic religion, 
aimed to cast the supernatural out of the consciousness of colonial subjects. Postcolonialism is 
also the time for haunting and schemes to deny the spectres their power and corporeal 
presence. The notion that spectres haunt the living is a way of saying there are events and 
thoughts that are persistent enough to suggest a redress of the forms of inequality.  It also 
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suggests that colonialism and post-independence consolidation have failed to eliminate their 
own ghosts, and that the latter returned to intrude into the living world as the disembodied 
“other.” Conjuring the spectres connotes the possibility of their multiplication and the ability 
to disturb the presumed harmonious and self-evident configurations of global capitalism.  
So, what are spectres and where do they come from? What accounts for their transformative 
power? It is in the question of the spectres’ ontology that Derrida brings deconstruction to 
bear upon. In Spectres of Marx, ontology is almost the homonym of hauntology, which is the 
logic of haunting, or the economy in which the spectres operate (Derrida, 1994, p.10). Central 
to ontology, as a philosophical system, is the identity of being that provides the ground or 
foundation of thought but, in Derrida’s terms, ontology is not confined to material and 
physical domains because it can be apprehended in “temporal dilemmas” (Jameson, 2010, 
p.141).  Ontology answers the question ‘what exists,’ but for Derrida, the answer must yield a 
full range of possibilities, such that the spectres’ ontology is paradoxical because it is both 
spirit and “becoming-body,” “neither soul nor body, and both and the other” (Derrida, 1994, 
p.5). Fredric Jameson has remarked that you don’t have to believe in ghosts to be convinced 
of the existence of spectres, and, instead of contemplating their “density and solidity,” it is 
better to think of what they represent and account for -- aporia, differences, and contradictions 
in a discourse or some forms of presence (Jameson, 2010, p.142). Spectres inhere in 
ontological constructs and concepts; they are detected as effects when they disturb order, 
command, or code. 
Spectres supply the sense of the metaphor that they convey (Beardsworth, 1996, p.1; Gasche, 
1986, p.128; Derrida, 1994, p. 79,94). A metaphor has revelatory elements that suggest the 
narrative sense and form. Thus, spectres, as a narrative device, constitute an economy of 
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engagement, judgment, and promise that opens up meanings to new structures of thought and 
experience. Derrida’s reading of Marx’s spectres’ demonstrates how deconstruction 
intervenes in Marxist’s text that Jameson termed “provocation” because it shakes the 
foundation of Marxism and, as Michael Sprinker notes, challenges it to “come to terms with 
its own past, politically and theoretically . . .” (Jameson, 1999, p.26; Sprinker, 1999, p.2). I 
will not restage the debates on Derrida’s spectres’ here. Instead, I will offer a reading of 
spectres as an intervention in postcolonial theorizing. In the latter, spectres provide a chance 
for “democracy to-come,” which, for Derrida, represents a promise that is being worked out in 
the present, against the seeming remoteness of its realization. My engagement with spectres is 
a contribution to postcolonial debates, in which Marxism and deconstruction have the centre 
stage but I will also include other theorists – Jurgen Habermas and Theodor Adorno, whose 
work figured less in postcolonial studies but have also exhibited exemplifications of spectres.  
In the survey of theories that follows, I will provide a genealogy of spectres. A genealogy is 
an account of a phenomenon but also includes the context that overdetermined the 
phenomenon’s beginnings and consequences (Jameson, 2010, p.434). The retelling is not 
rendered chronologically but in a manner that includes historical events, disjunctures, and 
their concealed modes of representation. This approach to genealogy, I believe, can reveal the 
anterior states that resist effacement in the history of the Philippines: centuries of colonial 
rule, decades of post-independence nation building, authoritarian rule, and the emergence of 
neoliberal regimes. All these regimes solicit spectres.  From the works of Marx, Jurgen 
Habermas, Theodor Adorno, and Derrida, I will appraise the ontology of these spectres. Two 
things are at work here: first, the account will explain the spectres’ occurrence or presence, 
and second, it will expound the connection between their presence and the political 
possibilities that they foreshadow in the Philippines. The possibilities will cover the 
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technologically mediated modes in which the spectres undertake their haunting that, in the 
light of an emancipatory politics, includes uncovering transformative impulses, promises, and 
demands. 
1.1    The Spectres of Marx 
Although the spectre is a dramatic opener in The Communist Manifesto, the first place to seek 
it is in the first volume of Marx’s Capital, where the spectre is insinuated as “effaced 
sensuousness” in the theory of commodity form (Marx, 1976, p.128). However, throughout 
his writings, Marx liberally turned to spectres as metaphors to describe the aporias that 
emerged with capitalism as well as to examine the ideological figurations through which it 
represented itself as freedom (Erickson, 2009, p.124). At the outset, two things should be 
noted in this discussion of Marx’s spectres: first, its presence, and second, its usefulness as a 
concept to dissect the logic of capital. Marx’s spectre is embodied in the commodity, in a 
manner that is phantasmagoric or mysterious as when the commodity goes through the 
process of abstraction, substitution, and equivalence (Marx, 1976, p.164-165). Marx notes 
that the value of a commodity is expressed as a representation of its exchangeability, in 
relation to other commodities (Marx, 1976, p.152). This means that value posits an idea of 
equivalence or exchangeability among incommensurable things or entities that puts them in a 
relation of mutual definition (Marx, 1976, p.128). Marx also introduced the terms ‘use value’ 
and ‘exchange value’ to demonstrate how capitalism operates as social relations that 
delineates value. Use value, which is associated with beneficial use, conveys the qualitative 
worth of a thing in relation to society’s needs and wants (Harvey, 1999, p.5). However, use 
value is immediately disavowed because the product of labour has to abandon its relative 
heterogeneity and takes a form that realizes the logic of the market (Marx, 1976, p.165-166; 
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Ryan, 1982, p.97). In this sense, the determining mediation of the market, which is governed 
by equivalence expressed in money, extinguishes use value in the consideration of a 
commodity. On the other hand, exchange value, which is a representation of human labour in 
a commodity, particularly the necessary labour time to produce a commodity, reflects the 
intervention of forces in society to privilege equivalence over relative differences. Thus, 
instead of being a relation between labour and commodity, exchange value becomes a relation 
of commodity and market with the mediation of money as the measure of value (Marx, 1976, 
p.94). In other words, the exchange of commodities concealed human labour and social 
relations that had created them (Marx, 1976, p.75-76). To sum up, the effacement of use value 
eclipses the tangible worth of a commodity while the mediation of the market, which sets 
exchange value, masks the causal agency of labour power and social relations. Simply put, the 
circulation of capital creates new forms of mastery, determination, and further alienation. 
The thing-like relations that Marx called ‘commodity fetishism,’ exemplify the condition in 
which social relations appear as ‘objectified’ because the labour power of individuals is 
disclaimed (Marx, 1976, p.165). In this condition, where the commodity is tied up with 
process, or history, and social relations, Marx was showing the way in which a thing, or its 
representation, can be disavowed, distorted or embraced. The disavowal, as Adorno would 
argue later, is not due to compulsion but the process of dissolution of singularities, within a 
particular system of thought, a state that he designates as reification (Rose, 1978, p.44). On 
the other hand, acceptance may also be partial and contingent. The importance of recalling the 
notion of commodity fetishism is this: it reveals the essence of the commodity-form as a 
system of representation, and also suggests a specificity in which this representation is made 
possible (Marx, 1976, p. 166; Mocnik, 1999, p.118). Put differently, value arises from a 
socially mediated system of exchange, which has the totalizing criteria of association, 
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equivalence, and parity. Value arises from the obfuscation and displacement of some 
elements, not so much to conceal them as to render them inconsequential and determinable. 
The switch from use value to exchange value also stands for a “misrepresentation of reality” 
that reduces elements to become mere shadows of their presence (Erickson, 2009, p.136). 
This brings the second sense of understanding the spectre as a metaphor, which designates the 
opacity of commodity-form, and inflects the symbolic systems, institutions, and social 
relations that mediate it. 
Another place to apprehend Marx’s spectres’ is in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte, where he uses the spectre as a metaphor to draw insights from ideological 
constructions of the turbulent period in France between 1848 and 1851. Just after the opening 
paragraph, Marx provides a paradigm of spectres that runs through his rumination; it is worth 
quoting in length to show the spectres’ semantic sway and their logic of iteration:  
 “Men make their own history, but not of their own free will, not 
under circumstances they themselves have chosen but under the given 
and inherited circumstance with which they are directly confronted. The 
tradition of the dead generations weighs like nightmare on the minds of 
the living. And, just when they appear to be engaged in the 
revolutionary transformation of themselves and their material 
surroundings, in the creation of something which does not yet exist, 
precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they timidly conjure up 
the spirits of the past to help them; they borrow their names, slogans 
and costumes so as to stage new world-historical scene in this venerable 
disguise and borrowed language” (Marx, 2006, p.8, e-book). 
The text brings out two elements that put the spectral metaphor to work:  first, the spectre is 
omnipresent in history and can be thought of as legacy; second, it can be summoned to bear 
on the present through unforeseeable forms that arise out of the repetition of events (Erickson, 
2009, p.127-128). The repetition does not mean duplication but an iteration of underlying 
contingencies as implied in the Eighteenth Brumaire’s opening paragraph -- “the first time as 
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tragedy, the second time as farce” (Marx, 2006, p.8, e-book). The line shows that the spectres, 
as effects of repetition, enabled the unmasking of the ideological sophistry that Marx 
identified. Representation, in its formal and positive sense, insinuates the presence of spectres 
in two ways: first, representation is a delegation of presence as shown in how a representative 
stands in and speaks on behalf of individuals, and second, representation also claims to repeat 
something that has to be present, like a voice of the will of a collectivity, that conveys the 
symbolic force of images and texts to register absence and presence (Webb, 2009, p.88; 
Thomassen, 2006, page 116). Marx’s arguments would admit that social relations involved 
exclusions and violence to the “other,” which is presupposed in the relation, is an exercise of 
power with spectral consequences. By the latter, I mean the logic of substitution that 
undermines, erases, and neutralizes presence, hence hegemonic representation is a “farce” 
because it misrepresents, as what Louis Bonaparte’s dictatorial rule exemplifies (Erickson, 
2009, p.128; Webb, 2009, p.91). The spectre, in this case, is oriented in several directions – in 
one sense, summoned as a legacy by those in power to provide a mantle of legitimacy to their 
political agenda, and, in another sense, conjured up by those who repudiate the hegemonic 
representation, and who consider spectres as having the potential of creating radical spaces in 
seemingly impossible conditions. This is what Marx meant when he said the revolutions are 
not a “parody (of) the old (ones)” but the “resurrection of the dead (that) served to exalt the 
new struggles . . .” (Marx, 2006, p.8, e-book). Instead of being deployed as ideological tools 
of the ruling class, spectres have the capacity to provoke the thinking of possibilities that, 
despite the erasure of an actual presence through formal representation, bring some kind of 
restored presence and possibilities.  
The other places to locate Marx’s spectres are the three instances where commodity 
production gestures toward ideological domination. The first condition emerges in the process 
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of surplus value accumulation through a process of transforming money into commodities, 
and then to money again (M-C-M). Money is a material representation of value, which has to 
be expanded limitlessly through production of commodities that yield more money, or surplus 
value (Marx, 1976, p.250-257). Surplus value arises from surplus labour, or the process of 
subjecting workers to work beyond the labour time necessary to produce their means of 
subsistence (Marx, 1976, p.344). This is an inescapable condition under capitalism that is 
repeated in various ways around the world: workers have to sell their labour power to those 
who own the means of production. This situation underscores an unspoken element of 
alienation; capitalism is interested in labour power, not the labourers per se, but it does not 
mean that it is less interested in shaping labouring bodies according to its logic of 
accumulation. Their bodily desires are roused by commodity consumption that seeks to 
neutralize critical and irrational impulses (Haraway, 1991, p.163; Cherniavsky, 2006, p.xviii).  
The second condition relates to the expansion of exchange and circulation of money capital 
that are crucial to the accumulation and appropriation of surplus value. Marx has shown that 
these pursuits are based on inequality, or the disavowal of certain peoples, classes, and groups 
(Marx, 1976, p.345). Marx cites capitalism’s reliance on these objective but compliant 
conditions for its growth. These conditions could take the forms of state or organizations of 
power, distinct patterns of production and consumption, social relations, culture, or ideology. 
Altogether, they comprise a distinct social formation with a mode of capitalist production 
partly constituted by old but agreeable production patterns and social relations. Instead of 
supplanting it, capitalism may retain the old mode of production because it could yield more 
surplus value, given its exploitative relations of production (Marx, 1976, p.873-876). 
However, while the superimposition of the capitalist mode of accumulation transforms the 
mode of production to a certain extent, capitalism also disavows the recalcitrant elements that 
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defy subsumption. They are revealed as sediments of the past that disturb the classic goals of 
surplus accumulation as well as traces available to subaltern representation. 
What emerges now is the variegated process of accumulation that, in the words of Marx, 
thrives in a “particular historical social formation, which simply takes the form of a thing and 
gives this thing a specific social character” (Marx, 1981, p.953). However, more than a 
system of production, capitalism is also a social relation that calibrates its movement 
according to circumstances that favour its continued expansion. Marx made similar, but 
tentative, arguments on his account of colonization in the first volume of Capital and in his 
pieces to the New York Tribune (Marx, 1976, p.931; 2007, p.213). Colonization, in Marx’s 
time, was accomplished through primitive accumulation to extract surplus value from 
agriculture in the colonies, where labour power was freely available for expropriation by the 
colonial administration, which also sanctioned its exploitation by private capitalists (Marx, 
1976, p.940; 2007, p.224). Primitive accumulation became the matrix for creating the 
“material basis” of capitalism in the colony that re-enacted the logic of accumulation and 
appropriation of surplus values in the colonizer’s country (Marx, 1976, p.875). Marx’s 
accounts of British rule in India, and his compressed chapter on colonialism in the first 
volume of Capital, imparted an idea that the capitalist mode of production is inseparable from 
the political forces that accompany it, or from the confluence of historical, economic, cultural, 
and political factors that are also shaped by repression, hegemony and resistance, which, 
according to Marx, could be written in “letters of blood and fire” (Marx, 2007, p.225; Marx, 
1976, p.724). Capitalism has advanced in industrial countries but primitive accumulation has 
been a permanent fixture in other countries that have been sources of cheap labour and raw 
materials for capital. The unevenness in the growth of capital provided the means through 
which resources and labour power were exploited for the surplus valued they yield. This 
31 
process of accumulation and appropriation was termed by Marxist geographer David Harvey 
as ‘accumulation by dispossession,” and has supplied insights for postcolonial theorizing. 
Technologies evince the growth of capitalism, and this is the third condition where Marx’s 
spectres can be located. Technology, for Marx, is more than just an assemblage of machines 
and tools, which are termed fixed capital, because it also reveals intangible elements like 
labour power, accretive knowledge, and skills (Marx, 1976, p.493). Technology is integral to 
the process of production and has a dialectical relationship with social relations. With the 
latter, I mean a condition where technology is ascribed with meanings, and shaped by designs 
and uses that emerge from social processes rather than their intrinsic properties as objects. In 
other words, technology is subject to the social, economic, and political context into which it 
emerges, and in which its effects are felt. New media technologies best exemplify how these 
social relations and interventions, in Marx’s sense, are worked through. With representation 
as their primary function, new media technologies are illustrative of conditions arising from 
the cumulative growth of the forces of production, expansion of capitalism and the social 
interactions that shaped and were also shaped by technologies. Representation constitutes 
ideology; it is the process of acquiring meaning within, and beyond, a given particularity.  
Thus images, myths, ideas, for instance, adopt a particular logic and vigor to permeate and 
influence society. In other words, representation has an ideological value; it expresses a will 
or point of view that, within a social relation, is not only instrumental or mirror-like, but also 
constitutive and aporetic.  
The spectres in new media technologies are part of the whole process of displacement, 
repetition and modification that their technical capacities are attuned to, while performing the 
work of representation in political and aesthetic domains. As in political representation, 
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aesthetic representation also operates in the economy of obfuscation, disavowal and aporia 
and is inflected by relations of power. These states, however, can never be fixed because 
representations are subject to being rehearsed and reiterated and are thus capable of 
undermining the dominant ideology. Emancipation, for Marx, is linked to the dissolution of 
the process of accumulation and appropriation of surplus value through the takeover of the 
capitalist means of production. Marx has advocated this stance in the Communist Manifesto 
where he, and Friedrich Engels, sketched the messianic role of the proletariat. However, this 
political project necessarily solicits spectres because, while the transfer of the means of 
production may eliminate alienation, it may not do away with objectification or reification 
that Habermas, Adorno, and Derrida were keen to point out.  Marx did not endow spectres 
with the power to undermine the logic of capitalism; it was the role reserved for the working 
class. However, in deconstruction, this role is also a form of direct and symbolic 
representation. What is germane is Marx’s recognition of the importance of technologies in 
material and symbolic reproduction, in which the notion of value shifts to prefigure a different 
social reality, and through which the logic of iteration brings a chance for change. Which is to 
say that Marx’s spectres will continue their haunting, for as long as the notion of value that is 
tied to exploitative social relations, persists. 
1.2     The Spectres in the Public Sphere 
Referencing Iris Murdoch, Richard J. Bernstein once posed a rhetorical question intended for 
Jurgen Habermas, a question that must be the bane of philosophers: “What is he afraid of?” 
“Irrationalism,” said Berstein, answering his own question (Bernstein, 2006, p.79). Thus, one 
does not expect Habermas to indulge in the metaphorical flourishes like Marx’s account of 
spectres or similar preoccupations – ghosts, spectres, and dancing tables. For Habermas is a 
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philosopher grounded on the particulars of reason. He takes responsibility for the recovery of 
Enlightenment-born rationalism from its descent into instrumental rationality. Habermas 
offers communicative action, a process of interlocution that aims for truth, transparency and 
consensus, in lieu of the hypostatizing language games of metaphors, allegories, and 
metonymies, deployed by those who are out to derail the march of modernity (Habermas, 
1987, p.63). It is not that Habermas is closed to critical dialogues and supplementations with 
other thinkers; it is just that he thinks everyone should agree with him because, after all, who 
doesn’t want to communicate and be understood, or be rational sometimes, if not all the time. 
Consensus, if applied to global politics and events, could have stopped unspeakable horror or 
tragedy (Thomassen, 2006, p.177). However, I will argue that Habermas undermines his own 
rational enterprise because he, too, conjures up spectres, of the Enlightenment for one, and, 
what he feared as signs of irrationality and “undemocracy” are but the unrecognized “other” 
of his thought. 
Habermas set aside Marx’s premises in the domain of production and instead reconstructed 
historical materialism to focus on processes of communication that are oriented toward the 
“truth” that could bind people together (Habermas, 1979). For Habermas, the production and 
distribution of commodities presupposes social interactions that have arrived at 
intersubjective understanding, which is crucial to the development of any society (Habermas, 
1979, p.131-132).   Like his predecessors in Frankfurt school, Habermas believes that the 
growth of forces of production does not lead to the overthrow of capitalism. Instead, the 
profusion of labour skills and technologies results in more complex social organizations and 
communication practices that, for him, allow for a “consensual regulation of 
conflicts”(Habermas, 1987, p.375-376; 1979, p.148-149, 156). To state it differently, he has 
deferred the inevitability of the proletariat’s role as a revolutionary class, and he thinks that 
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Marxism needs a communication theory that provides a way to override rationalization, 
reification, and instrumentalism of productive forces in society (Habermas, 1984, p.144, 362-
365).  
Habermas is better known for his theory of the rise and decline of the public sphere in his 
book The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, but this is more of a prelude to his 
two-volume work, The Theory of Communicative Action. The public sphere, as a 
metaphorical space for democracy and rational will formation, is the more popular theory, and 
has inspired many in societies where exclusions and censorship are a fact. Habermas 
characterized the public sphere as a transhistorical idea of democratic engagement built from 
the demands of the bourgeoisie to enjoy free commerce and unrestrained interaction -- ideals 
that support a liberal order as envisioned in the West (Habermas, 1989, p.27). Initially 
conceived as a spatial metaphor, the public sphere, in Habermas’s later work, became a 
mediated process of interaction among political publics that considered representation and 
legitimation as vital functions of social interaction (Habermas, 1996, p.360). Notwithstanding 
the shifts in the political function of the public sphere, its ideals persist, and the most 
important of them all is that intersubjective understanding is possible even in the most critical 
of discussions. The latter are governed by the norms of human communication that always 
strive toward rational consensus. Through his theory of the public sphere, Habermas made 
explicit the connection between communication as a process of representation, and the goals 
of bourgeois liberal democracy inspired by speech ideals (Thomassen, 2010, p.34). The 
underlying premise of this connection is Habermas’s intention to redeem the promise of the 
Enlightenment -- of progress through the public use of reason -- and then apply it to modern-
day politics, mainly the parliamentary form established in liberal democracies in Europe. 
Against Marx, Habermas does not regard class politics and the economy as having a 
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determining effect on the constitution of the public sphere as a place of linguistic mediation. 
Interaction in the public sphere proceeds from a premise that all are equal; participants can 
find a commonality from among their points of view, experiences, needs and dilemmas, and 
are also capable of sealing agreements. The public sphere draws its relevance from the idea 
that modes of association should be kept open while representations equally need wider 
political response (Habermas, 1989, p.85). Simply put, arguments need to be placed into the 
public realm, if they are to influence or initiate action. By subjecting political and aesthetic 
representation to the norms of public sphere, Habermas hopes to bring ideologies to critical 
evaluation, an exercise of re-appraising the norms and practices that are ingrained in the 
institutions, practices and histories of Western society (Habermas, 1989, p.88). In a clash of 
ideologies, only the force of the better argument wins, and this brings an insight that 
disruptive ideologies would have little chance of undermining existing structures of power. In 
all, Habermas’s theory of the public sphere allows critical theory to consider the unrealized 
potentials of constraint-free communication, based on a premise that everyone can freely 
speak and interact with anyone, which are essential conditions to maintain a “free civil 
society” (Goode, 2005, p.13). 
Habermas’s theory of communicative action shares the democratic matrix of the public 
sphere. However, in the former, he unites rational interaction with a practical intent to 
democratize the conduct of everyday life (Habermas, 1987, p.62). The theory reprises the 
value of reason encouraged by Enlightenment but, this time, it specifies that communicative 
rationality is the only form of reason that could deliver the Enlightenment’s promise of 
progress and emancipation (Habermas, 1987, p.93-96). One essential starting point in 
understanding communicative action is Habermas’s diagnosis of modernity as the motor of 
societal rationalization. The latter refers to the emergence of structures of consciousness to 
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apprehend the development in the realm of production, technology, knowledge, 
administration, and control (Habermas, 1984, p.340). Here, Habermas underscores an aporia 
of modernity: the latter brings rationalization that improves life but rationalization that also 
reduces life to a matter of efficiency and instrumentalism.  However, unlike Horkheimer, who 
believes that rationalization ultimately leads to the loss of meaning and freedom, Habermas 
thinks that instrumental reason holds certain emancipatory potentials when human 
consciousness is no longer controlled by nature, religion, and traditions (Horkheimer, 1974, 
p.6-10, 16-17; Habermas, 1984, p.346-347).  
Habermas regarded reason as having the interpretive capacity to understand the pathologies of 
modernization (Habermas, 1984, p.389-390). The notion of instrumental reason, as the 
percipient logic of modernity, does not necessarily lead to domination because, for Habermas, 
it also gives rise to new forms of self-reflection and rational deliberation. This is because 
reason permits “coming to an understanding,” a normative process of  “mutual convincing,” 
in which the action of participants are coordinated on the basis of motivation by reasons” 
(Habermas, 1984, p.392). For Habermas, the realization of human potentials is not about 
asserting of one’s knowledge and autonomy, but interacting with others to reach an 
understanding and consensus of action. Habermas came up with two structures of 
consciousness, which aid in achieving understanding: cognitive-instrumental rationality and 
communicative rationality. The first one finds its relevance in the sphere of production 
because it deals with knowledge suited to adoption and manipulation of the environment, or 
objective world (Habermas, 1984, p.14-15).  The second one, communicative rationality, is 
process of reaching understanding where participants rely on each other’s competence, 
sincerity and commitment to reach a consensus (Habermas, 1984, p.100-101). In 
communicative action, language is presupposed as a medium for coordinating action 
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(Habermas, 1984, p.94). This turn to language, as central to intersubjective understanding, 
means that not only does language become a vehicle of social cohesion; it also affirms its 
known, intrinsic purpose in communication, that is, making everyday interaction intelligible. 
Language is supposedly an “uncurtailed” medium of representation that users refer to and 
negotiate meanings with, so that it is possible to reach an agreement with others, as what is 
presupposed in every act of communication where Western humanism is the underlying 
thought (Habermas, 1984, p.95).  
Both the public sphere and communicative action stand potentially as realms that solicit 
spectres due to reification that arose from exclusions in the public sphere, and the bracketing 
off of the lifeworld. Criticisms of exclusions in the public sphere are nothing new, and the 
most spirited ones came from women and subalterns (plebeians or non-bourgeois) whose 
presence, numbers and radical politics became an afterthought in the theory of the public 
sphere (Thomassen, 2010, p.53-54; Goode, 2005, p.29-32)). It is one thing that these 
exclusions are rectified by Habermas in his later work on the public sphere; it is another thing 
if, in practice, they are ever removed. Habermas tried to update the public sphere but it even 
became more rule-bound and exclusive. For example, in Between Facts and Norms, 
Habermas came up with the concept of weak and strong publics, the former tied to civil 
society, the latter with the parliament, hence citizens occupy an implicitly secondary position 
(Habermas, 1996, p.371). Thus, Habermas’s bias toward formal rules in the context of liberal 
and constitutional democracy appears to undermine the very ground from where they 
emerged, that is, the ideals of democracy, equality and freedom (Thomassen, 2006, p.55).  
As in the second volume of The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas, in Between 
Facts and Norms, continued to regard popular movements and new media technologies as less 
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of an embodiment of the public sphere because they have the tendency to be ambivalent and 
particularistic in terms of interests and demands (Habermas, 1987, p.389; 1996, p.371). In 
other words, they might have “irrational impulses” (Thomassen, 2006, p.54;). While 
Habermas accommodates popular movements and the media in the web of democratic 
practices, he only grants them an “auxiliary” function because they have to learn how to live 
with the tradition of Western liberal democracy (Thomassen, 2006, p.56; Habermas 1996, 
p.317, 372). And yet in societies where positive freedoms are nearly, if not altogether, absent, 
street parliaments and new media technologies are spaces where the communicative ideals of 
the Enlightenment are instantiated. In other words, Habermas’s distrust of citizen groups’ 
inability to exercise the “public use” of reason undercuts the ideals of the rationality he seeks 
to protect and, hence, implies a certain tyranny of reason. By discounting some movements as 
expressions of democratic practices, Habermas tied democracy to procedures and formal 
structures, thus reifying it. However, this condition solicits a spectral position that could 
radically refashion the Habermasian public sphere. 
Spectral possibilities can be imagined in Habermas’s concept of the lifeworld, which is a 
repository of intersubjectively formed knowledge, practices and attitudes that can be accessed 
linguistically. I will argue that the value of the concept of the lifeworld lies in its spectrality, 
or its potential to articulates traces and impulses of certain recurring and latent demands. 
Habermas’s discussion of the lifeworld, linked to his concept of reification, holds the key to 
the lifeworld’s spectrality. In the final chapter of the first volume of the Theory of 
Communicative Action, Habermas revisited the concept of reification, first, Lukacs’s, and then 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s. Lukacs developed his concept of reification from Marx’s theory of 
value, particularly commodity fetishism, where exchange value supplies universal 
equivalence to a commodity that is objectified and cut off from its natural properties and 
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producers. Reification, to recall Marx’s theory of value, is a condition analogous to 
commodity exchange, where sensuousness disappears, and relationships become objectified 
and thing-like (Marx, 1976, p. 164-165). Lukacs sees the role of rationality in reification, 
which he analyzes as collective alienation derived from instrumental exchange and relations 
that has “ghostly objectivity” which finds expression in consciousness and ways of relating 
with others (Lukacs, 1971, p.100). Although not Lukacs’s intent, Habermas reads reification 
as a pathology of the individual consciousness, such that, in a reified society, individuals 
relate to each other in instrumental fashion, that Habermas construed as “strategic actions 
oriented to their own success” (Habermas, 1984, p.359, 379). Habermas credited Lukacs for 
implying that the reification and rationalization are not synonymous, so that it would be 
possible to infer the effects of reification from politics and culture where instrumental 
rationality operates (Habermas 1984, p.361).  
Habermas argues that reification does not only manifest itself in humanity’s relationship to 
nature, it is also present in the interpretive systems of the lifeworld.  The lifeworld is a 
metaphorical community accessed by a discrete individual; it is a repository of a “culturally 
transmitted” and “linguistically organized stock of knowledge” that is relevant to a particular 
social context (Habermas, 1987, p.124). This stock of pre-interpreted knowledge provides a 
common background and conviction that are “always already familiar” and applicable to the 
everyday communicative practice (Habermas, 1987, p.125). Language and culture are 
important elements of the lifeworld as they facilitate intersubjective understanding. The latter 
is possible when communicating parties raise claims that are open to criticism, verification, 
and resolution of disagreements (Habermas, 1987, p.126). In other words, the presence of the 
lifeworld presupposes mutual understanding, whenever communicating parties use the 
lifeworld to raise objective, social and subjective claims. The lifeworld complements 
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communicative action because the meanings that the lifeworld supplies enable participants to 
come to a consensus (Habermas 1987, p.126-127). It is also through communicative action 
that lifeworld is reproduced (Habermas, 1987, p.133). 
The lifeworld maintains a stock of shared knowledge and normative concessions which resist 
reified economic, administrative and technological necessities. Hence the lifeworld is, in 
itself, becomes a contradictory realm; it incorporates spectral objectivity of use value that 
underlies rationalization but, at the same time, it gestures toward something persistent and 
subversive (Habermas, 1987, p.186). The anxiety over the loss of feelings, traditions, and 
solidarity that enters into the “horizon of experience”, to use Habermas’s words, solicit 
something sedimented in the lifeworld that has an effect on social relations, representations 
and power structures. As rationalization puts technology at the center of modernization, it can 
be argued that the lifeworld, too, assimilates the aporias of technology in the way it represents 
knowledge and meanings. Put differently, the modes of perception and practices that emanate 
from the lifeworld are not to be regarded as purely rational forms. The horizon of experience 
constitutive of the lifeworld, and also the lifeworld itself, manifests the paradoxical 
incarnation of value: on one hand it is associated with strategic and instrumental rationality, 
on the other hand, it holds a promise of renewal, reminiscent of the Enlightenment’s call to 
reason. This suggests that the resources supplied by the lifeworld can also be “irrational” and 
resistive forms of representation.  
In a way, Habermas provides a promise of transformation through the lifeworld, and the same 
could be said in the public sphere, but he held back on their possibilities. He was inclined to 
confine their function within liberal and constitutional democracy conjoined with capitalism. 
He appears to be wary of the effects of reification, “structural violence” for instance that can 
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influence how individuals relate to each other (Habermas, 1987, p.187). This explains his 
introduction of all sorts of ramparts to protect the lifeworld from being “colonized” by money 
and power as evident in the second volume of The Theory of Communicative Action. While 
Habermas’s democratic theory provides analytical resources to examine reification, it is 
without the necessary intensity to mitigate it. Thus, I maintain that the theory of 
communicative action cannot be a truly radical critique of capitalism and its accompanying 
forms of unwarranted authority.  
Applied in the postcolonial condition, the public sphere and communicative action are spaces 
and processes of solicitation of spectres. However as a matrix of possibilities, they have 
limited potentials for emancipation. While their categories, relations and interactions may not 
be ideological justifications of postcolonial domination, neither do they herald progressive 
rationalization for the “irrational” other. Unlike the leeway that Derrida gives to the concept 
of spectrality, by giving it the chance to unconditionally acknowledge “irrational” demands, 
Habermas’s notion of reason is bound to procedures that manifest as discourses that can be 
accepted and admitted (Thomassen, 2010, p.24). While seemingly inclusive, the public sphere 
and communicative action provide little hope for subalterns in societies where civil liberties 
are restrained by regimes that present themselves as democratic and modernizing. However, it 
can be argued that the postcolonial transformation of the public sphere is not the variant of 
modernity that Habermas had in mind, because it is many times removed from the 
rationalization of society that the Enlightenment has aimed for. In other words, the project of 
modernity falters in postcolonial regimes because the actual relations and interchanges in the 
public sphere are not compatible with the classical ideal that Habermas sketched, even in a 
qualified form he offers in his later writings. Moreover, owing to deviations from Western 
democratic tradition and the operation of capitalism, the postcolonial project of modernity 
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cannot be expected to realize its goals because it cannot (and should not) dissolve differences 
and “irrationality.”  In the end, the notion of the public sphere and communicative reason in 
postcolonial societies with less than ideal democracies provoke certain spectres of the 
Enlightenment that animate the forces of radical heterogeneity. 
1.3    The Spectres and the Culture Industry 
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer are known for their “counter-Enlightenment” stance 
and their relentless critique of the universality of ‘reason,’ which is a legacy of the 
Enlightenment, have marked them as those that highlighted the “dark side” of this legacy, and 
its fall (Bernstein, 2006, p.75). For that, they could be considered among those who 
introduced the critique of the Enlightenment as, in the words of one writer, “something of an 
intellectual blood sport” (McMahon, 2001, p.12; 201). The charge is neither fair nor accurate. 
In the opening pages of Dialectic of Enlightenment, one can sense Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
rectitude, such that when they call for the evaluation of the Enlightenment, it was not to reify 
it but to redeem hope (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979, p.xv; Adorno, 1973, p.405). This hope 
is what had been lost in the wake of colonialism, racism, and the Holocaust as well as Gulag, 
Vietnam, and the present-day horrors that were all committed in the name of reason. Thus, I 
consider Adorno and Horkheimer’s work as a solicitation of spectres of the Enlightenment, in 
which certain subversion can be possible, and yet this possibility is entirely left to us to 
recognize.  
In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer outlined the idea of progress as 
regression that emerges from their examination of modernity as a promise of the 
Enlightenment. Their use of the myth of Odysseus, as a semantic strategy, demonstrates how 
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nature and traditions, rendered in myths, are subsumed by reason, which presupposed an 
identity that is dominant, calculable and logocentric. Myth, which consists of beliefs, 
practices, and attitudes, is generally regarded as irrational hence it has to submit to reason. 
However, as the shorthand of reality, myth can also be refashioned to fit to certain codes of 
authority (Taylor and Harris, 2008, p.65). The myth’s representational capacity is 
superimposed into the rational way of thinking, an iteration that unites time and memory to 
conform to a particular articulation. In this context, irrationality, in one form or the other, is 
incompatible with modern thinking because it interrupts its rhythm and disturbs its goals 
(Adorno and Horkheimer, 2010, p.37). The rationalization of myths illustrates hegemonic 
intervention to repress differences, within a binary relation that valorizes one pole over the 
other. On the other hand, the integration of myth and reason expands the field in which reason 
can range, through representations that reflect the nature of myths as ambiguous, oracular, and 
neither true nor false, and it is this condition which necessitates the exercise of moral 
judgment. However, there is a danger that the uncanny conflation of myths with reason can 
result in their becoming the mirror images of each other (Adorno, 1979, p.6). “Myth turns into 
enlightenment, and nature into mere objectivity,” says Adorno, and this schematization of 
domination runs through the length of modernity – which is “the system from which all and 
everything follows” (Adorno, 1979, p.7). In all, the instrumental turn of reason, as 
exemplified by the appropriation of myths, functions to control an individual’s self- identity 
and his, or her, labouring and consuming body (Taylor and Harris, 2008, p.65). The illusory 
narratives, pleasures and choices are bound up with a logic driven to gain from anything with 
exchange value. Thus, propaganda and commodification easily take over, while passivity and 
apathy are the consequences of the effectiveness of instrumental reason. 
44 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s idea of the regression of reason prefigures the presence of spectres 
through the way in which reason feeds upon and subsumes existing narratives and 
representations. They grant that reason was the underlying agent of emancipation, which is 
observable in the development of capitalism, technology, democracy and culture that 
demonstrate the triumph over forces of nature, religion, and fatalism. However the 
instrumentality of reason arises when homogenization successfully eliminates even the 
“partially autonomous spaces” where non-instrumental reason resides (Lunn, 1982, p.161). As 
Adorno notes that the process of substitution and the manipulation of myths inevitably bring 
contradiction: it is possible to imagine “something is itself and at the same time something 
other than itself” (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997, p.15). In other words, while reason fortifies 
itself by subordinating entities to a command, control is untenable in the long run. The 
appropriation of myths is a process that enables modification, repetition and replication that 
could loosen up suppositions and allows the emergence of elements that were unseen or 
banished. Iteration brings out dissonances that defy equivalence and similitude, as Adorno’s 
version of dialectics seeks to show (Adorno, 1973, p.136-137) 
Adorno’s concept of negative dialectics implies the spectrality that inheres in his radical 
thought.  Reason dominates when it performs a figurative operation upon a reality through 
‘identity thinking’ (Adorno, 1973, p.4). The latter occurs in a pairing arrangement between 
the concept and the object, which is also a relation between the universal to particular. To 
identify is to classify, and while this is presumed as devoid of value judgments, Adorno 
would argue otherwise. The problem starts when the concept designates the object but is 
construed as if the concept can sufficiently indicate the object’s properties and presence 
(Adorno, 1973, p.145). With the object’s identity being subsumed by the concept, the object’s 
particularity is effaced; the object merely resembles the concept that it could otherwise 
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contradict (Adorno, 1973, p.141). This is an operation of positing a likeness that makes the 
concept congruent with the object it identifies (Rose, 1978, p.45). For Adorno, identity 
thinking “perpetuates antagonism by suppressing contradiction” – a “violence of equality-
mongering (that) reproduces the contradiction it eliminates” (Adorno, 1973, p.141-142). 
Adorno argues that commensurability is not possible in this operation of equivalence and 
reversibility. In the first place, the concept is so “spent and impoverished” that the only way 
to articulate the condition of the object is to “dilute itself to the point of mere universality” 
(Adorno, 1973, p.138). This conceptual dilution is the function of homogenization that is 
analogous to the process of commodity exchange in Marx’s Capital, where commodity 
fetishism and reification set in and take hold of subjectivities (Adorno, 1973, p.146; Rose, 
1978, p.46).  
Adorno provides a distinct direction for dialectics when he conceptualized “negative 
dialectic.” Dialectic, as a method of analysis, is often seen as a relationship of binaries, 
sometimes resolved as a synthesis of opposites, other times, seen as opposites in identification 
with each other although they can never be in harmony (Warren, 1984, p.50; Jameson, 2010, 
p.3). Dialectic connects an object with a historical process, in a relation that brings out their 
identity, difference and possibilities (Ollman, 2003, p.15). However, in all these instances, the 
categories were accepted as pre-given, sufficient, and within a reciprocal circuit. For Adorno, 
the key issue to dialectics is commensurability, or whether one pole of the opposites can 
sufficiently affirm the other within a relationship that presupposes the other. He argues that 
congruence erases differences and places an object under the control of the identifying 
category. Thus, the “dialectic is obliged to make a final move . . . it must turn even against 
itself” (Adorno, 1973, p.405).  
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The negative dialectics of Adorno falls under what Fredric Jameson calls “the dialectic of 
incommensurables,” which unmasks a posited relationship of likeness to detect or reveal the 
false union of opposites (Jameson, 2010, p.25). Rather than likeness, negative dialectic 
perceives difference, and instead of accommodation, it grants two categories their 
distinctiveness, or that they could separately thrive in heterogeneity (Jameson, 2010, p.25-26). 
Incommensurability and freedom are presupposed in dialectic, or to put it slightly differently, 
that “unlike thought” is “represented in the inmost cell of thought” (Adorno, 1973, p.408). He 
went on to argue that while there is much emphasis on wholeness, “the idea of ‘otherness’ is 
one whose time has come” (Adorno and Horkheimer, 2010, p.65).   
Adorno reprises Marx’s theory of value to show that identity thinking is a parallel movement 
of reification in capitalist production and can also be revealed in social relations and 
structures of thought in society. These structures and relations provide the basis for the 
construction of a reality that strives toward commensurability and a particular rationality that 
seeks to prevail against unpredictability and irrationality (Adorno, 1973, p.23). To recall, 
value is a contingent relation of exchange, in which production and social relations are 
integral to its expression in a commodity. The exchange value in a commodity is expressed in 
the universal money-form, which is a model of how abstract relations present reality. Put 
differently, value is a social relation inscribed in a commodity. When use value is presented as 
the property of a commodity, when in fact it is exchange value that determines its fate as a 
commodity, this is a moment of enforced equivalence, or reification (Marx, 1976, p.166; 
Rose, 1978, p.47). Likewise when exchange value reflects the logic of the market rather than 
labour time expended, equivalence is also imposed. 
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Adorno attributes the totalizing process of identifying and classifying to capitalism, 
implicating it in cycles of production, the alienation of labour, totalitarianism, and the 
domination of technologies of consciousness in the realm of culture. This means that 
capitalism creates conditions of reification that negative dialectics aimed to uncover. Control 
resides in the principle of association, in which the relations between two things become an 
“unfolding of an already existing process,” of equivalence and subsumption. This conjunction 
of value with social relation, according to Adorno, is coincident with other relations of 
exchange, as it can also be appropriated into philosophy, language, art and so forth, where it 
operates on various levels and subjectivities (Adorno, 1973, p.146-147). As a way of thinking, 
reification works through concepts that are posited as self-evident and sufficient to describe a 
reality (Adorno, 1973, 147-148). As a social phenomenon, reification brings a condition 
where social relations are objectified, or having properties that resemble a thing (Adorno, 
1973, p.148). Adorno’s social grounding of the concept of reification, within the theory of 
value, has prevented it from becoming an encompassing concept dependent on psychological 
states (Rose, 1978, p.49).  Not only does it reveal the cultural consequences of the process of 
accumulation and appropriation of surplus value, it also exposes the latent workings of the 
bourgeois ideology that sustains capitalism. Thus, Adorno’s negative dialectic infuses vitality 
into dialectics, and prevents them from falling into a formulaic and positivistic position 
(Lunn, 1982, p.230-234; Warren, 2003, p.146-148). Reification exposes the undersides of 
both social orders, a critique that indicts capitalism’s instrumentalism as well as the 
dogmatism of planned economies. In those contexts, progress is more like a running inventory 
of material growth while crises, which arise from social incongruities and reification, are 
largely ignored. 
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Adorno’s analysis of reification is confined to capitalist relations in the West, and he has not 
acknowledged other forms of reification that are not in accord with such model. The issue at 
hand is how to reconcile Adorno’s work with postcolonial theories so that it can sustain a 
critique beyond the usual appropriation of his epigrams and ingenuous turns of phrase. Two 
postcolonial theorists have championed the cogency of Adorno’s scholarship by working out 
the critical theory’s place among the contemporary postcolonial discourses. Neil Lazarus and 
Keya Ganguly reflected on the basis of conceptual resources that Adorno and Horkheimer 
inaugurated and developed for critical theory. The basis of the latter is Marxism, which 
sustains a critique of capitalism, but for Adorno, along with his colleagues at Frankfurt 
School, Marxism has undeveloped frameworks that have to be teased out (Lazarus, 1999; 
Ganguly, 2004). If postcolonialism has missed out on Adorno’s theories, it is because, 
according to Lazarus, of the trend and trajectory that postcolonial studies have taken, that is, 
dwelling on the “post”-ness and the privileging of textual exegesis over historical materialist 
analysis (Lazarus, 1999, p.9-13). In a more reconciliatory tone, Ganguly suggests revisiting 
critical theory, especially its “political and epistemological commitments” to truth and 
knowledge, whose formulations and interpretative approaches could be made to bear on 
“various discursive productions” (Ganguly, 2004, p.243). He notes the value of Adorno’s 
notion of authenticity, which reckons with the concreteness of history that is relevant to 
colonial and postcolonial theories. Importantly, he underscores the spectrality in Adorno’s 
dialectic (“wherein there are things that have escaped the dialectic”) – that does not consign 
the “unverifiable to non-existence” as positivist theories are wont to be (Ganguly, 2004, 
p.244). This observation resonates with what Adorno said about the import of his theory, 
which lies not so much in order to “clearly see how things have to be changed” but in order to 
“see enough  . . . that change is possible” (Adorno and Horkheimer, 2010, p.60).  
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Adorno and Horkheimer’s work on the rationalization of cultural production and the 
emergence of the culture industry has been well received in anti-colonial studies, where the 
mobilization of the culture industry thesis served the critique of cultural imperialism. The 
term culture industry connotes an ‘economy’ concerned with the production of cultural 
commodities for mass consumption (Adorno, 1991, p.98). While broad enough to encompass 
the many aspects of cultural production, the term, however, becomes more intelligible when 
applied to certain media or technologies where manipulation, commodification, and ubiquity 
predominate. The media that primarily fit the criteria include the news media in print and 
broadcast, entertainment media of television and films, the Internet and digital interfaces, 
mobile telephony, and advertising.  
Instrumental reason is the underlying principle in the production and transmission of 
representation in the culture industry. Its goal is “anti-enlightenment” because it engenders 
disinformation, mass deception, and pretence (Adorno, 1991, p.106). The culture industry 
also manifests reification as it orients its convention toward uniformity, passivity, and 
repression of the incommensurable (Taylor and Harris, 2008, p.69). While it presents choices 
that are the embodiment of freedom, they are but semblances of this free rein. Understood as 
the instrument of class rule and its administration, the culture industry is constitutive of 
hegemony, which propagates technologically mediated representations that pre-empted the 
exercise of critical judgment (Adorno, 1991, 112-113). There are two ways in which the 
administration of the culture industry is exercised: direct control and technological control. 
First, direct control may entail intervention in the production of representation by owners and 
authorities that, depending on their power, resort to explicit or extra-artistic techniques 
(Adorno, 1991, p.102-104). State propaganda is an example of direct kind of intervention, 
while extra-artistic techniques refer to the realm of effects or manipulation of representational 
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techniques and the variation of representation as a result of reiteration. Second, the 
administration of the culture industry can be done through technologies whose design, use, 
and logic are oriented toward instrumental reason. For Adorno and Horkheimer, the logic of 
technology reflects the rationale of domination (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997, p.121). The 
omnipresence of technologies testifies to the prospective rationalization of the culture 
industry. Rationalization means the incorporation of technological forms and codes, while 
technological growth relates to the process of mechanical reproduction and its ideological 
justification (Adorno, 1991, p.101). With rationalization comes technological control, which 
is the process of accumulation and appropriation of representational interfaces. In practical 
terms, this means the inscription of conventions, codes, elements and forms of representations 
as a way of organizing, retrieving and re-presenting information. This includes the 
aggregation of images, sounds and texts into the prevailing techniques and modes of 
reception. Never purely mechanical, this process also allows dominant ideology to be 
naturalized and aestheticized (Adorno, 1991, p.113). The effects are the virtualities, or 
technological impressions, that enable iteration of representations which, for Adorno, deter 
autonomous praxis (Adorno, 1991, p.117, 122). 
To sum up, Adorno provided the theoretical resources for the critical examination of 
technologically mediated representations, locating them in history, particularly the way in 
which rationality and capitalism operate to capture minds and markets. The concepts and 
reflections he offered were forthright and prescient while many of his arguments on the 
culture industry are remarkably attuned to the networked era we are in (Taylor and Harris, 
2008, p.84). Adorno’s negative dialectics are often derided as banishing hope and inflexibly 
pessimistic. However, Fredric Jameson’s reading asserts that negative dialectic, as a 
formulation, has a messianic dimension. Jameson names negative dialectic as a critique of 
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“the linguistic and conceptual untrustworthiness” of identity thinking that has suffused reason 
(Jameson, 2010, p.57). Negative dialectic offers the possibility of experiencing reality in 
concrete terms because it allows the articulation of difference that the “wholistic approach” 
has failed to accomplish (Adorno quoted in Jameson, 2010, p.55). This suggests that the 
emancipating power of reason lies in the inference of the particular out of the universal even 
if the latter tries to attenuate the former. It further suggests that while reification cannot be 
avoided as a consequence of capitalism, a relentless critique, such as negative dialectic, 
provides a way of subverting it.  
Adorno’s negative dialectic, as a process of renouncing a legitimating narrative, prefigures 
deconstruction because it summons certain spectres. In that, Adorno’s negative dialectic 
shares the matrix of deconstruction, anticipating Derrida’s assault on logocentrism, which 
privileges dominant and unifying master narratives that repress differences. It can be said that 
the logic of negative dialectic is de facto deconstruction’s logic. However, it was Derrida who 
articulated the spectres of Adorno, especially in the culture industry, in which the “other” is 
always already inscribed within a reified relationship, disrupting the presuppositions that the 
pairing seeks to engender. Derrida also argues that while reification strives to eliminate 
differences, the exclusions set the stage for spectres or traces to return and unsettle the 
structures of reason, such that the myths rationalized by the Enlightenment return as 
phantoms. Adorno seems to have alluded to this deconstructive gesture in the closing lines of 
his brief exposition on the theory of ghost: “Only the conscious horror of destruction creates 
the correct relationship with the dead: unity with them because we, like them, are victims of 
the same condition and the same disappointed hope” (Adorno, 1997, p.215). 
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1.4    Spectres and the Chance of Justice  
In Spectres of Marx, Derrida underscores Marx’s fascination with ghosts and spirits that 
stalked his assumptions and exemplifications in Capital. However, in Derrida’s hands, Marx’s 
specters are parodied, multiplied, concretized, and sent to haunt in all directions. Jameson 
says Derrida’s Spectres was a “provocation,” which does more than nudge those who have 
forgotten Marx’s legacy in the wake of the collapse of grand ideologies, the aggressiveness of 
globalizing capitalism, and pervasiveness of new media technologies (Jameson, 2010, p.127). 
In a sense, Jameson was saying that Derrida’s purpose, in conjuring spectres, is entirely 
serious rather than ironic. However in lieu of a requiem, Derrida launched a discursive soiree. 
Hamlet is the curtain raiser in Derrida’s Spectres of Marx; the ghost of Hamlet’s father that 
returns to demand the settlement of an unfinished business, provides an analogy to Derrida’s 
reading of Marx, and the structure for conjuring a certain politics that could speak to the 
present (Derrida, 1994, p.1-3). The ghostly apparition in Shakespeare’s Hamlet is a fitting 
metaphor for the deconstructive logic of presence-absence and life-death, in which both 
function as a theme (spectrality) and the process of textual intervention (Jameson, 2010, 
p.128; Davis, 2007, p.8-11) 
With Derrida, Marx’s spectre functions as a metaphor that describes the dissimulation of 
capital, to become a “thing” that can simultaneously be invisible and visible, absent and 
present, or a spirit and “having a body” (Derrida, 1994, p.55). Analogous to how Marx sees 
money as essentially a piece of paper with value, Derrida’s reference to spectre as a “thing” is 
a sleight of hand that bestows upon the spectre its specificity. This is a deconstructive gesture 
that alludes to the importance of a context on which ethical responsibility can be established; 
it avoids the epistemological ploy of “impossibility of the subject” that postmodern theories 
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sometimes resorted to (Toth, 2010, p.3). First, the spectre is a spirit because it exists as a trace 
or remainder of something from the past (Derrida, 1994, p.5). By his definition, Derrida 
introduced an aporia into the logic of spectrality, a dual function of haunting and re-presenting 
that suggest repetition. The latter testifies to the possibility of a spirit coming back, time and 
again. The logic of haunting is marked by repetition, which is singular at any time, not a 
duplication, but providing a recognizable copy nonetheless (Derrida, 1994, p.10, 11). It is also 
an iteration that is disjointed, producing some heterogeneous effects. Spectres are the effects 
of the acts of conjuring that disrupt space and matter. These effects have the ability to modify 
a reality, even at a distance or in absentia, for example a Twitter feed that broadcasts an event 
as it unfolds, an operation that I will discuss later. Iteration provides spectres a new lease of 
life just when they, like Marxism for instance, are considered absent, dead or anachronistic 
(Derrida, 1994, p.39, 42). With repetition bringing “something other” to the picture, spectres 
add a new capability by allowing the transformation of a reality. For Derrida, repetition can 
neither exhaust the memory it is drawing from, nor the heterogeneity that it enables. Thus, the 
future can never be determined in advance because “the future to come and the coming back 
of the spectre” guarantees nothing (Derrida, 1994, p.46). But, at the same time, we could 
never think of the future without thinking the prior necessity of spectres.  
Second, spectres undergo a degree of visibility and materialization through technologies of 
representation, which is also termed new media technologies. The spectres were reincarnated 
as the effects of new media technologies, in which they register varying and destablizing 
effects on politics, culture and the technologies themselves (Derrida, 1994, p.66). New media 
technologies circumscribe the spectres’ presence, manifest simulation, transmission, and 
reception. Presence is perceived through certain kinds of texts – images, visual, sound, and 
anything that can be taken as having the conditions of text – that function as instrument of 
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power and control to manipulate representation across space and time. But, for Derrida, 
presence can never be self-sufficient or primordial because it also brought instances of 
disjunction, difference and deferral. Thus, spectres’ presence is never partial nor absolute; by 
differentiating and delaying something, it delivers unknowable outcomes. It has effects on 
reality, through amplification, alteration of motion, and compression of space and distance. 
The effects not only altered the aura, or the relation to space, in fact, they eliminated aura 
when they overcame the space and time dimension altogether. The effects of new media 
technologies emerged with the development of science and technology, whose design and 
function may be geared toward accumulation and appropriation of surplus value as well as 
communicating hegemony. This is evident in the technology of the printing press and the 
Internet that both illustrate the growth of new media technologies. For example, book printing 
allows reproduction and circulation of a singular text, thus allowing the interposition over a 
tangible object and relation, whereas books in digital formats are electronic impulses that 
emitted texts that are rapidly transmitted, virtually stored, and manipulated. The mutability of 
both formats permits various responses as to their effects that are possible within the epoch 
they are in. However, what is salient here is the fact that technology, which made spectrality 
possible, has disrupted the reality of the book form. However, despite the delineation of 
spectres as spirit and non-spirit, they are actually both and, in fact, exceed all depictions 
because a possibility always exists to cast doubt on the presumed completeness and unity of a 
moment or a supposition. 
Spectres have to be elaborated within the context of Derrida’s deconstructive politics.  In Of 
Grammatology, Derrida lays down the principles and politics of deconstruction, which can be 
broadly thought as a critique and a way of sensing reality (Spivak, 1997, p.xiii). 
Deconstruction is a critique of metaphysics, which works within the universal and self-
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evident grounds of identity, presence, and history (Spivak, 1997, p. xvii- xviii, xxi). The 
conceptual resources of metaphysics include conveying reality through the use of binaries, 
where one category is presumed to be superior and prior to the other, while the second, 
inferior term, stands as a threat to first term that represents stability, harmony, and 
primordiality. But, for Derrida, the taken-for-granted binaries and prior origins are, in fact, 
strategies of effacing and repressing the secondary term that it is deemed absent and “other.” 
Thus, deconstruction’s task is to redress that wrong, by exposing the pairing as a relation of 
domination, in which the second term is taken as inferior whenever supplementation and 
differentiation have to be presupposed in this relationship. A supplement adds itself to make a 
concept complete; it enriches presence (Derrida, 1997, p.144). However, at the same time that 
it posits a lack, it also voids a relationship of mutual signification that is “destined to 
reconcile” (Derrida, 1997, p.145). Difference, which is differance in Derrida’s neologism, 
roughly means dissimilarity and delay, hence providing a simultaneous sense of forbidding 
and yielding. As Derrida says: “Differance produces what it forbids, makes possible the very 
thing that it makes impossible”(Derrida, 1997, p.143). Differentiation is an effect that disrupts 
presence, or, in other words, differentiation is constitutive of presence, where presence 
translates to a thought, being, or truth that also reconfigures difference in the process (Ryan, 
1982, p.15). Deconstruction functions to insinuate an absence and marginality in relations and 
suppositions, which are considered complete and unalterable. The anxiety over primordiality, 
which deconstruction exposes, reflects a profound truth: that the particular hierarchy and 
identity, upon which presence is grounded, are themselves plastic. This argument finds 
relevance in the colonial conquest in the Philippines, for instance, where racial classification 
was a social construction arbitrarily fashioned out of visible markers, an argument I will 
expound in Chapter Three. Racism informs stratification, classes, politics and cultural 
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representations. However, the elements from which race is constructed, exceed the concept of 
race that they signify thus putting its meaning in doubt. The reiteration of the unstable concept 
implies the possibility that inflected meanings could emerge from a serial articulation. In 
other words, Derrida’s deconstruction seeks to bring out the aleatory movement he wanted us 
to see in synthetic concepts, categories, politics, and relationships, like race.  
Derrida relates deconstruction to the unprecedented and accelerated development of 
technologies in Spectres of Marx (Derrida, 1994, p.67). Technologies become the 
universalizing, rationalizing media but, at the same time, they also constitute what Stiegler 
describes as “objective, factual deconstruction” (Stiegler, 2001, p. 238). Derrida termed this 
the “new speed of apparition” where the reiteration of the “simulacrum, the synthetic or 
prosthetic image and the virtual event” reconfigures the social (Derrida, 1994, p.67). The 
acceleration of the accumulation and the appropriation of these synthetic representations in no 
way discount the possibility of contradicting the reality they staged because, according to 
Derrida, there can be no possible coherent meaning or understanding inscribed in the process 
of a technological iteration (Derrida, 1994, p.72). The technological effects, or spectres, of 
this articulation echo a promise that can be made or broken, fulfilled or forgotten, pledged or 
renounced, which, in either way, all presage newness or re-orientation (Derrida, 1994, p.92). 
Simply put, technologies supply the conditions of reification and emancipation – in which 
possibilities are reproduced whenever technologies intervene in a reality, or upon a 
technological reality/virtuality. 
At one point in Spectres of Marx, Derrida argues for the pluralities of spectral effects, not for 
stylistic effects but to underscore the logic of commodity-form that permeated not only the 
economy, but also the states, laws, culture, the public spheres, and private lives (Derrida, 
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1994, p.73). This explains his preference for the plural “spectres,” which draws attention to 
numerous, unforeseeable and iterable effects that exceed binary or dialectical logic. For 
Derrida, the effects of simulacra, the ghosts, ideologies and prosthetic images “materialized 
themselves in novel means and forms” made possible by modern technology (Derrida, 1994, 
p.94). That is why, he adds, while certain spectres are attributable to Marx, they are not 
entirely his heritage because his version was only “faithful to a certain spirit of Marxism” 
whereas spectres, in their repetition, summon other kindred evocations (Derrida, 1994, p.95). 
The synthetic or prosthetic effects enabled by technologies, which Derrida pointed out in 
Spectres, can be seen in two sensory levels: first, on the technological appearance or 
simulation, and second, on technologies’ impact upon society or reception. On simulation, 
one has to be reminded how new media technologies, that function as mechanisms of 
representation, have played a part in the development of visual images destined for 
technological reproduction. From the manual creation of visual images to algorithm-generated 
images, the changes afforded different ways of simulating a reality – for instance, think of an 
actual painting as against its digital version that are visually similar but of different material 
composition. The level of reception to an automated intervention can vary because the digital 
image, for example, can be subjected to all sorts of modification and manipulation. The same 
logic of iteration can also be seen in other modes of representation – texts, sound, and moving 
images. At present, there are numerous ways in which consumption of representation 
manifests as new media technologies simulate not just images but also actions, sound and the 
capacity to grow, react, feel and think – activities that lie within the sphere of human 
behaviour and mental states. The range of technological interventions includes alteration of 
images to the use of prostheses, in which technologies become parts or components of human 
bodies, as Donna Harraway’s notion of the cyborg evokes (Harraway, 1991). The point of the 
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preceding discussion is simply this: the possibilities of new media technologies affect the way 
in which meanings are constructed, testifying to the power of spectres to reconfigure a 
representation of reality for redefinition. As Derrida says, “a technical development suspends 
or calls into question a situation which is previously deemed stable,” and this condition brings 
anxiety and doubt upon the social (Derrida and Stiegler, 2002, p.149). 
What is at stake in this condition of uncertainties is democracy, which Derrida sees as a 
promise arising from conditions that deny it – inequality, displacement, and exclusion 
(Derrida, 1994, p.81). As a promise, it is meant to summon itself to fulfill an injunction 
known in advance, an event that is to-come but whose form is amorphous. In Spectres, 
Derrida linked the concept of democracy to a messianic experience, to which hospitality 
without reserve, or the unconditional opening up to the otherness of the other, is inextricably 
linked (Derrida, 1994, p.81-82). Democracy is not a fixed ideal, not an end-goal, but a 
prefigurative event. In his closing words of The Politics of Friendship, Derrida gives an 
elegant but aporetic definition of democracy to-come: “. . . not only will it remain indefinitely 
perfectible, hence always insufficient and future, but, belonging to the time of the promise, it 
will always remain, in each of its future time, to come: even when there is democracy, it never 
exists, it is never present, it remains the theme of a non-presentable concept” (Derrida, 1997, 
p.306). From the quotation, one detects an aporia that emerges from the contradictory 
demands of democracy to-come: it is a promise but at the same time it is an unfolding reality; 
it is anticipated and yet it is happening in the present. It is what Derrida describes as 
messianism, to mean that the “condition of possibility of the event is also its condition of 
impossibility” (Derrida, 1994, p.82; author’s italics). In Faith and Knowledge, messianism 
becomes “messianicity without messianism,” which names a promise linked to a desire for 
justice, an ethical demand that attends to a persistent call of opening up to “the possibility of 
59 
the other” (Derrida, 2002, p.56; Derrida, 1994, p.92). Democracy, in this sense, is not an 
ideal, not a political program, or an end-goal that postcolonial nation-building was aiming for. 
It is more of a process of installing justice where the decision of everyone, regardless of 
differences, matters. Justice guides the process of democratization that inspires every act of 
instituting democracy, and yet it is the infinitude of this justice which renders every act 
inadequate to the concept of democracy (Derrida, 2002, p.57). 
New media technologies are indispensable in the constitution of democracy to-come, where 
justice is always due, if not long overdue. Summoning the demand for justice is effectively 
accomplished by the iterative capacity of these technologies. They also inscribe the 
“possibility of the reference to the ‘other’,” which means acknowledging the latter’s 
unconditional alterity that has to be attended to, if democracy, as a responsibility, is fulfilled 
(Derrida, 1994, p.94). The mediation of new media technologies brings uncertainties to 
democracy because representation is an appropriation that always exceeds what is 
presupposed, prescribed and enforced. In other words, as the link between democracy and 
justice is established by new media technologies, democracy to-come becomes a struggle for 
the realization of justice. Much of the memory of inequality has been collected and stored in 
technological systems of inscription, and so the return of spectres is a way of recalling a 
promise to be heard and viewed in a new light. 
Overall, Derrida’s reformulation of Marx’s spectres does not offer any qualified prospects for 
emancipation – no structures, no rules for discourse, and none of those goals of 
communication to orient action and act as supports for undemocratic practices. What Derrida 
offered are the possibilities of deconstruction. Deconstruction is an essential process of 
illumination and actualizing a future; it pays attention to the inconsequential, the irrational, 
60 
and the “other” that the structures of thought and power have ignored for so long. It solicits 
resistance that is creative enough to fulfill its own potential out of the available mediating 
mechanisms for cognition and representation. Thus, as it supplies new vistas for freedom, 
deconstruction then offers the chance for subalterns to resist their subjection. 
Conclusion 
I opened this chapter with a discussion on postcolonial theorizing. I have also constructed a 
genealogy of spectres, in the theories of Marx, Habermas, Adorno, and Derrida, to elucidate 
their ontology and the aporias that they bring. Aporia means the way in which spectres are 
oriented to fulfill a promise of the future that is worked out within constricting structures of 
thought and power. That said, I will return to the issue I raised, that is, my right to theory as a 
postcolonial subject. In writing the genealogy of spectres, I have joined those who found their 
voices by engaging with transgressive Western theories. However, rather than seeing it as a 
kind of writing that departs from a tradition, it seems more like retracing one’s steps, where 
writing is a return journey that trespasses on everybody else’s field – the theories and their 
theorists, along with their acolytes and enemies. Along the way, writing has crisscrossed 
epistemological paths, located history, and traversed territories. In the closing pages of 
Beginnings, Said acknowledges the radical writings that shaped his own and highlights its 
spectrality when he notes: “Writing is an act of taking hold of language (prende la parole) in 
order to do something, not merely in order to repeat an idea verbatim” (Said, 1975, p.378). 
For Said, it is not just any writing but an “aggressive sense of writing,” the kind that take(s) 
the floor, to occupy the foreground” (Said, 1975, p.379). Put in another way, writing is both 
mutation and subversion of meanings, and, for Derrida, this “rupture of symmetry must 
propagate its effects in the entire chain of discourse” (Derrida, 1978, p.344). Writing and, by 
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extension, taking hold of postcolonial discourse, are acts of serial subversion. Therefore, 
postcolonial theorizing, as a way of “writing-back,” necessarily appropriates a tradition or 
language, in the same way that it could stand apart from a language or tradition of which it is 
a part, in order to open up possibilities for itself and for “others” (Said, 1975, p.380).  
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                                                                                                        CHAPTER  2 
DEMOCRATIC POSSIBILITIES OF NEW MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES 
IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
Introduction 
The genealogy of spectres, in the previous chapter, suggests an approach to understanding a 
postcolonial society in which new media technologies are coeval to its development. The 
theories threw light on the concept of spectres, as effects of new media technologies, and also 
suggested the ways that they can be perceived, incarnated, and assigned a role in history. The 
context of the narrative is the Philippines, which experienced more than three centuries of 
colonization and, to date, some six decades of post-independence rule. Since colonial times, 
new media technologies, as mechanisms of representation, played ambivalent roles in the 
political scene, and yet, at certain moments in history, they have been regarded as 
emancipatory because they helped install democracy, even in the most unfavourable of 
conditions. This chapter extends the genealogical work in Chapter One, by examining theories 
of the relationship between technology and politics, particularly the effects of techno-
representation on society. It also explores theories that foreground the distinctive function of 
new media technologies as mechanisms of representation. 
The relationship between technology and culture has been extensively debated, particularly 
the latter’s ability to sustain its independence from media-techno-scientific organization of 
modern society (Street, 1992; Barney, 2000; Dean, 2009; Feenberg, 2010; Lovink, 2011). For 
Marx, technologies are forces of production that embody not only the material activity of a 
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society but also its prevailing consciousness, including the ideas and representations that 
make up culture (Marx, 1976, p.492). Technologies comprise machinery, human labour, 
knowledge, and skills, but they are also shaped by social relations that crystallize around the 
notion of class (Marx, 1976, p. 493, footnote 4). Thinking about class is to stress its influence 
upon social agency, or the way in which its consciousness has shaped reality according to 
particular interests (Wayne, 2003, p.10).  Class, along with its concomitant power in society, 
is a crucial dynamic that is key to the ambivalent effects of technological innovation. It is also 
where academic debates converge to interrogate the extent to which technology has affirmed 
or undermined its connection with the social relations of capital (Wayne, 2003, p.39). This 
suggests that technologies participate in the construction of a consciousness that they 
constitute.  
My aim in this chapter is to come up with a framework to analyze the effects of new media 
technologies. I will argue that new media technologies offer ways of understanding a 
particular society in relation to how capitalism has developed. New media technologies relate 
to the process of rationalization or, more specifically, the reconfiguration of the interaction 
between machines and humans. They directly impact on culture due to their communicative 
role in the production and transmission of texts, images, and sounds. Walter Benjamin’s 
famous essay, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” is a roadmap in 
theorising new media technologies in a culture that is, as Derrida says, always “in 
representation” (Derrida, 2007, p.96). Not only does Benjamin look at the shifts in the 
function of art, he also considers its effects on time, space, audience, and politics (Benjamin, 
1968).  Benjamin’s notion of “aura” is essentially a spatial and temporal relation, but it is also 
necessarily political. Auratic art expresses a “unique phenomenon of a distance,” but this is 
also undermined by technologies of mass reproduction that are inseparable from the logic of 
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capitalism, which enforces mass uniformity and equivalence (Benjamin, 1968, p.222-223). In 
his account of photography, Benjamin showed the way to analyze a composite medium, with 
its medley of genres and effects, and without losing sight of the specificities and history that 
instantiate it (Hansen, 2004, p.1; Benjamin, 1968, p.225-228). Benjamin’s influence extends 
throughout the terms and categories of my analysis, particularly his account of the 
transformation of the image, the messianic potential of mass culture, and the contingency of 
technological effects. 
My use of the term “new” in new media technologies connotes newness as a historical 
artefact, not a fundamental reality; it designates the characteristic renewability of the media 
that digital technology shares with all forms of representation. For example, writing, along 
with the conditions of its possibility, can never be “old” because it is presupposed in all acts 
of inscription:  human expressions, ideas, and technologies of representation. In relation to 
Benjamin’s thoughts, Peters said: “In the beginning, media was new. History came only later” 
(Peters, 2009, p.26). The word “media” is generally linked to “mass media,” with a presumed 
“publicness,” because the media place arguments and representations in the public sphere. 
However, this sense of “mass” as being public and transparent should be enlarged, to reflect 
other forms of “publicness.” The term media also presupposes technical mediation, which 
conveys modification, alteration, and repetition to bring a plenitude that signifies accessibility 
and ubiquity. This suggests that mediation is a process that is both technological and cultural. 
Lastly, the term “technologies,” in its plural form, defines a set of artefacts and practices that 
humans produce according to certain plans and goals (Feenberg, 2005; Marx, 1976). As 
emblems of modernity, technologies are assumed to be instrumental, as a result of the 
commingling of science and capital that both share the logic of rationalization and 
objectification (Heidegger, 1997, p.25-30; Marx, 1976, p.497, 505-506). For Adorno and 
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Horkheimer, technologies represent the reduction of reason to instrumentalism, leading to a 
state of reification, while Habermas confines a technologically useful knowledge within the 
process of production, thus separating it from moral-practical consciousness in the realm of 
human interaction (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979 p.120-121, 131; Habermas, 1979, p.147-
148).   
Common to the work of Marx, Heidegger, Habermas, Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse,  is 
the idea that technologies have presence, which means that machines have material 
constitution, are overdetermined, and have determining effects on society, and thus are 
capable of producing new forms of consciousness and practices (Marx, 1976; Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 1979; Habermas, 1979; Heidegger, 1977; Marcuse, 1964). In other words, the 
presence embodied by new media technologies conveys a rationality infused with the idea of 
self-identity, self-continuity, and the self-sufficiency of existence. Presence is at the heart of 
metaphysics; the latter is a system of thinking that builds concepts around an ideal, in an 
opposition to a subordinate and secondary “other,” that carries the burden of being inferior, 
lowly, and subsidiary (Derrida, 1997, p. 101-102; Derrida in Ryan, 1982, p.10). Derrida, as I 
have said, contends that presence exercises domination by positing superiority thus 
suppressing difference. However, it is also through presence that difference is solicited and 
presence is subverted. Thus, if technologies are set in the contexts of politics and democracy 
in society, they establish a presence that is a condition of possibility, becoming at once the 
force of domination and the matrix of new forms of political expression.  
Technologies and society reference each other, not in a relation of opposition but one of 
infinitely constitutive solicitation. First, the relationship determines their concrete 
manifestation, or being empirical, and second, it brings the possibility of transcendence. As 
66 
mentioned, the term “new media technologies,” is a composite concept but its effects cannot 
be subject to synthesis or stipulative definition that might diminish the lexical and conceptual 
value of either term.  Instead of fixing the meaning, the tension of the combined terms should 
be allowed to surface.  In other words the irreducibility of the concept—to political, technical, 
discursive, and social imperatives -- has to be recognized in any account of new media 
technologies in society. The tension is called aporia, which refers to a concept or condition 
overdetermined by language and social practices (Derrida, 1993, p.7). In Aporia, Derrida 
designates “aporia” as “untranslatable sentence” experiencing an “unstable multiplicity” 
(Derrida, 1993, p.9).  Given this semantic seriality, the aporia designates what is not identical, 
or “other,” to itself, and “always exceeds meaning and the pure discursivity of meaning” as it 
opens itself up to the “hospitality of difference from itself or of a difference with itself” 
(Derrida, 1993, p.10). Meanings, as concepts, hint at tension or dilemma, but the thought that 
the same meanings also reorient the concepts is crucial, as this is a condition of traversal and 
transgression of borders and demarcations (Derrida, 1993, p.14-15). Aporia is a way of 
thinking about the political, while its impossibility is a condition of political judgment 
(Beardsworth, 2006, p.4). An aporia interrupts and suspends rules, practices, and discourses 
of hierarchical order so that a new decision may take place (Wortham, 2010, p.14). What 
makes translatability in aporia difficult is the condition of responsibility and decision that is 
required. To be responsible is to follow the rules but to decide, as a matter of duty, is to break 
the rules, or to be without rules (Derrida, 1993, p.17). Thus, an aporia in the discourse of 
technology at once sets the limit and undermines such a limit, leading to a condition that 
precipitates political judgment (Beardsworth, 1996, p.xiv; Street, 1992, p.9).  
There are several aporias that can be thought about in the relationship between technology 
and culture in the Philippines that will be highlighted in the following chapters. The first 
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aporia has to do with negotiating the complexity and specificity of technologically mediated 
representations within the context of the totalizing axioms of communicative democracy. The 
tension exists in the public sphere that imposes the criteria of rationality among the 
interlocutors, and this is likely to exclude those considered “irrational.” The second aporia 
resides in the forces of production that set the course of transforming society. Within a 
postcolonial context, this refers to the project of modernization with a promise of progress but 
having deleterious and reifying consequences arising from a particular deployment of 
technology, political power, and the exploitation of human labour. The third aporia is about 
the global dimension of this exploitation and reification, which reflects the hierarchies and 
power differentials of countries within a capitalist order. There is a danger that 
cosmopolitanism and the discourse of global village, with their promise of connectivity, will 
supply exploitation, immiseration and commodification of subordinate cultures. The question 
now is this: why is the relationship between culture and technology aporetic? 
In his interpretative work on deconstruction and technology, Bernard Stiegler contends that 
human societies are founded on the constitutive instability of the relationship between 
technologies and culture (Stiegler, 1998). In Technics and Time 1, Stiegler argues that culture, 
as the mediation of human experience, is radically transformed by mediatic technology that 
alters the experience of time and space. The heart of technology is technicization, which is a 
process that enables the abstraction, calculation, and proliferation of symbols. Technicization, 
according to Stiegler, results in the demise of memory, loss of spontaneity, and the decline of 
eidetic intentionality (Stiegler, 1998, p.2-3). However it is also through technicization that 
societies have materially developed, as rationalization underlies the growth of capitalism and 
the accompanying political structures. Up to this point, many theories have analyzed 
technicization as domination and the perversion of human freedom. Derrida and Stiegler did 
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not deny this reification. However, as far as deconstruction is concerned, this understanding 
of technology appears limited to seeing only the ends and means, or the instrumentality that 
has marked technology’s evolution and function. What is missed out are the social factors, 
which have been increasingly difficult to determine, in the light of recent techno-scientific 
growth (Stiegler, 1998, p.14). Stiegler locates a tension between technology and culture in the 
speed of technological growth that is not the same as the rhythm of cultural evolution. A 
tension ensues in this “advance and delay,” anticipating disjuncture, breakdown, and 
undecidability that could lead to the disruption of the experience of space and time. What 
prevents Stiegler’s analysis from falling into technological determinism is his adherence to 
deconstruction, as shown by his recognition that social relations are behind the 
territorialisation and temporalization arising from a relationship between technology and 
culture (Stiegler, 1998, p.17). Stiegler acknowledges Derrida’s notion of undecidability, 
presupposed in an aporia, which makes full fidelity, to either technology or culture, 
impossible. The notion of undecidability frees technological analysis from being limited to 
the empirical or transcendental. Stiegler, however, executes a subtle turn from Derrida, when 
he says that aporia could release a new form of intelligibility and reflexivity from historically 
specific technological mediation (Stiegler, 2002, p.161-163). While Derrida allows an aporia 
to remain open to the possibility of the future, Stiegler sees the aporia in terms of how 
technology alters society’s relation to time and space, the future, the past, and present 
(Stiegler, 2002, p.151). Coupled with a “political will,” technology has the capacity to initiate 
some forms of political intervention. Richard Beardsworth, who followed Stiegler’s 
arguments, notes that the latter argues for certain “specificity” of technology, which means a 
“necessary political dimension” to the undecidable future (Beardsworth, 2006, p.14; Stiegler, 
2002, p.151-153). Stiegler pursues the same proposition in Technics and Time 2, where he 
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said that technicization enables the massive reproduction of temporal objects, and this allows 
the synchronization of consciousness of the multitude (Stiegler, 2009, p.241). In Technics and 
Time 3, Stiegler returns to the same argument when he wrote about the far-reaching effects of 
“hyper-reproducibility” through digitization. He says “ . . . to describe is to reproduce, the 
result would be that a description would always also be a transformation: there is no such 
thing as constativity; there is always, in some respect, performativity” (Stiegler, 2011, p.218). 
Derrida’s work on new media technologies is prescient and insightful, as he brings together 
the reciprocal tension of their material constitution and transcendental orientation. Recall that 
in Spectres of Marx Derrida talks about deconstruction in the light of an unprecedented 
growth in the use of new media technologies in the world, as part of the accelerated expansion 
of capitalism, otherwise known as globalization (Derrida, 1994, p.98). Derrida considers 
technological mediation as representation of freedom, political recognition and desire when 
he explored the relationship between technologies and political emancipation as an aporia. 
This spectral logic extends time and space in order to exceed the reality of the present. It also 
mobilizes the metaphorical capacity of spectres to communicate meanings – as a frame or 
context in itself. Derrida is not keen to bind technology to any political orientation but allows 
it to give rise to its own aporias, messianic possibilities, and spectres. On the other hand, 
Stiegler explicitly entertains an emancipatory impulse in new media technologies through a 
technical reduction of spectres (Stiegler, 2009, p.6; Bradley, 2006, p.25-26). In this sense, the 
power of spectres, as technical effects of representation, lies in their capacity to induce 
political judgement, or articulate a certain political orientation in aporia. As Richard 
Beardsworth puts it: “ . . . aporia is the very locus in which the political force of 
deconstruction is to be found” (Beardsworth, 1996, p.xiv). Aporias, which resonate with what 
Stiegler called disorientation and malaise, solicit political reflection that comes after an 
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engagement with a technologically mediated process, or with the logic of the technical 
process, that, by itself, expresses an irreducible tension between technology and society 
(Stiegler, 2009, p.7). This tension opens up a space of difference between technology and 
society, where modification and transformation are possible. This space functions as a realm 
of promise that haunts speaking positions and political practices. The haunting has figured 
separately in Derrida and Stiegler’s theories on new media technologies, albeit with subtle 
variations that I will negotiate as I move along. The common ground between them is that an 
aporia anticipates technical intervention as it introduces an impasse, indecision, and doubts 
over an event or an idea, thus undermining the ideologies of techno-scientific progress. 
However, I will also argue that it is useful to examine aporias within an identifiable context as 
a starting point in an analysis of technology, because the spectres’ existence demands the 
articulation of a certain persistent demand. Moreover, a particular historical period generates 
its own spectres, and conjures up spectres from the past. This chapter will look at the spectral 
possibilities of new media technologies, particularly how they provoke and disrupt certain 
interpretations of a reality. The account foreshadows the following chapter while the 
fundamental questions are: What are the political possibilities of new media technologies? 
What are the effects of new media technologies when they confront the aporias of 
postcolonial modernization, democracy, justice, and identity? 
2.1     Spectro-analysis of New Media Technologies in the Public Sphere 
This section will look at the effects of new media technologies on the democratic orientation 
of the public sphere. These effects will be seen through the notion of spectrality that was 
discussed in the previous chapter, in the work of Habermas, Adorno, and Derrida. As I will 
argue, there is no clear-cut association between information and democracy, technology and 
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culture, discourse and freedom in the analysis of technological representation in the public 
sphere. Any theoretical account of new media technologies has to explore the limits and the 
potential that the relationship brings. In the discussion that follows, I will refer back to the 
spectres that have the capacity to transform the public sphere. The latter will also be discussed 
as to how it could become a matrix for spectres. Overall, this section seeks an answer to the 
question: Given the aporetic nature of their effects, how might new media technologies bring 
about a democratic transformation of the public sphere? 
The public sphere is a democratic ideal invoked in debates around nation, democracy and new 
media technologies. Thus attention has been given to the ways that it has established a 
political culture that considers the public sphere as a space where subalterns can speak and 
represent themselves (Sassi, 2001, p.100-101). A democratic culture requires a public, or 
people that come together, discuss issues, and hold the government in check. In Western 
democracies, this chance is sustained by mediation of new media technologies that are 
considered “infrastructures” of the public sphere (Butsch, 2007, p.9). The nature of 
infrastructures is often thought as facilitative and apparent but, in deconstruction, 
infrastructures represent the unaccounted and hidden concepts and meanings that support a 
larger idea (Gasche, 1986, p.147). The public sphere is primarily viewed from a rationalist 
standpoint, from the position that Habermas regarded as a space to exercise the public use of 
reason. This notion of publicness has its roots in the Enlightenment and in Habermas’s 
depiction of eighteenth century Europe, where the bourgeoisie was consolidating its class rule 
to counter the feudalistic aristocracy and thus needed institutional support to strengthen the 
new hegemony (Habermas, 1989, p.102-129). With the emergence of agonistic publics and 
globalizing markets, Habermas tried to redefine the parameters of the public sphere but he 
remains cautious of speaking positions that refuse to admit rationalizing goals. The 
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democratic culture of the public sphere, as defined by Habermas, demands the recognition of 
reasonable claims of others that have to be rendered with transparent sincerity. If the claims 
are opaque, due to ambiguous language and concealed purpose, which Habermas has 
indicated deconstruction with, then there is a breakdown of communication that could ignite 
resentment, miscommunication, and political extremism (Habermas, 1987, p.183-184). 
Habermas thinks that deconstruction’s disregard of intersubjective consensus, by allowing all 
difference to come into play, risks spawning deep social tension and destructiveness. 
Habermas’s admonition is uncharitable. Derrida’s solicitation of difference is not an implicit 
assent to anarchy or totalitarianism that could tame the volatility of differences, nor is it 
simply a privileging of difference for its own sake. Rather, it is a critique of the exclusiveness 
that clings to procedural rationality, which is exemplified by Habermas’s notion of the 
institutional organization of the public sphere. In The Other Heading, Derrida indirectly 
examines exclusion in the public sphere when he expounded the formation of public opinion. 
Derrida termed public opinion the “silhouette of a phantom,” which speaks for someone, and 
is also its own representation (Derrida, 1992, p.84-85). However an opinion is never sufficient 
to itself because it “breathes, deliberates and decides” according to other “rhythms” and 
exceeds what it delimits and claims. With new media technologies as purveyors of public 
opinion, there is a chance that the latter would generate “other” views and opinions (Derrida, 
1992, p.97-98). Thus the technological mediation of public opinion expands the space in 
which the publicness of an opinion can be formed, and this allows the articulation of voices 
that are excluded from institutional representation. Habermas, however, is distrustful of new 
media technologies’ role in the formation of public opinion.  In The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas argues: “The world fashioned by the mass 
media is a public sphere in appearance only” (Habermas, 1989, p.171). This remark hints at 
73 
Habermas’s misgivings about mediated representation, because he placed primacy upon face-
to-face interaction in the public sphere and procedural representation in politics. It also 
betrays his distrust of radical democracy and his fear of the irrational “other.” Locked in its 
Habermasian ideal, politics in the public sphere could only be exclusionary and 
circumscribed. A similar orientation of ‘rational’ reason is found in Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action where universal pragmatics is at work. In this case, communication has 
to be free of distortion, competent, mutually understood, and generative of intersubjectivity 
(Habermas, 1984). This communication process tends to privilege direct and unmediated 
interaction, or the discursive analogues of such dialogical exchange like the book or letter. 
However public spheres, in various contexts where they have been applied, have largely been 
technologically mediated realms, where representational technologies are deployed to reach 
the intended publics and to foster their rational interactions (Butsch, 2007, p.2). 
Communicative action, even if limited to the quotidian, is not wholly dyadic and face-to-face. 
As publicness is also presumed in new media technologies, they also can respond to diverse 
public and give voice to the unrepresented. It is not that these technologies are better than 
face-to-face interaction; rather they are “radically different” and have unknowable effects on 
the politics in the public sphere (Sassi, 2001, p.102).  
What now needs elucidation is how new media technologies correspond to or diverge from 
the democratic culture of the public sphere, and how their practice leads to other ways of 
imagining a public sphere. In the previous chapter, I argued that the public sphere solicits 
spectres, in the same manner that new media technologies do, through an engagement with, 
and the process of articulation of, persistent and ineffaceable demands. In the introduction to 
The Phantom Public Sphere, Bruce Robbins underlines the spectral impulse of the public 
sphere and proposes to address the aporia of representation in the public sphere. Spectrality 
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occurs through expansion of deliberative spaces, discourses and representation in order to 
address the “unfinished business of imagining postmodern democracy” that responds to the 
“irreducible diversity (and new connectedness) of identity politics” (Robbins, 1993, p.xiii). 
The phrase “unfinished business” alludes to the spectral metaphor, in which the 
communicative function of a ghost is to speak to the living (Davis, 2007, p.1-2). In 
deconstruction, spectral intervention functions as a frame of reference and a hypothetical way 
of reading in order to destabilize the public sphere (Davis, 2007, p.1-2). It also signals the 
technological turn in the discourse of the public sphere, as the metaphor of spectres designates 
the effects of new media technologies. These effects destabilize deliberation in the public 
sphere and undermine its politics. While this hints at political agency, I will offer a slightly 
different intervention in the spectralization of the public sphere by registering the crucial issue 
of representation. This intervention aims to foreground the function of the public sphere in 
colonial and postcolonial epochs that are many times removed from the democratic contexts 
that Habermas had in mind.  
“One might say then that we are in representation. I repeat. One might say then that we are in 
representation.” Thus, said Derrida, in his introductory remarks in Envoi, the repetition being 
the double “yeses” that not only conveys an infinite affirmation but the sense that second 
“yes” summons the first, thus underscoring the logic of iteration in representation (Derrida, 
2007, p.95). Whether a process or a product of a process, representation is all about positing a 
presence, or standing in for something that is absent but could be rendered present in the here 
and now (Webb, 2009; Derrida, 2007; Thomassen, 2006; Pitkin, 1967).  Representation 
operates in the logic of iteration, which is simultaneously reiteration and alteration (Derrida, 
2007, p.106). In deconstruction, iteration is what undermines Western metaphysics, which 
privileges presence over absence, and disavows the secondary term in favour of the first one 
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within a binary, and which, most of the time, has suppositions and formulations that are 
almost unquestioned (Ryan, 1982, p.11-12). When a representation is built around the 
principles of Western metaphysics, it perpetuates the rationality, repressions, and domination 
that are derived from a certain conceptual order, or ideology (Derrida, 1997, p.131). However 
the effects of repeating codes, categories, or convention render a representation entirely 
different (Ryan, 1982, p.30). In a condition where representation dominates and excludes an 
individual, group, or discourse, the effects of iteration have the capacity to solicit specific 
subjectivities and agencies.  
The important, if not radical, point that Derrida’s notion of representation posits is that 
presence, either as thought or as being, cannot be primordial or stable, because it is an effect 
of differentiation. In Of Grammatology, Derrida contends that meanings are produced through 
infinite differentiation, and not the difference between two terms. This differentiation is a 
parallel relation that creates a space in which other senses of the term or thing can be thought 
anew (Derrida, 1997, 62-64). With difference, new meanings emerge because the binary, in 
which one term or category subordinates the other, is abandoned when the relation of 
domination is brought to light by the very process of meaning making. Derrida extrapolates 
the tension between speech and writing, and applies it to the concept of sign, which consists 
of the signified and signifier. Signs can never be pure and stable because they emerged out of 
difference and are contaminated by what preceded them (Spivak, 1997, xi-xii). This means 
that binaries, hierarchies, and origination of meanings can be undermined by the process that 
sustains them, that is, by the multiplication of meanings that could exceed or overrun 
semantic strongholds (Derrida, 1997, p.7). Differentiation is made possible by redoubling, 
repetition, and alterity, which are also forms of representation. With iteration, representation 
can give rise to something which is no longer what it originally represents, hence posing a 
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challenge to conventional modes of representation supported by structures of power (Spivak, 
1997, p.xii-xiii). Thus representation, which frames interaction in the public sphere, presents a 
challenge to democratic practice. For in conditions where the privileging of presence 
translates to exclusion in a narrower sense and domination in a larger sense, the seemingly 
inconsequential gesture of iteration constantly interrupts the discursive monologue of 
hegemony. 
Iteration does not affirm; it subverts. In Derridabase, Geoffrey Bennington notes that, for 
Derrida, feminism is a term not insulated from “debasement and idealization,” and it also 
tends to homogenize women’s struggles and neglect particular experiences (Bennington, 
1993, p.205; Deutscher, 2005, p.50). Femininity becomes the etymological basis of feminism, 
and the two concepts respectively reflect the empirical and transcendental as co-dependent 
terms that function almost like binaries (Bennington, 1993, p.205-206). For Derrida, feminism 
repeats the implicit effects of femininity within the confines of an extended, but almost 
imperceptible, polar opposition. It is not that feminism cannot claim validity as a concept; 
rather, “femininity” remains to be the controlling idea that keeps the second term beholden to 
the first. To deconstruct this relationship, one does not simply negate the difference of the first 
term (femininity) but to expose the sense of dependence, exclusion and violence that 
sustained the binary (Bennington, 1993, p.206, 213). Moreover, deconstruction also homes in 
on “femininity,” which certainly exceeds what has been defined by what Derrida termed 
“phallogocentric” discourse (Bennington, 1993, p.207). The feminine is not a predetermined 
representation but, in fact, overdetermined as it is contaminated by traces, differences, and 
spectres of its origination. Thus, the “feminine,” like feminism, always risks returning to the 
hermeneutical organization of sexual differences, and so every time it is invoked and 
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enunciated, it undermines its own meaning and betrays its fallibility (as, of course, does 
patriarchy). Deconstruction, in this sense, is relentless, sparing no category in its inquiry. 
Bennington’s interrogation of feminism corresponds to the construction of racism that will be 
discussed in the account of colonialism in the next chapter. Racism is structurally analogous 
to feminism, that is, a social construction in which representations are assigned with 
anthropological and historical justifications. Race is a binary in which categories rely on the 
presumption of superiority that is also maintained as a universal ideology. Racism, as a 
discourse, is rooted in domination expressed in the language of universality, where race 
transcends various forms of domination and social formation, to become an essentialist 
discourse (San Juan, 2007, p.48). The latter is what underlies racial and racist stereotypes 
whose function is to generalize and categorize humans and their history.  Said’s notion of 
Orientalism encapsulates the damaging xenophobic judgments and taxonomic stereotypes 
imposed on certain peoples and their culture that, when repeated, multiply themselves. 
Etienne Balibar posits that in the construction of race, “culture can also function like a 
nature,” that purports racial belonging and naturalizes racial prejudices (Balibar, 1991, p.22). 
This construction appears as a self-validating and perpetuating account of the universalizing 
racial categories that mark the “other.” However, as with feminism, the reiteration of racist 
categories and racial stereotypes presupposes aporia, which is a space of conjecture that 
carries the tension of racial claims. The latter, when retold and repeated, are destined to 
undermine their claim of authenticity.  
Discourses, which are structurally analogous to feminism and racism, have aporetic effects on 
the public sphere. The Habermasian public sphere is a realm of representation where presence 
has to conform to criticisable points of appropriateness, truthfulness and sincerity, and should 
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aim to reach consensus. The assurance of deliberation somehow provides a chance to register 
criticism. However while the boundaries of criticism and deliberation are not established in 
terms of content, their universal goal, which is rational consensus, is a priority. Thus critical 
convergence is limited to validity claims, or the criticisable points of particular 
representations, and so the language and structures of power that are articulated have 
remained unchallenged (Goode, 2006, p.136). In a colonial context, for instance, the dominant 
representation presupposes the assimilation of identities to a single culture that of the 
colonizer’s that posits a prior claim over meaning and identity.  Arguing over the validity 
claims of colonial domination may have its merits but the nature of originary presence, being 
hegemonic and manipulative, contrives to make the oppression bearable, if not invisible. The 
goal of consensus in a colonial context is generally secured through deception or repression. 
Thus communicative action cannot be the only route to democratic representation in the 
public sphere.  
Derrida’s deconstructive politics guarantees nothing by way of democracy or rational 
consensus, but simply opens up the public sphere to all possible modes and mechanisms of 
representation by not privileging any discourse, conceptual order, or procedures of 
deliberation. There is a better chance for democracy to flourish when it is not driven to reach 
formal consensus and observe speech rules, but is allowed to stage myriad representations, 
even those that are what Habermas would regard as simply irrational. Certainly, the public 
sphere will be vulnerable to disruptions and aporias but these gestures, by themselves, are also 
forms of representation.  New media technologies are mechanisms that could accommodate 
immense possibilities of representation as their logic is also that of iteration. They open up the 
chance to transmit the representations that Stigler calls “tertiary memory,” which is a memory 
beyond the lifeworld and intersubjectivity but is still part of the past although one can 
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experience it vicariously (Stiegler, 2011, p.206). With new media technologies, the public 
sphere becomes crucial to the scene of representation because it permits the practice of 
democratic culture. New media technologies expand the virtual frontiers of the public sphere, 
in the sense that the public sphere overcomes spatial, temporal, and representational 
limitations. In other words, the public sphere, as a realm of representation, is radically 
transformed by the mediative function of new media technologies. 
Mediation, which is inherent to the convention of new media technologies, is replete with 
possibilities to modify representation. This has been examined by critical theorists like Walter 
Benjamin, in his work on technological production and reception of art, and Theodor Adorno 
and Marx Horkheimer in their work on the culture industry, which is a shorthand for new 
media technologies that embody the ideology, myths and illusions of capitalism. Mediation is 
the central theme in Walter Benjamin’s interpretation of photography, film and the visual arts, 
especially in his essay The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction. The essay 
shows the way to interpret simulation and replication in new media technologies that have 
profound effects on social consciousness and relations (Benjamin, 2008, p.14). Auratic art, 
because of its sense of distance and detachment, exerts a mysterious, hegemonic power over 
its audience (Benjamin, 2008, p.23). However the technologies of production and 
reproduction of artistic genres shatter the elitist and fetishist regard over a work of art by 
detaching it from the sphere of tradition to be viewed in other ways – spatially and 
epistemologically (Benjamin, 2008, p.22; Jennings, 2008, p.15). The techniques of cultural 
reproduction annul the spatio-temporal barriers of uniqueness thus subverting traditional and 
restrictive functions (Benjamin, 1968, p.244). The technological mediation of auratic objects 
of art and the emergence of film as a kinaesthetic mode of representation, yields emancipatory 
potential that could be seized by human agency (Benjamin, 2008, p.23). Mediation also leaves 
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an imprint on the work of art, in the manner that new media technologies reveal the historical 
epoch in which art exists. It also discloses a “mode of perception” that arises from a certain 
period, particularly the historical basis of the aura (Benjamin, 2008, p.24). Benjamin sees the 
superimposition of the past and present in new media technologies in repetition and 
replication, which re-store the past in the present, creating cinematic-like effects, where time 
is in flux and memory is spectral (Benjamin, 1968, p.23, 221). Indeed this mediation is caught 
up in the complexities of technological codes and capitalism’s logic but, for Benjamin, it is 
the principal site of representational strategies, the reason why he sees in popular 
representational technologies, photography among them, a canvas of political possibilities 
(Benjamin, 2008, p.24; Caygill, 1998, p.93-94).  
What the preceding arguments have shown is that these are possibilities of transforming the 
public sphere through the process of representation that supplies presence, meanings, and 
mediation, in which new media technologies are crucial to their staging. New media 
technologies are more than technical means to realize representation, as they also constitute 
the ideology of representation. In the public sphere, issues of political representation can be 
treated as technological issues in terms of their logic of iteration. With the latter, I mean that 
technological rationality operates in the process of political representation and negotiates the 
aporia of spontaneity and agency. However there is a danger that representation, being 
ideological, serves to maintain hegemony and curtails the process of representation in the 
public sphere. It is to these antinomies of transformation that I will turn to in the next section. 
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2.2    Reification and Representation 
The previous section sets up an argument about the contradictory ways in which new media 
technologies function as mechanisms of representation that could open up possibilities for 
political action and new modes of sociality. The question now is this: what are the ways in 
which the transformative possibilities, offered by new media technologies within the public 
sphere, could be blocked?  The question will be of particular importance when I come to look 
at the effects of new media technologies in the postcolonial context. This section highlights 
the nature of domination in representation and the structures of power in language and 
communication that impose relations of subordination. These conditions manifest in the 
public sphere when it is colonized by a dominant ideology, economic control, and a 
rationality that is oriented toward functional politics. The following arguments will address 
how the relationship between new media technologies and socio-economic relations prevent 
individuals from enjoying the material rewards of their labours and realizing their potential. In 
a collectivity, this means the absence of democracy and of the chance of representation for 
subalterns.  However, I will also argue that the reproduction of hegemony provokes spectres 
and the chance of democracy to come. 
Habermas’s theory of the public sphere gave the latter rational grounding, by making it a rule-
governed space for democratic action. The public sphere functions alongside institutions of 
formal representation. It operates on the premise of general neutrality in which various 
particular interests and concerns can be discussed democratically. In other words, specific 
demands have to connect with universalized interests so that social cohesion is maintained. In 
this regard, Habermas assigned new media technologies the regulative function of connecting 
the desires and ethical resources of each individual with the rational desire of others (Sassi, 
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2001, p.102). This is a Kantian postulation that runs in practically all of Habermas’s work, but 
especially in his theory of the public sphere. It holds that intuitions, sensations and desires 
must be conjoined with claims that are common to all. Representations, which operate in the 
public sphere, are seen as acts of practical reason responding to an independent sphere, which 
is grounded on intersubjective categories that supply logical judgments. The reasoning mind 
relies not on contingent facts but on frameworks available to everyone. For Kant, the primacy 
of reason bears on the moral outlook, or the common good, from which political actions 
proceed, and from where the notion of freedom emanates (Kant, 1998, p.575-578). 
Habermas, however, stood Kant’s idea of universality on its head when he sketched his theory 
of communicative action (Regh, 1994, p.1; Habermas, 1993, p.326). Communicative action 
has superseded the historical construction of the public sphere by providing a transhistorical 
grounding through which individuals can find moral bases for working together (Regh, 1994, 
p.1). Unlike Kant’s monological approach, wherein maxims are tested through reflection, 
Habermas’s universality is expressed through rational consensus forged out of interaction that 
promotes shared understanding through rational discourse (Habermas, 1993, p.323-326). 
Communicative rationality is premised on the idea that truth, freedom and justice are 
anticipated in every discursive interaction (Habermas in McCarthy, 1984, p.308). What 
Habermas termed communicative action is a process wherein individuals coordinate their 
actions consensually through an agreement that they have reached intersubjectively 
(Habermas, 1990, p.58).  Communicative action has a regulative element because it binds 
individuals to take part in a discourse that presupposes a consensus (Habermas, 1990, p.53; 
Thomassen, 2010 p.89). Truth, according to Habermas, invariably springs from rational 
consensus; it is not dependent on the assertion that something is true but on a claim that has to 
be redeemed discursively. Truth, in communicative action, relies on argumentative reasoning 
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that considers rational consensus as the immanent purpose of the social. In this way, 
consensus forged out of a discourse is also a procedure to attain universality in interaction. 
Habermas believes in the capacity of individuals to reach a rationally motivated agreement 
while the flexibility of the rules of discourse can accommodate and modify individual 
perspectives.  Thus, it can be argued that Habermas’s undue belief in the predominance of 
reason precludes adequate recognition of technological and ideological constraints to free 
communication in the public sphere. There are effects of universalizing interactions that 
remain unaccounted for in the theory of the public sphere and which are inseparable from 
existing social relations. Spectres are among those unexamined effects. 
The problem of universality in communicative action arises when there are irreconcilable 
interests that make agreements contingent or forced to foster harmony. Dissension, in fact, 
strengthens the argument for rational discourse that presupposes consensus in every 
interaction (Mouffe, 1996, p.2, 9). Habermas himself appears to have recognized the difficulty 
of resolving disputes among participants in a discourse whose positions are divergent, if not 
“irrational” (Habermas, 1996, p.427-30). This raises the question of the extent to which such 
“irrationality” is recognized in Habermas’s version of democracy, and of how it responds to 
questions of inclusion, representation, and difference – the issues that Adorno’s negative 
dialectics and Derrida’s deconstructive politics are oriented to. Through his critique of 
identity thinking, Adorno creates a paradigm of how a concept or an ideal, like democracy, is 
restricted by the historical process, whose contradictions it has also reproduced. Democracy, 
for Adorno, is about people making decisions about their world, and yet it appears that the 
practice of democracy also prevents them from doing so.  This is a result of what Adorno 
termed “self-alienation,” which describes the process where “people, in their societal role, are 
not identical with what they are as immediate, living people” (Adorno, 1998, p.296). 
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Alienation, for Adorno, is an outgrowth of reification, but it is more than just a disquieting 
condition in a capitalist society. 
Reification names a pathological and coercive condition that arises from the realm of 
exchange value, in which objects are cut off from the sociohistorical process of their 
production, as they take on abstract exchange value (Adorno, 2005, p.200; Cook, 2004, p.40; 
Marx, 1976, 160-164). As a mode of identity thinking, reification broadly refers to the 
effacement of heterogeneity, a condition wherein incommensurable objects and individuals 
become identical when subjected to relations of exchange (Adorno, 1973 p.148-151; Jay, 
1984, p.68; Buck-Morss, 1977, p.26). Standardization and sameness are also at work in this 
mode of domination. The underlying principle is imputed equivalence, which extends to all 
aspects of the social, thereby restraining autonomy, spontaneity and asymmetry. For Adorno, 
discussion of the public sphere reflects the instrumental organization of the social totality as 
this is structured by the relations of production that served to justify the economy of violence 
imposed upon individuals (Adorno, 1998, p.119, 120).  
If an object is abstracted from the conditions of its production as exchange value, this does not 
only deprive the object of its specificity (use value) but also hides from the buyer the real 
conditions of its production (Marx, 1976, 164-165). Applied analogically to the 
communicative action of individuals in the public sphere, this form of reification leads to a 
divorce of the signifier (communicative action) from the signified (democracy), a process in 
which the signifier overwhelms and moves independently from the signified. The irony 
cannot be missed here – that the very same guarantee of free expression actually cancels such 
freedom.  Adorno sums it up: “The right to freely express one’s opinion presumes an identity 
of the individual and his consciousness with the rational general interest, an identity that is 
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hindered in the very world in which it is formally viewed as a given” (Adorno, 1998, p.119). 
Adorno’s critique of reification demonstrates the valorization of the universal interest in 
economy, politics and subjective domains, and the negation of particular (Adorno, 1998, 
p.121-122). Since identity thinking is central to human experience, and ingrained in the 
consciousness that uses it, reification is present in the everydayness of human transactions. 
Thus, Adorno’s thoughts on reification bring up a condition of unremitting regression because 
certain determinations of power are always there to counteract the emancipatory imagination. 
Although he did not directly engage with the concept of reification, Derrida echoes Adorno’s 
assessment of democratic politics’ ruination when it is caught up with totalizing values and 
idealized patterns of representation. Timothy Bewes remarked that this non-engagement stems 
from Derrida’s fear of binaries and dominant discourses lurking within the term (Bewes, 
2002, p.10-11). However I agree with Bewes’s observation that reification is actually as 
nuanced as any deconstructive term because it has an “arsenal of elaborate metaphors and 
concepts” (Bewes, 2002, p.11). What could be reification for Derrida is the condition of 
democracy, formed around a regulative idea, which operates through a homogenizing 
calculability that reduces people to numbers and sameness (Derrida, 1997, p.105-6). 
Reification can also be deduced from Derrida’s designation of restricted economy in Writing 
and Difference. Restricted economy names a condition of existence which is not unlike the 
instrumental logic of commodification that mainly concerns itself with the value of 
commodities and their circulation (Derrida, 1978, p.343). In other words, it is an economy 
reducible to calculation of costs and risks (Cazeaux, 2007, p.4; Derrida, 2002, p.85-87). What 
is being circulated in this economy is knowledge that is absolute, homogenizing and intolerant 
of excess; what it aims for is the preservation of formal procedures and unquestioned unities 
(Derrida, 1978, p. 344 -345). Another feature of a restricted economy is the neutrality 
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expressed as part of the sovereign will, which actually masks a refusal to deal with diversity 
and specificities (Derrida, 1978, p.346). Thus the discourse of normativity that arises from a 
restricted economy is not only limiting but also intolerant of heterogeneity (Derrida, 1978, 
p.348-350). In all, restricted economy is the underside of democracy’s ethical demand, 
because it privileges closure over openness. 
What then is the fate of democracy in the mediated public sphere if reification reigns and 
constantly denigrates the multiplicity of things? Or stated differently, is reification a 
transcendental feature of all social relations? The Habermasian solution to damaged sociality 
is to appeal to laws that derived their legitimacy from the presumed rationality of 
intersubjective action. Laws are considered products of rational deliberation, or expressive of 
reason and the will of citizens themselves. Discourse has to acquire some consistency and 
stability; it should be rooted in the established rationally that the laws express (Thomassen, 
2010, p.120-5). However, Habermas does not concede that reification has come to dominate 
the public sphere, even though interlocutors may or may not be aware of the controlling 
ideology.  
Reification, according to Habermas, is the penetration of the system imperatives of money 
and power into the symbolic realm, which is the lifeworld, where individuals are treated as a 
passive audience rather than a deliberative public. This condition gives rise to a fragmented 
consciousness in which individuals cannot discern their own alienation and they have to rely 
on the pronouncements of experts (Habermas, 1987, p.355-356). By this route, Habermas is 
not giving in to the total command of reification, although his theory is unclear about who 
should be the agents of resistance. New media technologies would not fit that role because of 
the ambivalence of their purpose. This stance once more reveals Habermas’s predilection for 
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institutionalized or formal representation and the effectiveness of the public sphere to preside 
over discussions and consensus formation. He retains a reformist’s disposition in his belief 
that society can still function and undergo differentiation without the need to end capitalism 
because, after all, freedom inheres in every communicative attempt to secure mutual 
understanding (Habermas, 2006, p.122-123). However, I maintain that one can never be 
optimistic about the possibility of a genuinely dialogical interaction, under conditions of 
technological mediation, which retained their complicity with the imperatives of capital 
accumulation. 
Unlike Habermas, Adorno’s politics is not directly associated with democratic practice and 
yet his theories are replete with “change-causing gestures,” befitting the Frankfurt School’s 
critical tradition (Buck-Morss, 1977, p.33,36). Adorno’s negative dialectic demystifies 
ideological representation by drawing attention to its false equivalence, thus exposing 
reification (Buck-Morss, 1977, p. 36). Negative dialectic reveals falsely derived consensus 
and inspires a way of overcoming worn-out, exclusionary, and determinate concepts (Morris, 
2001, p.42). Thus, a critical tension emerges from rethinking the relationship of opposites and 
equivalents. Adorno’s negative dialectics is a critical force in itself, and yet we are not quite 
clear how the reversals in negative dialectics could become something like a politically 
transformative gesture aimed at dissolving reified categories. For one, the reified categories 
are stripped of their utopian impulse, and would remain reified for as long as the societal 
structures that occasioned them are intact. However, I would like to offer a deconstructive 
gesture in analysing reified categories, in a way foreshadowing my use of Derrida’s thought to 
make sense of the Philippines’ experience of colonial and postcolonial domination. I believe 
that reified categories, that signify empirical and transcendental states, undergo a sort of 
sedimentation, leaving in their wake the traces and spectres of themselves, embodied in 
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meanings, experiences, and history. These spectres are capable of revealing the suppressed 
utopian imagination in them, when summoned to re-present themselves.  
I mentioned in the previous chapter that Derrida extends Adorno’s negative dialectics to bear 
on democratic practice, and that this proved useful for showing the limits of Habermas’s 
normative politics. This critical strategy emerges in Derrida’s account of justice and 
representation, and his idea of the spectral presence of the unrepresentable that is considered 
irrational by Habermasian standards. Derrida’s spectre was inspired by Marx’s spectre of 
communism that haunts the capitalist order, but Derrida also used the term to affirm what is 
empirical and transcendental in new media technologies. The empirical element refers to the 
mechanical constitution of the media while the transcendental signifies their representational 
potential. The dual possibilities of the effects of new media technologies define their 
spectrality. These possibilities converge in a form of representation that has undergone the 
process of technicization, where it becomes complex, accessible and ubiquitous. Both are 
forms of inscription, or the expressions of writing and the conditions of their possibility. What 
spectrality brings to the scene is the idea that the technical and symbolic senses of 
representation exhibit effects replete with transformative possibilities. 
In Spectres of Marx, Derrida’s literary allusion to Hamlet in the phrase “the time is out of 
joint,” signals two things relevant to effects of new media technologies: first, the disruption of 
temporality, second, the attention to an ethico-political responsibility (Derrida, 1994, p.10-
19). In Chapter 1, I argued that spectres are technological effects of representation.  However, 
the effects are not merely mechanical, they are also subjective. This means that spectres are 
inseparable from the logic of new media technologies, as they also discharge representational 
function. Spectres are irreducible to their technical determination because they arise from the 
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consciousness, knowledge and ethical demands of their time. The spectral moment inheres in 
the practice of efficiency and repeatability. These values are what underlie the acceleration in 
production, transmission, and consumption of meanings that are instantiated in new media 
technologies (Derrida, 1978). Spectres are solicited through iteration, which aims to produce 
uniformity and stability but, ironically, engenders instability, ambiguity, and differentiation 
(Derrida, 1994, p.212-3; Derrida and Stiegler, 2002, p.72; Stiegler, 2011, p.215). Derrida talks 
about spectres as having a “visor effect,” which suggests that they haunt the living as the trace 
of a forgotten violence that has to be set right (Derrida, 1994, p.6). Derrida highlighted this 
spectral mission when he said: “the ghost looks at or watches us, the ghost concerns us . . . not 
simply someone we see coming back, it is someone by whom we feel ourselves watched, 
observed and surveyed . . .” (Derrida and Stiegler, 2002, p.120). The “visor effect” also refers 
to spectres’ capacity to be among institutions, cultures, technologies and politics. This 
capacity signifies the radical iteration and simulation that accompany representation. Spectres 
bring deterritorialization, dislocation, and dispossesion (Derrida, 2002, p.80; Derrida and 
Stiegler, 2002, p.79).  
With iteration as the underlying logic of spectres, representation becomes a process of 
deciding and thinking about the future, or what is to come. This chance of the future is what 
Derrida calls as “messianicity without a messiah,” to describe the political possibilities 
residing in a conscious collectivity (Derrida, 2006, p.269). What this economy of redemption 
introduces is, in Derrida’s words, “an opening to the future or to the coming of the other as 
the advent of justice but without the horizon of expectation and without prophetic 
prefiguration” (Derrida, 2002, p. 56). Derrida’s turn to theology, in his concept of 
messianicity, reveals his preference for an aporia, which is a particular form of messianism 
that cannot be reduced to an empirical event or context, and to an absolute and final futurity 
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(Derrida, 2002, p.98). Derrida’s notion of messianicity is derived from the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition of anticipating the Messiah that is analogous to the secular act of unconditionally 
welcoming a stranger (Derrida, 2002, p.57, 79). This allusion knits the ideas of a promise and 
of justice. It is a form of hospitality that anticipates radical gestures, including irrationality 
and violence (Derrida, 2002, p.268-269). Derrida considers spectrality as an effect of 
technicization, although it is not reducible to the technical (Derrida, 1994; Beardsworth, 1996, 
p.147).  In Faith and Knowledge, Derrida remains committed to thinking about an event in 
terms of the technical, historical, and empirical, but the event is also couched in 
transcendental terms as a “promise” or “messianic time” (Derrida, 2002, p.83). Derrida stayed 
faithful to the spirit of deconstruction, in which a response is simultaneously material and 
ethical, hence exceeding its determination. On one hand, the concept of messianism 
demonstrates how pliant deconstruction is, with its ability to simultaneously negotiate its 
meaning between the technological and theological, the empirical and transcendental, and the 
religious and the secular while, on the other hand, it acknowledges the historical context of an 
event, concept, or representation, as the point from which to proceed. However, I interpose 
that the two-sense of deconstruction is once more vulnerable to the charge of conservatism 
and relativism because of the ambiguous politics it advocates. Thus, if Derrida’s concept of 
the messianic is essentially an ethical gesture, then it should be all the more sensitive to 
various goals of realizing justice and their means of emancipation. In other words, messianism 
has to leave room for immanence and securalization of political demands.  
Stiegler’s stress on the specificity of new media technologies accommodates the 
transcendental focus of Derrida’s thought although he was keen to underscore the “technical 
possibility of sedimentation” which is likely to be expressed as a “programmatic iterability” 
that lends itself to the “destruction of its sediments”(Stiegler, 2001, p.247, 251). In other 
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words, the future has to be thought through a certain technicity, and this means that 
messianism, as a promise, can never be insulated from calculation. This is because a promise, 
which is something of the past that is being accessed in the present and fulfilled in the future, 
can be witnessed through new media technologies, a process that Stiegler calls “tertiary 
memory” that is another name for the “industrialization of memory” (Stiegler, 2009, p.3; 
Stiegler, 2001, p.258). Stiegler grants that the future cannot be reduced to the past and present 
because it is always already there, but this condition expresses a process of difference in 
which technicization is at work. Derrida situates this “chance” in the convention of new media 
technologies, noticeable in the reproduction of cultural products such as news, photographs, 
live and taped interviews, and the like. These experiences require judgment that either leans 
toward generality or variability, an intervention that can be considered as a moment of 
hesitation, thus a spectral moment, which then grants the opportunity for one to act radically 
despite the limits set by convention (Derrida and Stiegler, 2002, p.5). Messianicity is 
inseparable from judgements bound up with the acceleration of virtual communication, whose 
effects are spectral. In the following chapters, I will restage this retrospective dialogue 
between Derrida and Stiegler.  
What was considered in the preceding discussion is how reification solicits spectres, which 
are prefigurative elements that are summoned from the past in order to create the future in the 
present. This makes spectres relevant to the concept of subaltern history. Spectres provoke 
rather than react, or at least they strive toward a rethinking of the present that offers a chance 
for representation to be radically different from what was laid out by established politics, 
ideologies, or political programmes.  In what follows, I will provide the arguments for how 
spectres configure democratic representation even in inhospitable conditions, and also bring a 
sense that it is possible to salvage `the future’ even in situations of utmost subjection. 
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Meanwhile, these questions remain: How does this messianicity, as a chance of change, find 
expression in new media technologies? And how might this messianicity manifest itself in the 
postcolonial context?  
2.3    The Spectres and Regimes of Domination 
I have noted in the previous chapter that historical epochs solicited spectres as consequences 
of rationalization but the spectres also undermine these attempts at regulation. In this section, 
I will introduce an argument that colonialism, the postcolonial period, authoritarian rule, and 
the regimes of neoliberal ideology are solicitations of spectres that are both of the past and 
immanent to a particular historical period. These spectres are a response to two modes of 
reification – technological orientalism and technological messianism.  
Colonialism and postcolonialism manifest rationalization, in which new media technologies 
are crucial to their functioning. The technologies are ideological apparatuses and the means 
for capital to expand by stimulating illusions, desires and impulses of consumption. The 
patterns of domination and consumption are linked up to the global system of control and 
accumulation underpinned by the values of progress and instrumental rationality. These 
values point the way in which the enjoyment of the material products of modernization and 
the realization of human potential are made possible. In the Philippines, the general forms of 
domination undergo differentiation and modification when they are inserted into terrains with 
discrepant modes of production and notions of power. The spatial and temporal overlay gives 
rise to complex structures emanating from contradictions among several modes of production 
and intercultural exchanges premised on incommensurability between the colonizer and the 
colonized. The differentiations explain the inflection, violence, marginality, and caesura that 
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the Philippines had experienced as a colony (San Juan, 2003; San Juan, 2007).  The colonial 
conquests by Spain and the United States and the spread of capitalism through colonization 
were arguably fueled by the objective of technological dominance. While it is true that 
technological diffusion was not the direct cause of colonialism, the expansion of the latter was 
possible only because production and representational technologies have accompanied it. 
Territorial conquests are forms of inscription, in a material and ideological sense, in which 
new media technologies play an important role in encoding. Attending to the presence of 
spectres provides an insight into how a particular form of domination that evolves out of the 
colonial experience, and its aftermath, also embodies the possibility of their termination. 
One way of looking at how new media technologies are complicit with colonial domination is 
seeing them as an assemblage of technological codes that are not unlike racial and racist 
stereotypes. One form of these is technological orientalism. The latter can be thought as a 
racially charged thinking that uses technologies in order to discipline and integrate the strange 
and irrational practices of the “other,” with the overall goal of expanding the reach of 
capitalism and Eurocentric thinking.  Edward Said’s notion of Orientalism prefigures 
technological orientalism. He designates Orientalism as the representation of the “Orient” that 
renders little about the Orient, but more on how its institutions, traditions, conventions and 
knowledge are imagined in the Occident (Said, 1978, p.21-2). The West has a presumed 
privilege of defining the Orient as an “exercise of cultural strength” and this is rooted in 
colonization and achieved through the double tactic of co-optation and violence (Said, 1978, 
p.39-40). Technological orientalism reveals the way in which new media technologies have 
evolved and deployed by the machinery of colonialism. It is a justificatory discourse that 
purports that the colonized benefit from foreign control because their society is in a state of 
chaos, superstition, and varying conditions of backwardness; and so colonial subjects have to 
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submit to a political order that institutes discipline, reason, and civility (Brody, 2010, p. 3-5). 
The underlying claim is that deployment of technologies of colonial representation will pave 
the way for a civilized and democratic culture. It was through new media technologies that 
colonizers controlled formal and aesthetic representation, and it was also through them that 
the colonized formed their identity and coped with their subaltern position (Brody, 2010). 
Orientalism is an example of what Said calls ‘mimetic representation,” which “refers back 
doubly” to an idea that designates it (Said, 1975, p.11-12). This kind of representation 
maintains that there is an original and dominant subject, which is the colonizer, that could be 
disclosed, interpreted, and copied by the colonized, but whose derivation is considered 
mimicry and a poor imitation of the original (Said, 1975, p.16). Technological orientalism is 
essential to the patterns of colonial exploitation, political practices, and cultural impositions 
that refer back to Eurocentric logic for their derivation. In all, it amounts to a form of 
representation that is calculable and hegemonic. Technological orientalism outlives its 
colonial provenance in the Philippines, and its traces remained visible to this day. I will 
provide an account of its persistence when discussing colonialism and postcolonialism in the 
following chapters. 
Another reified discourse of technology is technological messianism. The latter is an 
imaginary that grants redemptive power to new media technologies. The discourse considers 
new media technologies as having the capacity to determine the social because they 
inaugurate new forms of agency, subjectivity, and recognition (Wayne, 2003; Street, 1992, 
Lovink, 2011). Simply put, if the masses are given access to new media technologies, they 
will be able to install democracy (Morozov, 2011, p.ix-xi). Two things are at work in 
technological messianism – first, it presupposes universality, or the assimilation of categories 
within a single experience, and second, it is a compensatory attitude toward irreconcilable 
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binaries. In The Political Unconscious, Fredric Jameson’s arguments on reification can help 
frame the suppositions of technological messianism as his justification of the use of “utopia,” 
and other religious concepts, is relevant to my appropriation of “messianism” in this context. 
Jameson argues for a semantic strategy that reinterprets the sacred into the secular so that the 
term can have meanings beyond the ideological and anagogical (Jameson, 1981, p.275 -276). 
Technological messianism presupposes binaries and an originary presence: the imagined 
condition of redemption counteracts a degenerated state that has to be effaced by 
technological progress. In this binary relationship, the undesirable category is displaced and 
subsumed under a defining, dominant principle. Jameson’s views on reification cast 
technological messianism as a totalizing discourse. He notes that in reification, categories are 
subjected to a “process of abstraction and rationalisation which strips the experience of the 
concrete, ” a phenomenon that is so associated with capitalism (Jameson, 1981, p.48). 
Technological messianism is also an attempt to gloss over inequalities by introducing 
technologies to bring about a synthesis. It is a scheme that privileges machines over labour 
power, technologies over human, and objectivity as opposed to subjectivity. This Manichean 
strategy, with its religious flavour, accounts for the discourse behind the deployment and 
adaption of technologies in colonial and authoritarian regimes. Therefore, like technological 
orientalism, technological messianism is a form of reification because it incorporates 
everything toward a single telos of history, that is, the civilizing mission and pre-eminence of 
a certain reality expressed in the logic and materiality of technologies.  
The two modes of technological reification – technological orientalism and technological 
messianism – are phenomena rooted in capitalism and its justifying regimes. They are implied 
in discourses of democracy and the public sphere. It is not that these ideals have no 
applicability to social formations; it is just that as elements that make up formal and aesthetic 
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representation, they fall short of what they signify, thus not only can they not represent the 
lives of subordinated classes, they are complicit with dominant regimes of representation 
(Said, 1993, p.291). They are what Said would refer to in Culture and Imperialism as 
discourses having the “residue of imperialism” (Said, 1993, 20-21). However, as I will point 
out in the following chapters, representation presupposes a “return,” not a mimesis or a 
closure. Representation is a condition of possibility that is bound up with repetition that is not 
remote from intervention and subversion. This suggests that technological orientalism and 
technological messianism are undermined by the binary logic that programmed them. 
Conclusion 
My thesis is an intervention in postcolonial theory through a critique of new media 
technologies in the context of the Philippines. It examines the effects and political 
possibilities of new media technologies in the public sphere, whose transformation indexed 
the political resistance of subalterns from colonial period onwards. The critique is grounded 
on the analysis of the growth of capitalism with a syncretic mode of production characterized 
by uneven development of the production system. Capitalism is key to understanding the 
growth of new media technologies in relation to the latter’s interaction with culture that, at 
different historical periods, has given rise to aporias, reification, and spectres. I have argued 
that spectres are the effects of new media technologies, which are the mechanisms or 
interfaces of representations. Spectres function as an analytical approach and semantic device 
for discussing the possibilities of new media technologies. The effects manifest the persistent 
and ineffaceable political and economic demands in the Philippines. My discussion of the 
public sphere, representation, and reification intends to provide a framework through which 
new media technologies can be understood as hope for democracy among subalterns. I have 
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earlier argued that spectres are solicited by the articulation of the enduring demand for justice, 
and this is also a form of representation.  
The genealogy of spectres in Chapter One lays down the theoretical basis for understanding 
the emergence of new media technologies and their effects on the social, economic, and 
political situation of the Philippines. Colonialism was a direct force of exploitation and 
brutalization that also introduced capitalism, starting with the rise of merchant capital and 
then the production of export crops that linked the colony to the global system of production 
for market. The economic integration reconfigured the mode of production and cultural 
practices, but not without tragic consequences for the colonized, whose labour power, 
products of labour, and labouring bodies were measured through the exchange value imposed 
by the colonizer. The systematic violence that emanated from the logic of capitalist 
accumulation, which turned colonial subjects into compliant and commodified forces of 
labour, also formed the basis of social authority. Control was presupposed in other spheres of 
sociality, defining what should be remembered and spoken while those considered irrational 
or defiant of the instrumental order were excluded, or erased from social memory, which is 
then left only with traces of the “other” consciousness. However, the latter, when summoned 
or articulated, generates spectral effects. Thus, here in Chapter Two, I looked at theories, 
principally Habermas, Adorno, and Derrida. Each suggests that technicization results in 
disorientation and uncertainty, whose effects open up new ways of thinking and acting. The 
logic of spectres is iteration, which informs representation either as a process or object of 
representation. It is through the concept of spectrality, however, that I have sought to 
explicate the radical break in the concept of democratic inclusion that is articulated in 
deconstruction. The specificity of spectres resides in the mechanisms or interfaces of 
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representation that I have referred to as new media technologies. The public sphere is the 
matrix of spectres, and where hegemonic representation gives rise to consequences.  
Chapter Three examines the colonial history of the Philippines and looks at the emergence of 
new media technologies along with the colonial conquest. The historical account does not 
offer an inventory of new media technologies but a speculative account of their effects. What 
is apparent during the colonial period is the inscriptive technology of the printing press, which 
saw the emergence of books and newspapers that were used in the anti-colonial struggle 
against the colonisers – Spain and the United States. The medium enabled the convergence of 
political subjectivities in print that became the objective basis of the memory. For example, 
the anti-colonial writings, launched by the native elite and intelligentsia, allowed the colonial 
subjects to imagine a condition that is different from their reality, an idea that became more 
plausible in its repeatability. The same possibility within dissident writing existed under the 
American colonial period, where technocratic modernization was in force. Chapter Four 
focuses on the period after the end of colonial rule, when the structures of power were taken 
over by the native elites. The post-independence years were a time of repression and 
economic control through the intensification of class rule, which accommodated the demands 
of advanced capitalism in the U.S. and Europe. This modes of domination saw the return of 
repressed subjectivities, among them the millenarian movements among peasants, the most 
exploited class in Philippine society. Mixing folk piety with messianic imaginary, these 
groups personified the spectres that exhibited the consequences of reification and 
rationalization. They replayed the anti-colonial struggles and rehearsed the trauma of 
exploitation in their daily lives. They also gave the spectres the chance to demonstrate their 
haunting and iterative power. However, by allowing the technicization of their presence, these 
groups were also reduced to spectacles that intensified their reification. Chapter Four also 
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analyzes the relationship between new media technologies and the post-independence task of 
building a nation-state oriented toward modernization. The latter simply means allowing 
capitalism to expand unhampered. This endeavour included the installation of the public 
sphere that reflected the liberal elite version of postcolonial democracy. The narrative in this 
chapter recounts the tension between the public sphere and the culture industry that have 
separately and jointly solicited colonial spectres. One area that deserves particular attention is 
the relationship between elite rule and the culture industry that brought reification, as 
similarly experienced in advanced capitalist countries but in a condition of postcoloniality, the 
alienation is arguably more acute.  
Chapter Five looks at the shifts in orientation and convention of new media technologies in 
the period of authoritarian rule in the Philippines. What will be underscored is their 
emancipatory potential in a time of censorship and the logic of iteration that functioned to 
provide a space for the articulation of dissident views. In this period of repression, new media 
technologies have been creatively shaped by political forces to outwit dictatorial control. In 
this scenario, one can deduce that the flow of images, texts, or sounds is inconsequential 
unless they undergo disruption, mediation and iteration, in technological and political terms. 
This link suggests the dynamism of representation when tied to a project of social 
transformation. Chapter Six brings the analysis to bear on the contemporary networked world, 
particularly how digital technology emerges with the neoliberal ideology of free market 
economy and the globalization of financial capital that has dictated the terms of labour, 
market, and representation. This trend, popularly known as globalization, has the capacity to 
synthesize representations around new media technologies that also make possible their 
modification, calculation, transmission, and determination. The supposed boundaries no 
longer hold between opposites, as between private and public, past and present, and local and 
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global, and yet this blurring of lines also brings more interpretations, repetitions, meanings, 
and spectres. In this epoch, almost everything has to pass through new media technologies, to 
be disrupted, re-produced, and re-presented according to imperatives of the market.  
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                                                                                               CHAPTER  3 
COLONIALISM: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION, CONQUEST AND 
THE INFINITY OF INJUSTICE 
Introduction  
The Philippines’s experience of being a colony of Spain and the United States for three 
hundred fifty years follows an archetypal colonial plot; the colony was a source of wealth, 
power, and prestige for the colonizers, and these gains were worth more than the adversities 
and resistance they encountered (Said, 1994, p. 10-11; Scott, 1982, p.3-4). The colonizers 
introduced the artefacts of civilization – weapons, machines, ways of thinking, and so forth – 
that were not only vital to the function of a colonial regime. Importantly, they projected 
superiority onto a society that is deemed backward, superstitious, and obscure – hence it had 
to be integrated into the civilized world at large. 
The link between power and civilizing artefacts is more compelling when seen through 
technologies of representation that are crucial to the instrumentality of colonialism in the 
Philippines. These technologies intend to rationalize the colonized subjectivities but, in 
retrospect, they are primarily tools for domination. It is a fact that the two colonial regimes in 
the Philippines controlled the representational technologies to induce subservience among 
colonial subjects.  Starting with the printing press in the Spanish colonial era and continuing 
with newspapers and radio during the American rule, censorship and repression attended the 
use of new media technologies all throughout the colonial period. It appears that the colonial 
regimes paid less attention to technologies that improve labour power and more to those that 
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shaped the “labouring bodies,” because while the former are primarily concerned with 
material production, the latter dealt mainly with capacities to think and reflect. Thus, 
corporeal repression was effective to the extent that it was accompanied by the suppression of 
mechanisms through which repression and its consequences can be known.  
The control of technologies of representation was meant to eliminate the unknowable 
condition that these technologies could give rise to, a condition that Derrida termed iteration 
(Derrida, 1994, p.10-11). The latter designates more than just the repetition of sameness, 
resulting in the plurality of meanings. Iteration is a condition of possibility, or the possibility 
of the  emergence of something unknowable and indeterminable. Iteration also suggests the 
irreducibility of representation to a singular interpretation, or the capacity of representation to 
generate infinite meanings. At the same time, the indeterminacy of iteration is constitutive of 
the logic of new media technologies where repetition and differentiation are both inherent in 
the technical and discursive effects of their genres and conventions. The subversive possibility 
of iteration in new media technologies in the Philippines will be the focus of this chapter.  
In revisiting colonialism in the Philippines through a critique of new media technologies, I 
will deal with the concept of history that is constituted through a relation to the “other.” By 
this I mean not the history that references the “other” but one that constructs itself through the 
possibility of being “other.” An important aspect in the latter is the notion that there can be no 
single or arche-history, only “differentiated histories” attuned to certain “types, rhythm and 
modes of inscription” (Derrida, 1981, p.57-8).  This Derridean notion of history builds on the 
existing yet neglected specifics and particularities; however their interpretation is not meant to 
designate the truth, or what he termed the “finished signified,” but rather to look for the 
possibilities underlying unforeseen events (Derrida, 1981, p.63). Adorno posed a similar 
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challenge to “rectilinear” history, written from the standpoint of the dominant order, which 
could result in “blind spots” and overlooked intervals because it only privileged the victory-
defeat narrative that often excludes the silenced (Adorno, 1974, p.151).  Adorno and Derrida 
separately endorsed a material and messianic concept of history, which addresses the 
encounter and anticipation of alterity that, when applied in postcolonial theory, could account 
for certain singularities within a structured and totalizing experience (Syrotinski, 2007, p.12). 
By attending to the “other” of history, I hope to retrospectively bring new insights on 
contestable circumstances that commence with the colonial conquest of the Philippines. 
In the three sections of this chapter, I will examine the colonial history of the Philippines to 
reveal the transformative possibilities of new media technologies. Of interest here is the way 
that new media technologies intensify the logic of iteration that simultaneously brings 
coherence and instability to a colonial society. The first section provides a historical sketch of 
the Spanish and American regimes that were actualized through conditions that contributed to 
the technicization of the colonized society. In other words, this section is about how new 
media technologies formed part of the territorial conquests of colonial powers as well as the 
possibility of their destabilization. The second section explores colonialist claims of 
colonialism that perpetuate the idea of universal progress through Western Enlightenment and 
the unquestioned instrumentalism of capitalism. Colonial control, which includes social, legal 
and political functions, corresponds to the imperatives of capitalist production in the colony. I 
will argue that the complexity and variability of the mode of production that capitalism 
transformed have a connection with the way that social hierarchies were formed out of class, 
racism, racial stereotypes, and control over representational technologies. The third and last 
section of the chapter focuses on the transformative possibilities of new media technologies, 
particularly their capacity to interrupt the reproduction of colonial subjection, and the way this 
104 
is actualized through the logic of iteration that, ironically, is also the process through which 
the colonial regimes were undermined. 
3.1    Revisiting the Colonial Past 
The Philippines reveals capitalism’s growth as it came under the colonial rule of Spain for 
three hundred years and under the United States for nearly half a century. The economic shifts 
that took place in Europe and America resonated in colonial Philippines as the object of 
capitalism’s expansion.  The beginning of the Spanish conquest in 1521 occured in an era of 
primitive accumulation in Europe marked by the dispossession of domestic peasants and, in 
the colonies, through plunder, slave trading, exaction of tributes and long distance commerce 
to support the theocratic and feudal rulers of Spain. This mercantilist commerce accelerated 
the circulation of commodities needed by industrial capital in Europe (Constantino, 1975, 
p.17; Abbinnett, 2007, p.117-118). When the U.S. annexed the Philippines in 1898, the 
former was a young industrial giant in its imperialist stage, noted for its dominance on 
financial capital and aggressiveness in finding new markets and raw material sources 
(Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, p.5). Whether under Spain or the U.S., the Philippines colonial 
history is bound up with the growth of capitalism, where political, cultural and technological 
dominance were crucial to the process of colonization. 
3.1.1    The Spanish Conquest 
The Philippines was a Spanish colony from 1565 to 1898, but the islands had been claimed 
for Spain since 1521 by Ferdinand Magellan. The Spanish conquest was fuelled by the goals 
of commerce rather than religious zeal; the long voyages were outfitted for trading, while the 
colonial settlements were built with the intention to amass wealth for the Spanish sovereign 
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(Constantino, 1975, p.12-25; Scott, 1982, p.42-3). Under Spain, the Philippines became an 
entrepot and the staging ground for military and missionary work in Asia (Constantino, 1975, 
p.28, 56).  Manila, the capital, became a transhipment point in the lucrative trade between 
China and Mexico where the latter traded silver for Chinese silk and porcelain. This long 
distance commerce persisted until the 1800s when the colonial administration shifted to 
growing sugar, hemp, tobacco and coffee for export that consequently sealed the Philippines’ 
peripheral position in the global capitalist production, that is, as a source of raw materials for 
industrial manufacturing centres of the West.  
The two feudal institutions established by Spain in the Philippines, namely the encomienda 
and hacienda, mirrored the shifts in capitalism’s growth (Constantino, 1978, p.48-9). The 
encomienda collected tribute in cash and kind to finance the colonial administration and the 
friars; it placed a group of people under one administrator for whom they are rendered free 
labour to build ships, houses, cut timber and produce food, in slave-like fashion (Constantino, 
1975, p.22-23). The exaction of tribute was accompanied by overt cruelty. In 1700s, the 
encomienda was on a decline, but by then it left an imprint on the syncretistic modes of 
production in precolonial Philippines that ranged from primitive communalism, subsistence 
settlements and some feudal communities in southern areas, all characterized by differing 
labour productivity, limited access to technology (Scott, 1982, p.112-119; 143-147).  The 
hacienda is a production system established in vast private estates where crops are grown for 
export. The exploitation in the haciendas rested on feudal relations, but the system is an 
offshoot of capitalism’s dominance, where surplus accumulation served to facilitate growth in 
the general rate of profit (Constantino, 1975, p.130; Abbinnett, 2006, p.118). These two 
production systems expressed configurations of capitalism in a colonial society. 
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In the third volume of Capital, Marx’s account on land rent has similarities with the 
production system in hacienda, where the flow of capital to land property ensured 
accumulation of surplus through the use of land as the means of production, the exploitation 
of workers through the payment of low wages, and rationalization of production in line with 
world markets. This system presupposed other developments in the colony: circulation of 
money and availability of credit, improved transportation, global commerce, and access to 
technology and information. Whereas in the encomienda exploitation came from the exaction 
of tribute that is direct and coercive, the hacienda was subtler as it was not always with force 
and compulsion but also with specious consent and reciprocity (McCoy, 1991, p.4). However 
both the encomienda and hacienda, typified Marx’s account of primitive accumulation that 
David Harvey modified as “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2005, p.160, 178-179). 
Both involved peasants losing their lands and designate their exploitation through forced 
labour, tribute, and the onerous rent or low wages that are integral to the expansion of 
capitalism in the colony.  
Marx termed primitive accumulation as an inhuman process “written in the annals of mankind 
in letters of blood and fire,” while Harvey posited that it varies across places and in the ways 
it “attacks, erodes, dissolves and transforms” pre-capitalist societies (Marx, 1976, p.875; 
Harvey, 2006, p.416).  Primitive accumulation is also the process of capital’s subsumption of 
labour power. The violence that accompanied this drive for surplus value, such as pillage, 
looting, corporal punishment, and killings of recalcitrant natives, reminded us that the 
expansion of capitalism cannot be smooth that it has to be accompanied by the extra-
economic means. I argue that throughout the colonial era in the Philippines, primitive 
accumulation foreclosed possibilities for the full growth of domestic capitalism through the 
development of the forces of production.  In the case of hacienda, colonialism strengthened 
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the feudal relations so to sustain the export crop production that eventually imparted to the 
colony its overall value within the global circuits of capitalism. The hacienda has outlived 
colonial times and survived to this day; it testifies to its effectiveness in securing surplus 
value. 
The integration of the Philippines in the global capital market unified the country for the ease 
of the Spanish colonial administration. It had made export-crop production its major 
economic activity, treating other economic activities as ancillaries. But the harmonization of 
production toward the world market also brought disruptive breaks that destabilized the 
colonial rule as evidenced by hundreds of peasant rebellions that erupted due to loss of land, 
food shortage, and the cruelty of landlords (Constantino, 1978, p.43-46). The import of huge 
volumes of cotton from England, as return cargo for Philippine sugar, had caused the demise 
of the thriving weaving industry in central Philippines and the proletarianisation of peasants. 
The colonial trade monopoly of tobacco, for instance, only benefitted the few that the scheme 
eventually collapsed due to the resentment of growers (Constantino, 1975, p.134-5). 
Underlying the colonial trade pattern were violence, immiseration, backwardness, and 
exploitation of the peasantry that all had to be contained by patronage, passivity, and 
subservience that were taught by the Catholic church, the chief propagator of colonial culture. 
Colonialism also shaped its prerogatives through racism. Often seen as a symptom of 
Eurocentric universalism, racism, however, has its roots deep in the existing social relations 
and practices of reproducing meanings, or representation. Racism, I will argue, relates to class 
and the politics of representation more than simply as the idea of an “other” assigned by the 
colonizer. I maintain that race prefigured class but both have a role to play in the growth of 
capitalism in the Philippines. As such, racism remains the central issue in discussing 
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colonialism, not only because of how racial assumptions justify colonial conquest, but also 
because racism is inseparable from the growth of capitalism in the country. In the Philippines, 
as in other Spanish colonies, the natives were classified along racial lines (Taylor, 2007, 
p.52). It is not that the precolonial Philippines did not have any form of social hierarchy; 
rather, colonialism reconfigured the economic base of the indigenous social categorization 
and transplanted its notion of racial superiority into colonial subjects. At the apex are the 
peninsulares, or Spaniards born in Spain, next to them are the insulares, or those born in the 
colony, then the mestizos, or those of mixed race, and below them, or at the bottom, were the 
indios or natives. Political, cultural, and economic power were obtained, used and controlled 
around these social divisions that also manifested forms of horizontal oppression among 
natives, for example the importance attached to physical features and gradient of skin colour 
(Constantino, 1975; Shohat and Stam, 1994, p.19). However, the racial exclusivity was 
steadily breached by the growing population of mestizos, who were products of intermarriages 
between the Spanish, Chinese, and the natives. This made possible the rethinking of racial 
division and miscegenation on the part of the colonizer. The mestizos vied to become a 
progressive force, aided by their access to education and strong presence in the economy as 
big landlords, traders, and commercial agents, the opportunities that were denied to the 
natives. Some of them studied in elite learning institutions in the Philippines and in Spain, and 
became propagators of European culture and liberal ideas that consequently invited 
prosecution from colonial authorities and the Catholic church (Constantino, 1975, p.143-5). 
The Church played a major role in the maintenance of racist policies, class divisions and 
reifying cultural practices while feudalism flourished in the vast friar estates.  
The subordinate classes – peasant, small landowners and farm and urban labourers— bore the 
brunt of exploitation and predation of the Spanish colonial rule. Unlike the mestizos who had 
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a sense of belonging to the colonial system, the subalterns were considered the “other” and 
denied representation. In all, the way in which classes emerged from racial differentiation is 
attributed to the Spanish colonial regime and the growth of international capitalism. The 
interplay of race and class resulted in the reproduction of racial hierarchy based upon, and 
also intensified by, class differentiation. Thus, the class antagonisms that developed 
implicated the colonial racial hierarchy but this does not mean that by eliminating racist 
practices class oppression would have ended. 
Given the colonial class structure, there was little or no chance for formal and public reforms 
in the colony. The Church and colonial administration resorted to censorship and open 
persecution of anti-colonial sentiments. It was no surprise that waves of anti-colonial 
resistance came from peasant-based millenarian or nativist groups. These movements were 
generally linked to agrarian unrest, launched against land grabbing, collection of tribute, 
forced labour, and abuses of Spanish friars (Ileto, 1979; Constantino, 1975, p.89). The 
plebeian revolts were distinguished for the use of animism, indigenous rituals and emergence 
of self-styled leaders who promised their followers a utopian future. They attempted the 
revival of pre-Christian beliefs to challenge the imposed religion and Hispanization. I argued 
that these subaltern rebellions were primarily solicited by primitive accumulation, which is a 
form of reification, in the colonial regime. 
The bourgeois and mestizos’ rebellion came much later, through what is known as the 
Propaganda Movement, in the last decades of the nineteenth century, and was initiated by 
Filipino exiles in Spain called ilustrados, or “the enlightened” ones. They pushed for political 
and economic reforms in the colony and demanded formal representation in the Spanish 
legislature. However they were more effective through their writings. Their books, periodicals 
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and other printed tracts, which were smuggled into the Philippines, articulated the concepts of 
formal rights and freedoms, and exposed the obscurantism of Spanish friars. What Derrida 
said about writing as iteration was true in the case of the ilustrados, that is, writing is an 
event, marked by its iterability, which not only multiplies to the plurality of interpretations, it 
also brings various speaking positions together which anticipate various reactions to ‘the 
event’ (Glendinning, 1998, p.113). Iteration, as a condition of possibility, was evident when 
the propaganda movement inspired the formation of a plebeian-led revolutionary group called 
Katipunan, which staged armed uprisings. Later, the enlightened bourgeoisie were at the helm 
of the revolution but this leadership was not without intrigues, vacillations, and betrayals of 
revolutionary goals. The armed resistance proved too much for the moribund Spanish empire, 
and soon victory was within the revolutionaries’ grasp. However, Spain chose to surrender to 
the United States in 1898, ceding the Philippines to the later for twenty million dollars. Thus, 
another chapter in the Philippines’s colonial history unfolded. 
3.1.2     American Imperialism 
The Philippines’s colonial experience under the United States, from 1899 until its nominal 
independence in 1946, happened during the imperialist phase of capitalism. As sketched by 
Lenin, imperialism names the dominance of financial capital and intense rivalry between 
centres of capitalism over markets and raw material sources (Lenin, 2005, online). At this 
stage, there was an “accelerated penetration” of non-capitalist zones by developed capitalist 
economies that consolidated the global capitalist system (Parry, 2004, p.108). Aside from 
intensification of capital’s growth in the colony, what distinguishes the U.S. rule from that of 
Spain is the dominance of cultural production through the culture industry, which, arguably, 
was the necessary component of its economic exploitation and a signifier of U.S. imperialism. 
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In the second half of the nineteenth century, the U.S. emerged as a powerful industrial nation 
evidenced by the rise of huge corporations and the growth of monopolies (Schirmer and 
Shalom, 1987, p.5-6). No sooner, it experienced a crisis of overproduction and 
underconsumption that threw millions of workers out of work, severely affecting industrial 
and agricultural production. American capitalists believed that the way out of the crisis was 
the expansion of foreign markets and thus the U.S. eyed the vulnerable Spanish colonies in its 
backyard, including the Philippines, which could become its gateway to Asian markets like 
China (Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, p.5; Constantino, 1975, p.289). The U.S aided the 
Cubans in a revolt against Spain and proceeded to the Philippines where Spain was 
considerably weakened by Filipino revolutionaries. American rule in the Philippines was 
formalized through the Treaty of Paris on October 1898, thus commencing what the 
Americans called “Benevolent Assimilation,” which is carried out through systematic use of 
violence and co-optation. 
What the Philippines granted the American capitalists is its relative advantage as the source of 
cheap labour power and raw materials. However, the U.S. ensured that what the colony 
produced did not compete with American industries hence there was no push for 
industrialization in the Philippines while exploitation remained consistent with Marx’s 
analysis of primitive accumulation. The U.S. also tried to eliminate competitions from 
Spanish, British and other European traders in the Philippines by reorienting the market 
toward the American economy. The trade imbalance between the two countries expressed the 
reification of value: the colony’s agricultural products had to measure up to the value of 
imported industrial commodities, a disparity that can only be superficially harmonized by 
money. This unequal exchange was underpinned by capital’s imperative to situate itself in 
places where the rate of profit is highest. 
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The U.S. considered it profitable to maintain the feudal relations in haciendas that produced 
sugar to meet the U.S. export quota (Constantino, 1975, p.306). More lands were opened for 
this purpose, including those seized from Spanish friars. Under American rule, the mestizos, 
who once sided with the subaltern, enjoyed the opportunities for employment, higher 
education and position under the American colonial government. Class, this time, has less to 
do with lineage but more with access and control of economic power from where political 
influence proceeds. Social relations were shaped around the control of the means of 
production. However it was also true that the Americans reconfigured the existing class 
structure to fit with the surplus-oriented and utilitarian rationality. 
No class, however, was spared from the U.S. hegemony that corresponded to the logic of the 
market. The flood of imports changed the consumption habits of Filipinos while the culture 
industry - films, music magazines, radio, newspapers, and so forth “Americanized” the colony 
(Constantino, 1978, p.68, 78). The cultural invasion was premised on the notion that the U.S. 
brought “progress” to the colony and consumption of commodities meant self-actualization, 
autonomy, and being modern. It was an ideological strategy to blur the differences between 
the colonized and the colonizer, as it appeared that they shared identical interests and desires 
(Constantino, 1978, p.80).  
Racism and the myth of white supremacy were constitutive assumptions of the U.S. colonial 
policy in the Philippines. The point of examining racism is to bring out its intensification that 
is crucial to the hegemony of the U.S. colonial rule premised on equivalence, abstraction and 
hierarchy of values. Racism manifested systematic violence in the early years of U.S. colonial 
rule, particularly during the Filipino-American War (1899-1902) when American troops 
resorted to torture, killing of prisoners and civilians, and applying the scorched earth policy – 
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acts that foreshadowed the atrocities in Vietnam (Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, p.7; 
Constantino, 1975, p. 247). With their superior firepower, the Americans defeated the 
Filipinos but when the latter resorted to guerrilla warfare, the Americans retaliated with 
impunity. To this day, the number of Filipinos killed in the war was unsettled but historians 
estimated it to be between 300,000 to one million while the American casualties were about 
7,000 out of the 30,000 troops sent to the Philippines (San Juan, 1999, 61-2; Schirmer and 
Shalom, 1987, p.19). Rosa Luxemburg did not miss the brutalities of American rule in the 
Philippines when she wrote in 1902: “On the Asiatic coast, washed by the waves of the ocean, 
lie the smiling Philippines . . . there, American rifles mowed down human lives in heaps  . . . 
“(Luxemburg, n.d. online).  
Race is crucial to the examination of American imperialism because the latter used racial 
assumptions to argue against granting the Philippines its independence. Racism was behind 
the portrayal that Filipinos were unfit to govern themselves. This infantilization posited that 
Filipinos were politically immature, they had no concept of democracy and equality, and it is 
necessary for them to have a “long period of tutelage in self-government” (Zwick, 2007, p.36; 
Shohat and Stam, 2004, p.140; Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, p.25).  Thus, the Philippine 
Assembly, established by the Americans in 1907, brought together men from the elite, 
educated, and property-owning class to be trained to represent themselves. As well, the 
successive presidents, who were elected during the American colonial period and onwards, 
were judged by their loyalty to the Americans’ interests. Altruism also cloaked the racism of 
colonial education that saw the establishment of the universal public school system, which 
was the centrepiece of the pacification campaign. It commenced with the arrival of hundreds 
of American teachers to teach English and civics, the aim of which was to produce compliant 
colonial subjects (Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, p.45; Constantino, 1975, p.314). 
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The Americans also tried to restrict mechanisms of representation, among them newspapers, 
through harsh censorship laws and by establishing American-owned newspapers in the 
Philippines in the first decade of the U.S. colonial rule (Lent, 1973, p. 9). The censorship 
intended to blunt colonial resistance and the clamour for independence (Lent, 1973, p.10). 
The American press primarily portrayed the colony in an Orientalist light and also justified 
colonial rule (Brody, 2010, p.6). Local periodicals devoted substantial pages to advertising 
and literary pursuits that popularize the English language. The availability of newspapers, 
along with the rise of the literacy rate, expanded the reach of the culture industry. The 
popularity of print media occasioned Filipino journalists to push the limits of censorship laws 
by publishing anti-colonial pieces that unmasked deceptive rhetoric of American democracy 
and free trade, and advocated for self-rule (Lent, 1973, p. 10). In the 1920s, radio started its 
test broadcasts in the Philippines but in ten years it became a vehicle for entertainment and 
spread of consumerism (Lent, 1973, p.15). I will say more about the ambivalence of new 
media technologies in the last section of this chapter but for now, it is suffice to say that 
representational technologies provided the conditions for the institutionalization of racism, 
Orientalism, and consumerism. 
The exponential growth of the culture industry did not end the censorship; it only provided 
more opportunities to expand the American hegemony at a time when anti-colonial sentiments 
were growing among marginalized classes, foremost among them was the peasant class whose 
conditions revealed alienating consequences from its confrontation with the logic of 
capitalism. Millenarian and nativist groups reprised their uprising against `U.S. colonial rule, 
retaining their religious garb, folk Christianity rituals, and utopian longing (Constantino, 
p.349). Unlike during the Spanish colonial period when these groups were seen as threats to 
Catholicism, this time they were considered as bandits and fanatics, or threats to law and 
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order. Thus, their resistance resulted in mass arrests, killings, and land evictions while their 
demands for land and jobs were largely ignored (San Juan, 1999, p.78). These occurred in the 
1930s when the U.S. Depression seriously affected Philippine exports. The radicalization of 
peasants and workers was also attributed to the emergence of the Communist Party of the 
Philippines, which took political positions on self-rule and international solidarity against 
imperialism. Political restiveness continued until the eve of World War II, when the struggle 
against fascism and Japanese invasion saw the organization of the “People’s Army to Fight 
Japan,” Huk for short, a peasant-based guerrilla force that fought alongside American and 
regular Filipino soldiers against Japanese troops. However, after they war, Huk members were 
persecuted for espousing communist views. The witch-hunt continued well into the Cold War 
era after the formal independence of the Philippines from the U.S. in 1946, when landlords 
and the elite took over.  
In sum, the colonial rule of Spain and the U.S. was exercised through racism and economic 
exploitation, and this double oppression was accomplished through the use of overt violence 
and co-optation.  Racism manifested a plethora of ethnocentric, altruistic and infantilizing 
discourses, in which the mechanisms of colonial representations were complicit. The 
economic exploitation in the Philippines echoes Marx’s description of primitive accumulation 
that secured the conditions for the growth of capitalism in the country. The mode of 
production that emerged was uneven and syncretistic, one in which feudalism and other pre-
capitalist modes of production reinforced capitalism’s strategy of surplus accumulation and 
appropriation in the colony. The shifts in the modes of production, however uneven these 
were, also brought change to social processes of production, to include realms of formal and 
symbolic representation (Harvey, 1982, p.120-121; Marx, 1976, p. 383-384). The changes, 
however, cannot be subordinated to economic forces because the process of rationalization, 
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along with its iteration, disrupts and modifies the horizon of experience and meaning 
(Stiegler, 2009, p.2-3). Rationalization is inseparable from the use of new media technologies 
through which colonial hegemony was exercised. Under the Spanish colonial period, this 
condition translated to a regime that privileged control and secrecy while under American 
rule, this corresponded to uniformity and multiplication of consumerist desires. The latter was 
accomplished through technological mediation of representation. In the next section, I will 
elucidate the reification of this mediatic process that solicits spectres.  
3.2    Colonialism as Restricted Economy 
The previous section showed how a reconfigured mode of production gave rise to various 
forms of representation enabled by new media technologies. Representation was a response to 
reification in economic, political, and social domains under colonial rule. This suggests that 
representation is a catalytic action while reification is also a condition that reveals the 
possibility of its termination. In what follows, I will discuss how the hermetic injustice of a 
colonial regime could undermine its own legitimacy and open up spaces for its 
impermanence. In other words, it will be an account of how the programmatic conditions that 
close off possibilities actually solicit spectres. 
Franz Fanon considered colonialism a violent act of colonizers that divides the colony into 
two-zones -- the dominant and the dominated or the uncivilized and the civilized (Fanon, 
1963, p.27-29). Violence, for Fanon, arises from the estrangement of the symbolic from the 
economic system that predominates (Fanon, 1963, p.30).  The objective, he notes, is to 
obliterate the colonial subjects’ capacity to remember and enact their old ways, and what 
better way to facilitate this than to disparage their culture as inferior. The erasure of memory 
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is a form of violence, where memory is a weapon to hone one’s subjectivity and judgment. 
Marx’s notion of primitive accumulation serves to underpin the violence that Fanon names. 
Violence, to recall Marx, is inseparable from the ways in which primitive accumulation was 
introduced (Marx, 1976, p.927). Primitive accumulation is the route through which 
colonialism and capitalism were embedded in the Philippines. It provides the condition for 
surplus production in order to accelerate the growth of money capital in the centres of 
capitalism. In Capital, Marx described this process of surplus accumulation as having brutal 
consequences in its use of “forcible methods” of “thievery, predation, violence and abuse of 
power” (Marx, 1976, p.927-30; Harvey, 2010, p.291). These methods indicate the separation 
of peasants from their land through land grabbing, enclosures, exaction of tribute, usury, 
proletarianisation, and other extra-economic means. Primitive accumulation thus marks the 
long, uneven, and indentured process of subordinating people to capital that necessarily 
involved the denial of their distinctive subjectivities, in order to maximize the production of 
surplus value. 
Although this is an argument contrary to the fact, still it is worth asking, hypothetically: is it 
possible for primitive accumulation to bypass the brutalities when installing capitalism? Rosa 
Luxemburg’s account of the expansion of capital noted the importance of non-capitalist areas 
for the accumulation of surplus as one way in which capitalism works. In The Accumulation 
of Capital, Luxemburg argues that capital will saturate and dominate countries where the 
mode of production is not predominantly capitalist, while the conditions of exploitation 
installed there are more ruthless than what could be tolerated under purely capitalist 
conditions (Luxemburg, 1951, p.366-374). By pointing out that capitalism requires an 
“other,” Luxemburg has amplified Marx’s notion of primitive accumulation and brought it to 
bear on colonialism as the means to secure markets in order to stave off the structural crisis of 
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capitalism (Luxemburg, 1951, p.350). However, while Luxemburg notes the possibility of 
change arising from the economic crises inherent in capitalism, that is, the tendency to expand 
and the limited capacity of consumption, she, like Marx, confined this chance to centres of 
capitalism in Europe and America, where capitalism is advanced and with a more defined 
working class (Cliff, 1983, p. 56). And yet she was aware of the complexities of various 
forms of resistance against capitalism, as a consequence of the lopsided and hierarchical 
division of labour that allowed the plunder and direct expropriation of resources (Luxemburg, 
1951, p.375-98). The limited growth of the forces of production in the colony resulted in the 
inchoate presence of the proletariat, but the struggle for self-determination enlisted an 
admixture of subaltern classes and groups, thereby providing class character to the anti-
colonial struggle.  
A colonial economy may appear peripheral to overall capitalist production but its position 
invariably extends the parameters and opportunities for capitalism. I contend that these 
conditions do not invalidate Marx’s notion of primitive accumulation, or Luxemburg’s idea of 
capitalism’s “other,” but, in fact, recognize the crucial role of technicization in structuring the 
economic and social power of capitalism. The reconfiguration offered by technicization, by 
itself, does not guarantee an outright alteration of class structures and ownership of the means 
of production. But what it offers is the possibility of instantiating difference and radical shifts 
as a result of repetition, simulation and dissemination within a differentiated reality. What 
primitive accumulation in colonial Philippines reveals for new media technologies is an 
unevenness of growth; new media technologies can be subordinate to or decisive in the 
development of productive forces but nonetheless constitutive of the evolving social relations 
and consciousness. In them, one can read the embodied techniques and symbolic forms that 
make up the lifeworld, as well as the social relations and the possibilities for new media 
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technologies. Shifts also take place as a result of their mutual interaction thus making new 
media technologies in consonant with and exceeding the demands of surplus accumulation. In 
this manner, the condition of possibility gets transfigured in technologies even in conditions 
of repression. 
In his reading of Marx’s Capital, Harvey, who echoed Luxemburg’s points on the expansion 
of production, posits that technologies are subject to the logic of production and judgment 
rendered in consumption and reproduction of life (Harvey, 2010, p.209). For Harvey, 
technologies perform the repetitive, mechanical tasks that undermine variable capital. They 
simulate the capacity of labour power and stimulate the need to lengthen the working day. At 
the same time, technologies were made to come to terms with whoever takes hold and deploys 
them, along with the consequences that such access and control could bring. The 
intensification of struggle over access and dominance over technologies brings them to a point 
where they either alienate or uplift humanity. However, I argued at the outset that the 
conditions of alterity and repetition reproduced by technologies pave the way for unknowable 
political contingencies to emerge. Hence, if we map out the consequences of new media 
technologies in the uneven terrain of capital growth in a colonial regime, we can infer that 
capital’s operation subsumes and centralizes whatever it is that generates surplus value. 
However this sphere of exchange, where forcible ways of expropriation occur, could also pose 
a challenge to homogenization.  
Colonialism, I contend, can be examined as a theory of modernity where the notion of 
progress is central to its conceptualization. Progress is associated with rationalism, 
technological advances in the process of production and belief in universal ideals and truths. 
Colonialism is bound up with capitalism, which is presented as the project of modernity 
120 
rooted in the Enlightenment. The latter names an eighteenth century movement in Europe that 
encouraged individuals to take a critical attitude towards any form of dogma and political 
authority, through the exercise of reason (Kant, 1991, p.54-55). In his essay, “What is 
Enlightenment,” Immanuel Kant did not fix the age of Enlightenment to a particular time but 
sees it as a movement toward its fruition (Kant, 1991, p.58-59). In The Origin of Capitalism, 
Ellen Meiksins Wood argues that the Enlightenment transcends the historical specificity of 
capitalism and while rationalization and modernity are what Enlightenment shares with 
capitalism, they can also be historically located in non-capitalist society just as in pre-
capitalist society (Wood, 2002, p. 182-183). In other words, Wood cautions against the facile 
conflation of Enlightenment with capitalism or modernity because this may “disguise the 
specificity of a non-capitalist modernity” (Wood, 2002, p.182). While Wood’s warning is 
helpful in delineating the historical paths of modernity in Europe, it cannot sufficiently 
account for other forms of modernity when the rationale of capitalism is also the premise of 
modernity as domination. In other words, the connection between capitalism and colonial 
conquest are complex that the economic system, imposed upon non-capitalist society, pulls 
everything to its advantage. Granted that the Enlightenment was historically rooted in non-
capitalist society and social relations, Adorno and Horkheimer however maintain that the 
orientation of reason, which includes rational autonomy and the crucial role of technology in 
the dissemination of knowledge, stages the logic of capitalism (Adorno and Horkheimer, 
1997, p.3-4). Adorno did not view reason evolving toward that which enables humans to act 
morally and live an ethical life but, in fact, towards instrumentality. Surplus accumulation and 
the expansion of the market nullify the exercise of rational autonomy, which has less to do 
with the struggle against nature and more to do with control of individuals. Hence, if on one 
hand, freedom and reason are at the core of Enlightenment’s goals, the historic forms that 
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represented them have brought out their destructive elements on the other hand (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 1997, p.90). The idea of modernity as regression was examined in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment where it is argued that economic productivity that indicated progress did not 
liberate humanity but instead brought forth “a new kind of barbarism” (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 1997, p.xi).  
The Enlightenment has secularised the idea of progress when it is posited that history 
advances primarily due to humanity’s effort and not through a universalistic principle of free 
reason (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997, p.xiv). Science, at the helm of progress, leads to the 
path of calculability and instrumentalism that, for Adorno, demands the submission of 
subjectivities and nature to a compulsion of equivalence (Adorno, 1998, p.148-9). The 
reification of progress is a function of identity-thinking that effaces singularities and 
constrains categories, and whose origin is inseparable from the history of domination 
(Adorno, 1998, p.149).  Thus, if colonization is a “civilizing mission,” which aims to 
transplant modernity into other lands, it does not arrive with an agenda to install positive 
rights and recognize agency. In fact this colonization is maintained by the dual operation of 
capitalism and racism. Concretely, the colonial subjects are twice dominated, in the relations 
of exchange that bear on production and consumption, and in the process of representation 
where meanings become manipulable and commensurable with the myths of egoistic 
individualism. For Adorno, these myths find expression in structures and mechanisms that 
render the subject passive and yielding to the goals of domination that became even more 
entrenched as the capitalism expands. He adds that the evolution of rationality is coeval with 
the transformation of capitalism in which the culture industry is part of what sustains 
domination. Adorno and Horkheimer wrote that the culture industry bears an imprint of their 
degradation in their “calculation of effectiveness and of the techniques of production and 
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distribution” (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979, p.xvi). What they articulate for colonialism is 
that the underlying logic of intensification, centralization and standardization, which are 
intrinsic to the expansion of capital and the instrumental conventions of new media 
technologies, are what constitute domination. As these reached down to the society’s aesthetic 
sensibilities, individuals became incapable of taking a critical stance toward their own society. 
The conditions of the colonial Philippines and Adorno’s Europe in modern technocratic 
capitalism fundamentally differ, if we grant the dissimilarity between primitive accumulation 
in a colonial context and flexible production of industrial capitalism. One of the salient issues 
in the former, and which has the potential to be critiqued through Adorno’s negative 
dialectics, is racism. I have argued that racism, which emerges alongside colonial domination, 
can be teased out of Adorno’s notion of progress as regression and theory of negative 
dialectics.  Adorno’s engagement with the problematic of race was eloquent in the essay that 
he co-wrote with Horkheimer, “The Elements of Anti-Semitism: The Limits on 
Enlightenment,” in which anti-semitism is woven into racist thinking and the values of fascist 
and racist groups. Adorno and Horkheimer argued that racism is rooted in fetishism as a false 
projection that through fascist rationalization converts the “ambient world into a diabolical 
system” (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979, p.187). False projection is a thinking that ascribes 
negativity to the “other,” who is likewise blamed as the source of a social pathology, and in 
this case, racism. Adorno and Horkheimer maintain that false projection is more of a cover-up 
for self-preservation as it is premised on incommensurability arising from racist assumptions 
(Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979, p.195-6). Thus, while the comparison yields something that 
is taken to be objective, (i.e. on the basis of physiognomy) false association is a sinister 
ground used to assess racial superiority (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979, p.196; San Juan, 
1999, p.129).  Analogous to Adorno and Horkheimer’s treatment of fascism and anti-
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Semitism, racism is reification because it renders judgment based on “blind subsumption” and 
“hasty distinctions” that came to be regarded as normal, legal and moral (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 1979, p.201). Their idea of racism could help explain why colonial racism is 
abhorrent to the extent that force is applied to quell and eliminate the racially “other,” in the 
colonial history of the Philippines (San Juan, 2007, p.xv). What makes Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s analysis of racism useful is that not only did they indict capitalism as complicit 
with racism, they also paid attention to the psychological processes, irrationality and cultural 
modalities of race when they argued that racism arises from social relations, which are 
consistent with domination. 
Adorno’s negative dialectic can elucidate racism, when the latter is analysed as value that 
inscribes itself on the “other.” Racism is regarded as a condition that is analogous to the 
workings of commodity fetishism. In other words, value, which is quantitatively calculable in 
a commodity, can be projected onto race, wherein one commodity stands for and determines 
the value of the other. Commodity fetishism is peculiar to capitalism and the societies that it 
dominates. The process of reflecting or projecting value not only erases the worth of the other 
but also creates new meanings, forced equivalences and tensions within social relations. In 
identity thinking, Adorno sees the conceptual unification as reification because the idea of 
equivalence suppresses difference and diversity. The repressive parity is not only 
characteristic of concepts but it is also evident in convention, tradition, perspectives, and 
representations in society. Racism ranges such contexts in order to construct and legitimize 
the way it classifies and excludes people on the basis of presumptive claims that moulds 
thinking to its representation of reality (Adorno, 1998, p.253). This naturalization is 
analogous to the enigmatic mediations of commodity fetishism described in Marx’s Capital, 
in which commodities can be exchanged with each other on the basis of measurable abstract 
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human labour, which is the source of value in capitalist production. The commodity form and 
the value relation between products of labour have no connection with physical properties; it 
is the social relations that assume the “fantastic form” of relations between things. Thus, 
commodities acquire a life of their own when value is projected on them. What mediates this 
exchange is money, the universal equivalent that subsumes use value into exchange value and 
concrete labour into abstract labour, as if they were commensurable. Exchange value prevails 
in this scheme of synonymy, so that it then transforms relationships between producers of 
commodities into one of mutual indifference to all content. 
Racism is that property of the dominance between humans or groups in a similar way the 
commodity exchange functions by inflecting the social into the natural through a 
preoccupation with imputed resemblance (San Juan, 1999, p.129-131). In other words, it is an 
imaginary system of representation arising from the process of negation and inscription. 
However, Adorno sees the process not as unity over likeness or opposition but subsumption, 
because the subject projects itself onto an object and, in the process, reduces the object to its 
likeness. Thus, an object is understood in relation to the subject and yet the latter is also 
infected by the reified resemblance, so that the subject is “condemned to nothingness,” a 
hypostasis they both have to suffer simultaneously (Adorno, 1998, p.256). In Adorno’s terms, 
no antithesis could prevail over the universal and particular, or the subject and object, as both 
are attenuated in their reification (Adorno, 1998, p.257).  
Thus Adorno’s submerged arguments on racism via identity-thinking can be posited in this 
way: the moment the “other” is acknowledged, it is also naturalized and imbued with 
attributes necessary for exchange, and then “other” embodies the values of exchange it is 
assigned with; the “other” is deemed inferior and subordinate to a dominant category on the 
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basis of certain claims to difference. The underlying goal of racism is to preserve the social 
relations that guarantee the conditions for exploitation of labour power and the reproduction 
of a resigned and malleable consciousness. Following Adorno’s examination of the 
parameters of modernity, it can be argued that racism is constituted by dual eventualities in 
accordance with the development of capitalism – the marginalization of the colonized by 
virtue of their exploitation of their labour power and the destruction of the colonial subjects’ 
sense of what they are. This unilateral coercion has inhuman elements that are different to 
those of Western capitalist societies. I do not intend to trivialize the effects of capitalism in 
the colonizer’s homeland and disregard the solidarity that could be forged among exploited 
classes, but the colonial violence has to be seen in a different historical register. Primitive 
accumulation coupled with a “civilizing mission,” enabled both overt and, what San Juan calls 
“tributary barbarism,” to designate an official “monopoly of violence and coercive means” 
that keeps the colonized in check, given the absence of legal and civil guarantees enjoyed in 
Western capitalist societies (San Juan, 2009, p.5). In other words, the reification generated by 
racism in an uneven mode of production is not identical in its disparities with that of the 
centres of capitalism where no colonizing power dictates the pace of modernization.  
A similar reified schematization emerged in Derrida’s discussion of restricted economy. The 
latter, I argue, could be analogically designated as capitalism as evinced by Derrida’s reading 
of Marx’s theory of value.  In Writing and Difference, Derrida’s assessment of restricted 
economy is not confined to the primacy given to value but on what is expended, missed or 
lost because of such valorisation. A restricted economy falls within the logic of identity and 
non-contradiction. It unifies value and meaning and then represses them by denying them 
their alterity. Thus while value and meaning circulate, they do so within the constrained 
condition of their utilization, tied to a particular system of absolute knowledge and 
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determining judgment (Derrida, 1978, p.342-5).  Such an economy suppresses the very thing 
that revitalizes it -- the circulation of difference that supplies meaning and accounts for hidden 
values. Restricted economy’s maintenance of stability of meanings and interpretations is also 
maintained through forms of violence. Applied to the double oppression of racism and 
primitive accumulation in a colonial context, a restricted economy constitutes a bias for the 
stability of representations in accordance with dominant norms and political ends. Thus 
Derrida argues for the presence of a general economy that marks and exceeds the limits of 
representation, and transforms interpretive domains and forms of political actions (Derrida, 
1978, p. 345-7). Through the notion of a restricted economy, Derrida reaffirms the importance 
of the “other” as a politico-economic responsibility disavowed by capitalism.  The inverse of 
restricted economy is general economy that, for Derrida, transcends the former because it 
solicits possibilities of reinterpretation which displaces, disjoins, and suffuses all ontological 
determinations. The connection between a restricted economy and colonialisn is simply this: 
if a society exhibits such “restrictions,” it is essentially colonial, or such an economy is 
structurally analogous to a colonial society. However, the specificities have to be spelled out. 
Derrida’s notion of restricted economy is comparable to Adorno’s reification but when 
explicating racism, Adorno’s concept translates to a determination that is still situated in the 
context of a certain form of capitalism that is caught up with identity thinking. In other words, 
racism is confined to a negativity that operates along with a particular rhythm of capitalism. 
However, with Derrida, racism can neither be reduced to a specific condition of capitalism 
nor does its end come with the downfall of capitalism. He refuses to associate the violence of 
racism’s presence to particular historical determination. For as long as a particular presence 
symptomatic of race asserts its dominance and limits the forms of representation possible, 
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racism is at once inevitable and unrealizable, and so are the kinds of exploitation that it 
enables.  
The preceding discussion on modernity and racism in the context of colonial Philippines 
suggest that their conceptions are to be seen as crucially distinct. Modernity is associated with 
the rule of reason but it turned out to be a political domination in the name of reason. We can 
also conclude now that racism is beyond the spurious consideration of colour, clash of culture, 
and the concern for profit. It is all these and much more while acquiring some uncanny 
instrumentality within a colonial order. Thus racism is a thinking that recognizes difference 
but uses it to the advantage of the dominant, and a representation that imposes a dual strategy 
of inclusion and exclusion (San Juan, 1999, p.130-1). Like modernity, racism is also installed 
in the name of reason. In the next section, I will examine the ways how these historically-
encoded contingencies encounter a chance for their undoing through new media technologies.  
3.3    New Media Technologies and the Redress of Colonial Injustice 
Adorno’s critique of instrumental reason would admit an argument that the logic of 
technicization, which allows simulation, repetition and dissemination of representation, 
supports one-dimensionality, depoliticization and infinite injustice. However, technicization, 
if we go by Derrida’s account of the spectre, also permits ethico-political judgment because it 
pries open the determinations, closures, and unquestioned ideals to reveal a gap -- a space of 
contingency. Unlike Adorno, Derrida contends that the intensification and reiteration of 
authority brings possibilities for transformation. The latter is a chance offered by the new 
media technologies that summon spectres. In what follows, I will provide an account of their 
interruptive power in a postcolonial context. 
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In the previous chapters, I have argued that the logic of technicity, which is constitutive of the 
dual movement of iteration and alterity, is inscribed in the epoch of colonization. 
Representation, understood in both a formal and an aesthetic sense, carries a different 
historical weight in the colonial period, which also coincides with the adaption of new media 
technologies as mechanisms of representation. Whereas in societies where these technologies 
have originated, representations are coeval with the growth of capitalism and the emergence 
of a public sphere where less-constrained interaction is possible, the colonial context into 
which they are transplanted has a very limited distribution of control, power and reason. The 
double oppression of economic exploitation and racism brought an inhuman dimension to 
capitalism’s domination and manifested in the way representations are instrumentalized, 
mediated and technicized to serve the colonizers’ interests.  
Edward Said’s Orientalism dwelt extensively on colonial representations through which the 
Orient’s identity is shaped by the presumed superiority of the Occident, such that the Orient is 
depicted as the irrational, childlike, and depraved “other” of the West (Said, 1978, p.20-3; 40-
41). These reified representations repeat the violence of racism that I discussed earlier, such 
that while racism acknowledges difference, it also disavows it in order to preserve the 
inequality of power and material resources. Said notes that the power of Orientalism lies in 
the way that it represents the Orient, not on the basis of its reality but through the elaboration 
of mythologies. In time, this representation appears to have been derived from and justified by 
Orientalism itself. The Philippines, under colonial rule, endured similar representations, 
where colonial subjects were portrayed as menacing, backward and indolent (Brody, 2010, 
p.4). And yet, the same colonial subjects provided the labour power crucial for the 
accumulation of profit in the colony and the global system of accumulation. Said’s 
Orientalism, which is structured by an oppositional logic, bears on new media technologies 
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because it is through them that representations are stored and shaped by dominant frameworks 
(Said, 1978, p.40-1). New media technologies have intensified rather than altered Orientalism; 
they even reinforced the latter through their capacity to encode the “reality” of cultural 
difference. This fetishism also leads to technological orientalism, which is the idea that 
technologies and infrastructure bring irresistible change and democracy (Brody, 2010, p.76). 
Technological orientalism was key to the establishment of control in the colony. Not only did 
it introduce advances in science in otherwise backward societies, it also demonstrated the 
colonizer’s capacity to reconfigure the colony into something familiar and resembling home. 
This scheme includes the designs of cities, transportation system, road networks, schools and 
entertainment areas that were intended to emphasize and tame the “savage nature of (an) 
Oriental culture” (Brody, 2010, p.79).  Technological orientalism also strengthened 
capitalism’s hold over the colony as it facilitates commerce and the creation of market for 
commodities (Brody, 2010, p.80). Likewise, new media technologies presented the colonized 
with aesthetic representations that signify a colonial culture that they should try to mimic. 
Technological orientalism is a form of reified thinking because change, which is associated 
with bourgeois freedom expressed in rights and access to the public sphere, is primarily seen 
in terms of how society embraces technologies and their accompanying control. 
Technological orientalism also echoes Marcuse’s notion of technological fetishism, which 
works by projecting the power of technology onto humans and institutions to establish 
mastery over nature, social relations and consciousness (Marcuse, 1964, p.235). For Marcuse, 
technologies can be invested with instrumental values that neutralize those considered 
traditional and irrational, or make them submit to the imperatives of market and power 
(Feenberg, 2005). Thus, complicit with colonialism, new media technologies articulated such 
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alienating portrayal of the Orient – as a place that lacks civilization and which would benefit 
from adopting a civilized capitalist culture.  
While Said’s arguments on Orientalism as a mode of representation remains mainly on the 
level of the symbolic, they also shed light on the way in which they are mediated by 
technologies. I argue that Said’s critique is resonant of spectres that attend colonial 
representations and the growth of new media technologies. Orientalism, as a logocentric 
discourse, is an erasure of difference that is achieved within the context of colonial 
domination (Syrotinksi, 2007, p.10).  However, this reifying condition can be annulled, not 
through a reverse discourse of Orientalism but though the disruption of its continuity 
(Syrotinski, 2007, p.20). Disruption does not aim to reproduce reifying categories within a 
binary; instead the impossibility of thinking beyond the binary brings other ways of imagining 
another reality. This disruption connotes more than just an interruption of preset conditions 
because it allows mediation, alteration, reconstitution, and re-presentation to simultaneously 
occur with destabilization and subversion. Disruption resonates with iteration or iterability, 
where an intervention solicits new meanings and other ways of acting. Disruption, as 
iteration, is the privilege of spectres that, to recall, refer to ghostlike effects, or traces, that is 
both present and absent, past and future, and lasting and ephemeral (Gasche, 1986, p.186). 
Like value abiding in a commodity, spectres can be suppressed or reconfigured – but 
whatever the conditions, these effects still traverse prohibitions. Spectres are summoned by 
prohibitions of their arrival such as rules, codes, and formulas. These prohibitions are 
presupposed in a colonial society but, at the same time, the very control they imposed invites 
a provocation that allows a space to exceed calculability and programmable effects. With 
spectres, and the undecidable effects they emit, colonialism is undermined, while its laws and 
codes are exposed to constant questioning and threats of dissolution. A dominant 
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representation, like Orientalism, exhibits spectrality, thus it cannot remain as an uninterrupted 
totalizing discourse.  
In concrete terms, spectres represent the effects of new media technologies during the Spanish 
and American colonial period, where print and broadcast media provided the chance for the 
articulation of anti-colonial sentiments, in conditions of censorship and repression. The 
clandestine circulation of banned books, newspapers and other tracts undermined the colonial 
authority and the Catholic church, the two institutions that were behind the maintenance of 
Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines. New media technologies breached the seemingly 
unilateral hold of colonizers over the consciousness of the natives who can then imagine an 
end to centuries of subjection. The role of the ilustrado, or the emerging bourgeoisie, was 
crucial to the technicization and mediation of representation. Their depiction of the abuses in 
the colony was intended to demand colonial reforms but the fiery writings led to a revolution 
that drew on the previous and enduring demands of colonial subalterns. The effects of the 
writing is the function of iteration, where writing is a technique that re-presents something 
that is absent and communicates to readers who are also absent but can be imagined or 
represented in the here and now. Iteration was also behind the emergence of oppositional new 
media technologies during the American colonial period, where censorship and the flood of 
cultural industry products were meant to drown out anti-colonial sentiments. However, 
technological advances in printing, photography, film and broadcasting enabled mass 
reproduction of representations. The latter exhibited aberrant interpretations of the American 
colonial rule that claimed to be a harbinger of progress and democracy. The pro-independence 
sentiments turned the American claims against themselves to expose their duplicity and 
misrepresentation. Once again, these forms of subversion resonated with the logic of spectres. 
In Spectres of Marx, Derrida argues that new media technologies have both presence and 
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absence, and induce certain apparitions that disturb the living present (Derrida, 1994, p.125-
6). The spectres work in two troubling ways – first, it reprograms an event to become 
technologically compliant to its convention, and second, it opens up the event for 
unforeseeable judgments. The haunting occurs in two modes – as techno-logical presence, or 
simulacrum, and re-presentation as ethico-political responsibility. By allowing near-infinite 
variations of the two spectral modes, other representations can be possible (Derrida, 1994, 
p.212; Kamuf, 1996, p.208-10). For Derrida, this allows us to imagine “another space for 
democracy,” (Derrida, 1994, p.212).  
In Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas rendered the bourgeoisie as the 
class behind the installation of the public sphere that is crucial to their economic and political 
interests (Habermas, 1989, p.31). No such space is allowed in a colonial society in the 
Philippines but new media technologies have prefigured the public sphere through their 
effects that allowed the possibility of diverse anti-colonial and utopian demands to be 
articulated. In other words, while the public sphere was absent in the colony, it was 
anticipated in new media technologies. This means that representation becomes a condition of 
possibility because it allows an articulation that reaches back into the past, so that those who 
cannot be physically present can nevertheless speak (Glendinning, 1998, p.116). Iteration 
undermines dominant and prior presence while memory is enlarged to include events and 
subjectivities that are erased.  
The same alterity was present in the use of radio in the anti-colonial struggle in Algeria in the 
1950s. In A Dying Colonialism, Frantz Fanon discussed how radio, which was introduced in 
Algeria to strengthen the French colonial hegemony, became a tool and a site to fight for 
independence (Fanon, 1965).  Radio Alger was the mouthpiece of colonial authority but the 
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proliferation of transistor radio, the emergence of clandestine radio stations, and the variety of 
news and programming available had rendered it impossible for the French to fix the 
reception of the broadcasts. Radio sets, in the context of Algerian colonial struggle, were not 
considered modern gadgets for news but, according to Fanon, they became “. . . the only 
means of entering into communication with the Revolution, of living with it” (Fanon, 1965, 
p.85). Fanon’s account of the radio brings to light the political spectrality inherent in media 
technologies. This spectrality was evident when the French jammed the revolutionary 
broadcasts. The iteration of the broadcasts came in other forms – through relays, the change of 
radio bands, or through an interpreter who repeats the message before a group that also 
discusses it.  In the end, the French strategy failed. Fanon notes that even if the rebel station, 
Voice of Algeria was off-air, it represented the spectre of Algerian independence (Fanon, 
1965, p.87).  Thus, the logic of spectres was at work in the clandestine radio in Algeria, to 
undermine colonial control, even in difficult conditions, and presaged a “free” public sphere. 
The messianic element of the enduring anti-colonial demand for independence was also 
suggested by Fanon who noted that listening to the rebel broadcasts is like “hearing the first 
words of the nation.” 
Conclusion 
In the accounts of the anti-colonial resistance in the Philippine, the possibilities of response to 
domination were propelled by a prefigured public sphere, which was conceived to reflect and 
represent anti-colonial sentiments. While new media technologies were regarded as 
ideological tools for the articulation of a civilizing mission, they were also seen as vehicles to 
undermine colonial hegemony. With new media technologies present in the public sphere, it 
was possible to imagine a postcolonial order. The possibilities that await actualizations were 
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found less in harmonized representations and more in discrepant and volatile ones that 
manifest alterity. This alterity haunts representations as a spectre that disturbs the connection 
– time, history, and democracy. By rendering regulations out of synch, spectres render 
democracy as a desirable future. If reconciled to the enforcement of consensus and mutual 
understanding, representation can only be dominating because it overrides other voices, 
actions, and differentiations. In The Other Heading, Derrida provides the given in democracy: 
iterability, or having the grounds for repetition and continuity, and it is alterable (Derrida, 
1992, p.15; 41-3). This idea supplies a radical praxis to Derrida’s spectres. 
The spectres of violence that haunt the colonial Philippines were induced from the economic 
and material effects of colonial rule as well as the effects of representation, that is, the 
iteration and alterity that can be summoned by new media technologies. The deconstructive 
remembering, which is attempted in this chapter, aims to highlight the spectres at work in a 
colonial context, something that is often missed in the discussion of anti-colonial struggles in 
the Philippines. Bringing them to the fore might inspire a second look at their emancipatory 
and messianic potentials. Likewise, revisiting the colonial history of the Philippines intends to 
bring out new ways of understanding its inroads, inflections and resources in order to prepare 
the theoretical groundwork for the postcolonial milieu discussed in the next chapter.  
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                                                                                    CHAPTER  4 
POSTCOLONIALISM, THE PUBLIC SPHERE, AND NEW MEDIA 
TECHNOLOGIES 
Introduction 
The Philippines, according to cultural theorist E. San Juan, is bound up with two historical 
narratives; the “archetypal colonial experience” and the “plot of self-determination” (San 
Juan, 1996, p.3). Having written about issues that can be rightly traced back, even at the 
subtle level, to these twin accounts of the nation – for instance, the permanence of patronage 
and celebrity politics, the phenomenon of Filipino diaspora, and right down to the popularity 
of skin whitening products – I agree that it is these narratives that haunt almost every story 
that Filipinos tell themselves and others. 
Consider the fascination for fair skin. I argue that it is symptomatic of a belief that equates 
superiority with white skin and wealth, traceable to racial stereotypes and class construction 
in colonial times. Stated otherwise, you are dark skinned because you are a subaltern – you 
are neither of mixed race nor have the money to prevent yourself from working in the fields. I 
believe that skin whiteners are popular among the masses, partly because they allow them to 
mimic those with power, and equally because it is a way of redressing the difference, a sort of 
perverse plot of self-determination. These ways of imagining are essentially part of the 
subalterns’ history that originate from colonial institutions of power and mechanisms of 
representation that were once deployed to ensure that certain ideas are transmitted in society, 
regardless of their political consequences. That they have persisted to this day testifies to the 
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capacity of their re-presentation as sets of beliefs that are innocuous, despite their obvious 
exclusionary intent and complicity with the white mythology of capital. 
In the Introduction, I mentioned about the terminological tension that “new media 
technologies” brings, owing to the interplay of technical, communicative and social 
conventions that the term discharges as well as the unforeseeable consequences that it 
provokes. This chapter will examine the possibilities of new media technologies in a 
postcolonial society that is generative of spectres. This will be discussed in the first section 
where I revisit the growth of new media technologies after the end of colonial rule, or during 
the period of building a nation. One of the concerns of this period was the construction of the 
public sphere where new media technologies were drawn in to various interests – politico-
legal, economic and cultural. The years after the end of colonial rule in the Philippines were 
also a time for the unprecedented growth of new media technologies, due to advances in post-
war science and engineering as well as the rise in the literacy rate and the relative freedom of 
expression that new media technologies enjoyed. However, I will emphasize not only the 
advances of technologies, particularly their spectrality, but also their renewability, or their 
ability to precipitate new engagements of existing social forces (Peters, 2009, p.22). Consider 
that when Adorno theorized about the culture industry, he did not focus on technology per se 
but highlighted the ideology behind the technology, to mean its power to subject mass 
consciousness to codes of conformity (Adorno, 1991, p.103 - 104). While advances in 
particular technologies anchored the culture industry, its schema lies in the accompanying 
aesthetics, or the way that they are oriented to deal with the styles and rationalisations of 
representations of their time (Adorno, 1991, p.101).  
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I argue that this orientation of the culture industry similarly designates an aporia for new 
media technologies, which were seen as instruments of nation building that, for Benedict 
Anderson, is a process of “imagining a political community” (Anderson, 1983, p.5-6). The 
latter refers to the formation of a “national consciousness” that stitches together disparate 
interests, languages and representations through a form in which they can be imagined 
(Anderson, 1983, p.6).  This process is crucial to a nation that is barely out of the colonial 
stronghold because of the anxiety it elicits. Anderson posits that the emergence of print 
capitalism, or “print-as-commodity,” enables horizontal unity through the codification of 
meanings and circulation of homogenous ideas (Anderson, 1983, p.42-44). However, I will 
argue that technological effects are far diverse and volatile than Anderson suggests 
(Anderson, 1983, p.43-6). I agree that new media technologies provide a space for 
disseminating meanings by recalling and representing a variety of discourses of a nation. 
However, I contend that Anderson missed out on the spectrality that is inherent in 
technologically mediated forms of representation that allow the differentiation and disruption 
of centralized and dominant representations. In the end, there could be not just one “imagined 
community” but a profusion of inventive or imagining communities.  
New media technologies are essentially related to the compelling issues of nation building and 
modernization, which are twin goals of a consolidating nation-state. The intention behind the 
consolidation was to make way for new arrangements, imaginaries and emblems of belonging 
to secure national cohesion. New media technologies are involved in modification of the 
lifeworld as the new regimes assert their own mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion that 
have to gain some public approval. Habermas has faith in this exercise of forging social 
consensus. For example, he believes that the popular acceptance of certain beliefs, values and 
suppositions offers the best chance for stability amidst the increasing complexity and diversity 
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of society (Habermas,1987, p.81-2). He claims that interaction, which revolves around reason, 
is the rallying point of a linguistically mediated society and the vehicle through which social 
goals are achieved (Habermas, 1987, p.110-11). Progress, in other words, would not be 
realized if the telos of communication, which is mutual agreement and consensus, is either 
blocked or deflected. Nation building and progress are dependent upon rational 
communication that has the potential to eliminate ignorance, fatalism and prejudices 
(Habermas, 1987, p.55-7). For this, Habermas was also criticized for his strong idealization 
that accompanies his account of consensus and intersubjective understanding that translates 
into a neglect of other modes of communication that are not considered rational, sensible and 
obliging (Thomassen, 2010, p.67-75).   
Adorno’s engagement with the concepts of modernity or progress diverges from Habermas’s 
concept of rational interaction because Adorno maintains that the idea of progress stands on 
its head (Adorno, 1998, p.147). Equated with certain rationality, progress is reified and 
reconciled with an “imperious spirit,” rather than freed from control (Adorno, 1998, p.148-9). 
In other words, when progress, as a universal ideal, is made compatible with the existing 
relations of domination, the concept contradicts itself (Adorno, 1998, p.149; Morris, 2001, 
p.50).  In Minima Moralia, Adorno termed universal harmonization as a perversion of the 
motif of public enlightenment for its disregard of expressions of free will and heterogeneity 
(Adorno, 1974, p. 114.). Thus, it is only by opening itself to difference and heterogeneity that 
social interaction becomes invigorated and dynamic because it unconditionally welcomes 
critiques, contestations and aporias, revealing not only the points of disagreement but also the 
insufficiency of reified concepts to fulfil what they promised, and account for the complex 
reality that they designate (Morris, 2001, p.44-5).  Hence the relevance of Adorno, when 
thinking about the bonds that make up the nation, lies in his supposition that the decision to 
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subsume and incorporate concepts under encompassing ideals, be it nation, modernization or 
nationalism, renders them complicit with the structures and discourses of power (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 1997, p.12-13).  
This chapter also concerns itself with the relationship of modernization and the discourse of 
nationalism in the Philippines (Constantino, 1978b, p.269-301). The latter is a contentious 
construct that emerged alongside the pursuit of nation building, with progress as its goal. 
While this modernist orientation of nationalism is not exclusive to the postcolonial condition, 
the politico-economic determinants of the postcolonial regime make nationalism a 
problematic enterprise. Nationalism inscribes an ideology of exclusion and exploitation on the 
nation state; it becomes a justification for the concentration of wealth and power in the hands 
of the few and the suppression of dissent.  I will argue that the process of postcolonial nation 
building is a time and place of extreme spectrality. Postcolonialism here refers to the aporetic 
condition after the actual presence of colonial rule as well as the ethico-political issues 
engendered during and after its formal end (Hiddleston, 2009, p.4). One such issue is how 
colonialism lingers in discourses, and also how the attempts to construct new modes of 
representation of a nation have re-established hierarchy and inequality. The difficulty of 
apprehending these reified beliefs resides, in part, in the acceleration of their reproduction and 
transmission that makes them commonplace. The reified constructs are ubiquitously presented 
as essential to the expansion of knowledge, progress and participation, not as thoughts 
complicit with former colonizers and the new rulers. In this case, the nation becomes a 
frontier in which new media technologies are harnessed to the task of governing. 
Technicization, per se, is integral to the project of unifying a nation as it provides access to 
modern knowledge, new modes of representation and political participation. New media 
technologies are vital in the creation of an enlarged public sphere, wherein the exercise of 
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their techno-mediation power overwhelms the sphere of inclusive interaction. Conversely, 
new media technologies are employed as hegemonic tools by the new rulers to reach the 
masses. However, I will argue that the same technical function can supply other 
transformative resonances. In relation to the postcolonial agenda, spectres open up a space 
between political goals and their hegemonic representations (Derrida, 1994, p.79). The space 
yields to ambivalence and contingencies thus allowing an expansion of ethico-political 
choices that veers from the fixed and homogenizing points of prevailing narratives. 
The spectral possibilities of new media technologies in a postcolonial context will be explored 
in this chapter. The first section provides historical overview of the postcolonial conditions in 
the Philippines and the events that followed in the aftermath of colonial rule, together with an 
account of the theoretical debates they have provoked. The retelling will pay close attention to 
the ways in which the technological process, through the accelerated transmission of 
representations, has produced effects that interrupt and undermine postcolonial regimes, 
which have grown reliant on new media technologies. This periodization intends to bring out 
the elements that solicited the Derridean spectres in the public sphere. The second section of 
the chapter surveys the discourses of nationalism that emerged from the project of 
postcolonial nation building. Nationalism, which was part of the basis of anti-colonial 
resistance, has acquired a plurality of meanings and articulations derived from various 
propositions of what could constitute a nation. For instance, nationalism has been reworked to 
justify the silencing of minorities, the turn to utilitarian calculation to exclude the “other,” and 
the assignment of reified representations. In this process, which includes the practice of 
governance and installation of material and discursive means of democratization, the 
deployment of new media technologies is complicit with the constitution of hegemony. What 
I offer in this account is an examination of the diversity of conceptual modes of nationalism 
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as the paradigm of a particular postcolonial politics. I will look at how the construal of a 
nation feeds into the structures of authority and domination as well as the dynamics of 
resistance and self-determination.  The third section deals with how new media technologies 
disrupt the hegemonic order in the public sphere as their varied technological effects threaten 
attempts to dissolve differences in favour of decreed unanimity and harmonization. Hence, in 
this case, a representation can never be discursively enclosed so as to exclude simulacra, spins 
of information, burlesques of esteemed truths, and simulations. The appropriations afforded 
by new media technologies can open up perceptions and experiences to other ways of framing 
and contextualization. Overall this chapter aims to explore the possibilities of new media 
technologies in conditions of postcoloniality or, simply put, the deployment and use of new 
media technologies in relation to the construction of a nation and the public sphere, but 
paying attention to what they reveal and create from what were not there before. 
4.1    The Postcolonial Nation 
In the dominant historiography, the postcolonial era in the Philippines commenced in 1946, in 
a fourth of July ceremony, which was marked by the dramatic lowering of the United States’ 
flag, while that of the Philippines was flown free for the first time. The event was dubbed the 
Philippine-American Friendship Day in a move to represent the transformation of a colonial 
relation from one of subjection and exploitation to that of fraternity and mutual respect. This 
unpromising discourse on friendship conveyed that despite the dreadful acts of colonisation in 
the past, the two nations could part as friends even though US hegemonic interests, in the 
form of trade agreements, military pacts and geo-political agenda, were secured and preserved 
long after the ceremonial independence. 
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In the historical timeline of the Philippines, the postcolonial period meant the incipience of 
modernization. The latter means the pursuit of progress through science, accumulation of 
wealth through industry, democracy through representation and the construction of national 
identity. These goals have universalistic telos, that is meant to encompass the many rather 
than particular political standpoints. In other words, they seek to unify a post-independence 
nation while downplaying discord and difference. These larger goals betrayed a type of 
thinking that favours instrumental rationality, uniformity and stability, which are values 
aligned with modernism and capitalism. They coincided with the expansion of commodity 
markets and technological progress in the 1950s and the decade that followed. In all these 
preoccupations with economic and political shifts, new media technologies have been 
indispensable for the mass generation of discourses to construct identity and coordinate social 
relations. It is not for nothing that the growth of communications infrastructure in the 
Philippines has been presented as an index modernization, as shown by statistics on the 
number of transistor radios owned and newspapers in circulation (Lent, 1977). The ease of the 
circulation of information supports the growth of domestic capitalism, as it is supposed that 
the simultaneous access to messages stimulates consumption and the exercise of personal 
choice. 
My examination of postcolonialism as a historical period necessarily raises questions about 
colonisation and its aftermath. Postcolonialism expands the inquiry by dealing with the larger 
structure of the economic, political, cultural and philosophical issues arising from the colonial 
experience and after. In this sense, postcolonialism problematizes the historiography of 
colonialism as well as the determinants of its persistence, and this includes the agency of the 
colonial subjects and their struggles. With the colonial legacy as the starting point, 
postcolonialism interrogates the attempts to break from the colonial past, and how this would 
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be possible given that the exploitative structure of capitalism is still a fact. The condition of 
postcoloniality is one in which the political and technological processes of colonialism have 
simply not gone away. Frantz Fanon, in his critique of decolonization, notes that the transition 
from being a colony to an independent state is not a reversal of the colonial order but the 
preservation of its production relations, trade pattern, and political system in which the native 
bourgeoisie became the beneficiaries and intermediaries of the former colonialists (Fanon, 
1963, p.122-3).  
Fanon’s argument is cogent when examining the Philippines’ ties with the United States. The 
relationship was shaped by the growth of capitalism and the Americans’ geo-political interest.  
The Philippines stood as a staunch ally of the U.S. in the Cold War era. The years after World 
War II saw the further rise of U.S. hegemony globally. The U.S. became the major source of 
investments and reconstruction funds even as it aggressively searched for new markets, 
having learned lessons from limited foreign economic policy during the Depression years 
(Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, p.87). The Cold War further guaranteed the expansion of U.S. 
strategic interests. When the U.S. established its network of military bases around the world, 
especially in the Philippines, not only did these serve as deterrence to the Soviet Union and 
liberation movements in Asia, they also worked to protect American investments. On the 
other hand, the American culture industry was also crucial in moulding the Philippines’ 
postcolonial consciousness, something that was inevitable, given the proliferation of imported 
films, magazines, canned television shows and radio broadcasts (Pineda-Ofreneo, 1986, p.14-
6; Lent, 1977). These cultural products not only exhibited their technological superiority, they 
also registered their ability to sustain dependency. In all, the policies of the U. S. over its 
former colony rested on its post war economic advantage, cultural hegemony and military 
power. 
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The United States’ postcolonial dominance in the Philippines manifests in four ways: cultural 
dominance, economic and trade agreements, military pacts, and political interference. Cultural 
dominance is one of the ways in which U.S. imperialism exerts control in the Philippines. One 
aspect of this control is exercised through the presence of the cultural commodities presented 
by the American culture industry. By the manner that these strategic and economic interests 
were communicated culturally, one can say that a Hollywood movie can easily encapsulate 
the ideology, fantasy, and anxiety of U.S. supremacy.  The influence of the American culture 
industry continued with the abundance of imported magazines, books, news, music and other 
cultural products, exposing Filipinos to American fantasies in various guises (Ofreneo, 1986, 
p.218-220). English continued to be the language used in major Philippine newspapers, 
schools, and the government bureaucracy, and thus retaining its status as a signifier of 
Filipino identity, aside from being the language of reflexion (San Juan, 2009, p.37-9). 
Cultural dominance was based on the erstwhile colonial belief that technologies and modern 
culture could bring material and cultural development as well as liberate people from the 
bounds of traditions and excessive piety. In other words, the case of the Philippines 
demonstrates the furtherance of U.S. imperialism, justified by discourses of orientalism and 
technological messianism that perpetuate the exploitation and racism of the colonial period. 
The following discussion will take into account the complex interplay of economic, political 
and cultural elements that make up the overall communicative process from which 
technological messianism emanates. 
The narrative of technological messianism sustained the postcolonial project of modernization 
in the Philippines, and the underlying premise is this: adopting a superior technology leads to 
progress. With U.S. capital predominating in the local economy, Filipino elites were acting as 
the financial agents, go-betweens and middlemen of American business (Ofreneo, 1984, p.5). 
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American investments are located in strategic industries like communication, military 
installations, construction, export trading, and hospitality.  Except for communication where 
diffusion was the norm, the technological and economic ventures were confined to specific 
sectors and urban centers. The economy of the Philippines remained predominantly 
agricultural, with production tied to export of crops like sugar, hemp, tobacco, coconut, and 
timber. The unevenness of capitalism’s growth ensures that the economic activities posed no 
competition to imported commodities and U.S. investments.  Trade agreements between the 
Philippines and the U.S. came with disadvantageous provisions, as indicated by quotas set for 
Philippine products as well as the preference and protection of American investments 
(Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, p.88-9). The domestic and foreign trade, and the fiscal policies 
of the Philippines were also increasingly steered by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, two institutions that have been setting the terms of global economic 
reconstruction and fiscal regulation (Constantino, 1978b, p.311-17). 
The ties that best served the U.S. military agenda were the military agreements for the 
establishment and unhampered use of 23 American military installations in the Philippines. 
The major facilities were Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base that were used in military 
campaigns in Korea, Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, 
p.140). Up to 1991, the bases were the largest in the world outside the U.S. territory. The 
military assistance safeguarded the U.S. interests and conveyed the U.S. military presence in 
Asia (Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, p.96-7). U.S military assistance, in the form of weapons, 
funds, and advisers, helped suppress the communist rebellion in the Philippines (Constantino, 
1978b, p.267-8). The United States also showed an “undisguised interference” in politics -- 
from the election of presidents to the establishment of foreign relations and policies 
(Constantino, 1978b, p.269). For example, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel and 
146 
funds ensured the election of Ramon Magsaysay as president who rode on a populist and anti-
communist platform backed by American businesses in the Philippines (Schirmer and 
Shalom, 1987, p.120-3; Constantino, 1978, p.257). The CIA-sponsored anti-communist 
hysteria and smear campaigns targeted politicians and groups critical of U.S. policies in the 
Philippines, easily circulated in the media (Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, p.111-18).  
The successive of postcolonial administrations in the Philippines maintained the colonial 
trade relations with the United States. However from 1950 to 1960, the country attempted to 
industrialize and protect local manufacturers by minimizing imports (Constantino, 1978b, 
p.312-14). But lacking requisites like the steel industry, the country had relied heavily on 
imported machinery and industrial components. Indeed, the policy had established some light 
manufacturing industries but it was later abandoned to return to a strategy of export-oriented 
growth. The brief period with domestic industrialization did not significantly affect the 
prevailing mode of production but it had, to some extent, introduced the idea of economic 
self-determination. The uneven growth of productive forces within the expanding contours of 
capitalism defies a simple designation of the country’s mode of production as pre-capitalist or 
semi-capitalist. In fact, the mode of production is neither capitalist nor feudal: it is not 
predominantly feudal despite the feudal relations in the countryside, nor principally capitalist 
because commodity production is not the principal activity where surplus value is derived 
(Sison and De Lima, 1998, p.9). The mode of production is a specific configuration of its 
own, from the pattern of exporting agricultural products and importing commodities wherein 
the latter was assigned an exchange value greater than the former’s use value. The extraction 
of surplus labour and exchange value were also shaped by class struggles and political 
circumstances that have all encoded the bases of the asymmetrical relations of exchange. In 
this peculiar mode of production, the development of new media technologies is similarly 
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uneven but open-ended in their convention, their tempo driven both by the material 
conditions, technological processes and the possibilities of representation. The latter inhered 
in the way in which these technologies are harnessed -- in consonance with the drive for 
profit, installation of hegemony, and entertainment. 
When Filipino elites took over the reins of power from the colonizer, they came up with an 
exclusivist rule with the trappings of liberal democracy. This type of authority resonates with 
David Held’s idea of “competitive elite democracy ” where factions of the ruling class 
dominate the centralized government through party politics that is sustained by keeping the 
masses uninformed but beguiled by the technocratic expertise and charisma of their elected 
leaders (Held, 2006, p.157).  Political participation is mainly through the ballot while public 
discussions are constrained by limited access to resources of reflexion and the lack of avenues 
for critical engagement. Competitive elite politics is reflected in the manner that factions of 
the Filipino elite used their position to their economic advantage by helping themselves to 
licenses and franchises, land grants, lease agreements, timber and mining concessions, among 
others, either as owners or intermediaries. Inevitably corruption seeped into the levels of the 
bureaucracy. In the national legislature, laws were shaped around the economic interests of 
politicians, many of whom are from the landed class (Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, p.126). 
Hence land distribution was never legislated seriously. It is a fact that in the provinces, 
landowners’ economic influence extends to politics, a leverage used to gain favours from the 
central government. As election choices were not determined by political platforms but 
mainly popularity, landlords easily delivered command votes. In this sense, elections, as 
formal or direct political forms of representation, not only legitimated the rule of the elite, but 
also became the mechanism to secure, in hegemonic fashion, the acceptance of the elite’s 
economic and cultural positions. 
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Some historians described this post-independence Philippine politics as the dominance of two 
parties, secured by kinship and ritual ties that value reciprocity and debts of gratitude 
(McCoy, 1994; Schirmer and Shalom, 1987; Kervliet and Mojares, 1991). They point to the 
presence of the two major and ideologically indistinguishable parties -- Liberal and 
Nacionalista –- whose frontrunners and stalwarts came mainly from landowning and 
comprador classes.  But while political families are vehicles for ascent to power, I agree with 
postcolonial theorist San Juan that such political dynamic offers a delimiting analysis of the 
calculating and, at times, violent Philippine politics. Privileging clan and factions masked the 
nature of class politics that shaped the condition of subalternity (San Juan, 1998, p.63-4). I 
argue that while clan politics thrives on filial ties, power has remained class-based, derived 
from the ownership of the means of production, unequal social relations, and efficacy of 
hegemony. As San Juan has pointed out, control is possible because subalterns are relegated 
to the fringes of politics and civil society where the elites easily propagated their ideology, 
values, beliefs, way of life, and morality upon those whose autonomy are circumscribed (San 
Juan, 2009, p.177). At the grassroots, politics rests on relations of production and political 
representation that sustain a condition characterized by the absence of free will on the part of 
the masses to reach, what San Juan calls the “integral, organic and critical self-consciousness” 
(San Juan, 1999, p. 95). In a sense, the dynamism and diffusion of new media technologies 
neither guarantee shared enlightenment nor dissolution of the dominating representations 
serving the instrumental rule of the elites.  
If politics supplies the avenues for formal representation, then this elitist post-war politics in 
the Philippines had fallen short of providing formal and symbolic representation befitting the 
idea of representative government (Held, 2006, p.64). The presence of a nation is premised 
upon a prejudiced exclusion of some groups or classes. Its consequence is the denial of 
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“publicness,” in a Habermasian sense, that implies the curtailment of interaction in the public 
sphere. In other words, exclusion inheres in the process of forging a Filipino nation, the basis 
of which reached back to the interplay of class and racism during the colonial times. This 
disavowal of presence resonates with Spivak’s analysis of subalterns and representation 
wherein the former are incapable of representing themselves, formally and aesthetically, thus 
politically (Spivak, 1988). For Spivak, the subalterns are excluded in the double sense of 
representation, the direct and aesthetic forms, and therefore such a condition defined them as 
unrepresentable. This exclusionary regime conveys a deep but larger sense of proscription that 
implicates representations tied to the genealogies, colour, and other indicators of difference. 
What this implies is that the ideology of nation building has re-inscribed the colonial forms of 
racism and consequently it is this which framed the reprisals taken against groups exhibiting 
some forms of resistance to the postcolonial state. In the Philippines, they include workers, 
peasants, and millenarian movements that altogether became the radical faces of subaltern 
resistance against elite rule, U.S. hegemony, and capitalist exploitation. Their various 
struggles can be thought as a form of direct representation that also prefigured an inclusionary 
public sphere (San Juan, 1998, p.51).  
The repressive policies of postcolonial regimes solicited spectres of violence and various 
modes of resistance of intransigent groups. The peasant and workers’ movement grew strong 
with the merger of the communist and socialist parties in the 1930s but the alliance was short-
lived because the leaders were arrested and imprisoned.  In the 1950s, with U.S. military aid 
and CIA advisers, the Philippine government broke the backbone of the communist-led 
struggle for land, jobs and representation, with the leaders and followers arrested en masse 
(Constantino, 1978b, p.231-40). As a result, communists abandoned armed resistance in 
favour of parliamentary means and this occasioned the U.S. to claim credit for crushing 
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communism in its former colony (Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, p.118). However, an even 
more brutal suppression was inflicted upon the peasant-based millenarian groups that staged 
sporadic uprisings in the 1950s. Among them was the Sakdal, whose actions bore an 
insurrectionary legacy from the colonial times (San Juan, 1999, p.78). In the previous chapter 
I have pointed out that millenarian movements’ during the colonial period are mechanisms of 
representation that, through rituals and mystical beliefs, articulated politico-ethical demands. 
Under Spain’s rule, such representations were seen as a defiance of Catholicism while under 
the Americans, and in postcolonial regimes, these were regarded as bandits, outlaws, and 
subversives, while their uprisings were considered irrational acts (Ileto, 1979, p.1). Filipino 
historian Renato Constantino stopped short of recognizing this strand of subaltern politics as 
“political” because he believed that the attained self-consciousness of the participants failed to 
grasp the connection between poverty and capitalism’s penetration of the countryside via the 
hegemonic devices of the US and the local elites (Constantino, 1978b, p.5). However, Rafael 
Ileto, in his path-breaking study of millenarian groups in the Philippines, argues that their rites 
and mysticism, which are suffused with idioms of equality and messianism, had sufficiently 
challenged the formal representation denied to subalterns (Ileto, 1979, p.19). What is salient 
about Constantino’s argument on the limits of millenarian consciousness, and Ileto’s 
examination of the groups’ apocalyptic but barely perceptible political tones, are their 
recognition of the movement’s possibilities to directly represent the subaltern’s politics within 
the confines of the nation, and thus undermine the hegemonic devices of the elite. 
Gramsci’s notion of the subaltern’s transformation can explain why political ideas of peasant-
based millenarian and messianic groups in the Philippines were inchoate. What can be drawn 
from Gramsci is that these groups go through phases and changes within the milieu that 
frames their marginalization and yet the same condition also provides the ingredients with 
151 
which to expand their social consciousness,  and overcome their subordination and 
exploitation of their labour power (Gramsci, 2000, p.196-7; Green, 2002, p.15). While 
Gramsci notes that the subaltern’s transformation exhibits a commitment to an ethico-political 
society, this idea does have difficulty with mimetic practice, or the recurring presence of these 
millenarian groups at certain periods in history.  This recurrence, I believe, should not be 
dismissed as an epiphenomenon in response to the lack of representation, which then would 
be remedied by representation. Rather, the “return” is inhabited by a certain faith in the 
promise of an end, by a sense of justice, by some inheritance. I will argue that this subaltern 
consciousness can be summoned by the very thing that prevents its staging, and just when it 
was thought that it has been effaced and emptied, it springs a presence or, as Derrida would 
say, it is always already representation (Derrida, 2007). However, this process goes beyond 
restoring equivalence and balance in representation, and gestures toward transforming the 
context in which representation operates. This means that subaltern politics simultaneously 
installs and disrupts the construction of a postcolonial nation as it engenders a narrative that is 
both symbolic and irrational, something that Derrida termed “rogue,” which is an “other” of 
democracy. The rogue is permeated by dilemmas and possibilities despite the decision to 
render it stable (Derrida, 2005, p. 81-92). To return to the historical account of the subaltern 
politics in the Philippines, I argue that the inscrutable consciousness of millenarian groups is 
characteristic and an expression of a condition of postcoloniality, one of the many that 
manifested their presence in the public sphere, and challenged the authority that considered 
these groups incompatible with a rational order. 
The presence of new media technologies requires a rethinking along the promise of spectres 
not as a recurring phenomena or mimesis. Neither should it be regarded as playing a support 
role to politics and popular movements. New media technologies exhibit spectral effects the 
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moment they reconfigure representations, be these epistemological reconfigurations, recursive 
paradoxes, or persistent discourses. These effects come across as ghostly apparitions with 
multiple evocations, essentially marked by discrepancies and unpredictability. But what is 
often missed is how they supply political impulses that are unknowable and beyond absolutes. 
New media technologies have the capacity to summon representations that have been effaced. 
This aspect of summoning finds relevance in the Philippines, in so far as it marked its bid for 
modernization by relying on new media technologies’ capacity to enable interaction and 
representation that overtook the traditional forms of communication. 
The postcolonial period in the Philippines saw the unprecedented growth of new media 
technologies – print publication, radio, television, magazines and films. Between the 1950s to 
the early part of the 1960s, fifteen big English language newspapers circulated in Manila, four 
of them owned by Americans. The biggest was the “Manila Times,” with 200,000 copies 
daily while the combined circulation of 50 weeklies in the provinces was estimated at 300,000 
(Lent, 1977, p. 14-15). Some newspaper owners also expanded their media holdings to radio 
and television. Radio grew to become the popular medium for mass entertainment and public 
information in the rural areas while television’s reach was limited to the cities and a middle-
class audience who were then exposed to predominantly canned American shows (Lent, 1977, 
p.45). Newspapers continued to be the main source of news in urban areas. Three visible 
factors were noted for the boost of print media – the use of modern printing presses, the 
printing paper quota from the U.S. and revenues from advertising. In terms of ownership, 
editorial independence was suspect because newspaper owners had interests ranging from 
shipping, airline, trading, and public utilities, and this can explain why newspapers aired anti-
communist views, overtly partisan, and resorted to self-censorship (Ofreneo, 1984, p.69-73).  
Moreover, they accommodated much of the U.S. Cold War propaganda (Ofreneo, 1984, p.75).  
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In the 1950s, the aesthetics of the culture industry transformed the public sphere in 
paradoxical ways. New media technologies allowed unlimited access to information, drawing 
people from private into the public realm, and yet this also brought cultural alienation. The 
relative freedom enjoyed by new media technologies, which was responsible for their growth 
and proliferation, also reined them in as they were within the reach of the state’s mechanisms 
of control, and money, or the class interests of their owners. Gramsci’s notion of civil society 
explains how non-juridical elements like churches, schools, voluntary organizations and the 
media produce and disseminate representations that are congruent or supportive of the 
hegemonic power. Civil society, along with the public sphere, is a “realm of hegemony,” not 
of freedom because it enables the reproduction and transmission of the dominant ideas and 
representations (Green, 2002, p.7). The Philippine elite’s concern was primarily with how 
new media technologies contribute to normalcy and stability, which indicates their political 
and economic interests. Not only should meanings be fixed, the repetition should also secure a 
constancy when reinterpreted in various contexts. In the period of class and identity 
consolidation, unity is accomplished by exposure to more or less the same accounts and 
sources of news. It was erroneously surmised that access to new media technologies is 
equivalent to civic participation, which styled the exercise of critical reason. The latter is 
propitious to the elite that tried to preserve a reified notion of unity, underpinned by an 
exclusionary version of nationhood. 
There were, of course, other critical voices that challenged the hegemony of the U.S. and the 
political elites. Their emergence signified the growth of political consciousness among 
subaltern groups – peasants, farm workers, the urban poor and petty bourgeois – who were 
conscious of their subordination. There were some enlightened elite politicians who deplored 
American intervention in politics and economy of the Philippines in the 1950s (Constantino, 
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1978b, p.288-292). Added to that was an upsurge of the radical student movement in the 
1960s that criticized the Philippine government and elites’ complicity with the U.S. economic 
and Cold War agenda, the pervasive corruption in the bureaucracy, and harsh feudal relations 
in the countryside. The founding of the new Communist Party of the Philippines and its armed 
group, the New People’s Army, in 1968 infused a revolutionary agenda to the popular 
movements of workers, peasants, students, middle-class intellectuals and the religious. The 
new communist party presented a countervailing analysis of the postcolonial Philippines, 
which is a society constituted by classes having differing interests and where the dominant 
ideology is at work (San Juan, 1996, p.198; Sison and De Lima, 1998, p.3). In all, the 
presence of these groups, along with their various political subjectivities, gestures toward an 
aporia, which Derrida describes “time (is) out of joint,” marked by dislocation and inordinate 
variation of representations (Derrida, 1994, p.20-21). 
The preceding account of the postcolonial condition sketched a socio-historical reference of 
the Philippines through a selective and deconstructive reading of history. I have shown that 
the reconfigured political formation became the precursor of new contradictions and aporias. I 
provided an account of the conditions in which the spectres of colonialism are solicited. My 
intent was to demonstrate that deconstruction, which has been accused of avoiding ethico-
political responsibility in favour of indecision and textual indulgence, actually has the 
capacity to address the “real” promise of emancipation and messianic justice, in a specific 
historical context.  I contend that justice is possible through the exercise of communicative 
reason cognizant of alterity and iteration. Alterity suggests the redress of the injustice while 
iterations links that possibility to the process of technicization that enables the infinite 
repetition of such a possibility. In what follows, I will give an account of how the attempts to 
confine the ways of constructing a nation rendered them incompatible to the spectral 
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possibilities solicited by new media technologies. The spectrality of the latter, in terms of the 
speed and breadth of its effects, can no longer be confined to a homogenous imagining of a 
nation. This teleology gave rise to a paradox, such that the hegemonic discourse actually 
enables reconfigurations that disrupt the attempts to constitute a fixed memory of the nation. 
4.2    Spectral Nationalism and Postcolonial Democracy 
If nationalism is a spirit, it is a ghost dragging along a chain that bears the weight of the past 
and the present’s ambiguities that, from Balibar’s list, include “civic spirit, patriotism, 
populism, ethnicism, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, chauvinism, imperialism . . .” and so forth 
(Balibar, 1991, p.46).  Nationalism is a social imaginary that animates the task of building a 
nation. Nationalism supplies a framework wherein progress, modernization and democratic 
practice can be understood. Changes taking place in the nation can be mapped out in the ideal 
and experience of nationalism, the typology of which will be highlighted here. At the outset, I 
would argue that variants of nationalism provide clashing directions and dispositions in the 
public sphere that have the potential to hasten, impede or alter the goals of a nation. 
 I wish to highlight what I see as the two variants of nationalism that represent the imaginaries 
of a nation after the end of colonial rule. One kind of nationalism is conceived around an 
imagined organic unity while another kind is formed around the notions of difference and 
hospitality. The first one starts with a lofty goal of unifying the people that make up a nation 
by regulating individual interests, which ends up repressing and effacing anything that 
challenges the supposed unity. As a collective imaginary, this version of nationalism does not 
address deep differences and reification in society. The second version affirms unity through 
difference that were often disavowed, hidden and suppressed in the name of general interest 
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or common good– but an affirmation that nevertheless leads the way toward an unknowable 
but conceivably transformative path of a nation.  The first kind of nationalism valorises an 
original identity that conveys purity, self-sufficiency and self-perpetuation; the second one 
displaces this identity by tracing the constitutive absence that is its condition. From these 
aporias, I will argue that the second kind of nationalism, which is what Derrida had in mind, 
would lead to a more radical politics and democracy. Nonetheless these two variants of the 
nationalist imaginary, with all their political and economic implications, have significantly 
shaped the allegories of nation building.  
In the Philippines, nationalism is the ideal behind the task of promoting participation in civil 
society and the public sphere. The latter draws its justificatory elements from nationalism too, 
when, for example, favouring the majority over the few (“others”) or privileging some groups, 
culture or language as opposed to recognizing their identities. As a consequence, the process 
of establishing legal and civic institutions out of a colonial foundation in the Philippines was 
appropriated by the economic and political elites, and while it appears to uphold universal 
inclusion, it actually narrows the scope of national interests to a fraction of those who stand to 
benefit from progress and participation in economy and politics (Constantino, 1978, p. 341). 
The Philippine elite, who took over the state machinery from the colonizers, approved of the 
“counting” view of nationalism and democracy (Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, p.126-131). 
This majoritarian politics was secured through formal and aesthetic modes of representation. 
Or to put it slightly differently, representation is secured through the ballot and also the 
dominant discourses in the public sphere and new media technologies. This suggests that the 
successive postcolonial regimes were keen to bring everyone to accede to the dominant views 
and agenda, especially those who had no chance to represent their political aspirations. In this 
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sense, nationalism became the rhetoric to secure consensus, harmony and assent to the goals 
of those in power; it is also designated as the sine qua non of progress. Along the way, the 
conflicted concept of nationalism delivered the masses to the hegemonic designs of the 
postcolonial elite (Lumbera, 2008, location 2847, e-book). Nation building was primarily 
concerned with civic, cultural and political consolidation rather than attending to diverse 
ethnic or cultural differences.  
The shifting discourse of nationalism at work in postcolonial Philippines finds a link with 
capitalism, Orientalism, political reformism and subaltern politics. First, nationalism 
accommodated capitalism by appealing to consumers to buy locally produced goods to 
support Filipino capitalists who were just starting out (Constantino, 1978b, p.312). 
Nationalism was patriotically reworked to support the local production in lieu of buying 
imported goods. However there is nothing home grown in the production process because the 
Philippines’s market was penetrated by American firms along light manufacturing, assembly, 
and packaging industry (Ofreneo, 1984, p.4-5). The local bourgeoisie turned to nationalism as 
an alibi to accelerate the accumulation of surplus value. In their appeal for support, they have 
presented their own class interests as the general interest. In this instance, the discourse of 
nationalism is compliant with capitalism that operates and expands unevenly. The second 
construction of nationalism exposed the roots of cultural nationalism, as this is conjoined with 
a bourgeois aesthetics that challenged U.S. cultural imperialism by reviving traditional values, 
rituals and culture that convey placidity, affective ties and idyllic settings that contrast with 
the chaos of modern, urban life. In Culture and Imperialism, Edward Said warned of a similar 
sentiment wherein cultures are simplified and reduced to caricatures that are easily staged and 
exploited for profit (Said, 1993, p.36-7). In this case, nationalism cashed in on indigenous 
aesthetics, turning them into cultural spectacles for the benefit of the touristic gaze. The third 
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sense of nationalism addressed political reforms initiated by enlightened bourgeois 
politicians. As a political platform, it draws on anti-colonial elements to criticize the U.S. 
economic and political hegemony. This political stance recognises the salience of being 
independent from the political dictates of the U.S. and, as a result, was criticized by the elites 
and U.S. agents in the Philippines, including CIA operatives. Nationalism, in this case, is 
inflected with liberal and reformist convictions that summon the anti-colonial sentiments just 
when it is thought they have been erased by the end of colonial rule. This notion of 
nationalism unsettles elitist politics that now has to come to terms with its own subversion. 
This type of nationalism exposes the fissures within the ruling class, showing the fluctuations 
within the dominant idealization of nationalism.  
The fourth signification of nationalism relates to a subaltern politics that perceived the 
connection between postcolonial control of the U.S. and class-oriented politics in the 
Philippines. This kind of nationalism reincarnated the political aspirations and needs of 
groups that are seen as backward, fragmentary, irrational and unrepresentable, and who are 
left out in the discussion of the modernizing nation. This concept of the nation was built 
around the idea of inclusion and difference as opposed to preclusion and homogeneity. It 
emerged from the experience of subjection that persists in the uneven terrain of capitalism and 
inaccessible juridico-political structures that deny the many the chance of representation. 
Nationalism, for these groups, carried the questions of justice and representation, where 
justice translates to having access to the means of production, such as lands and decent jobs, 
and also political representation in the public sphere. These demands negate the inherently 
exclusionary nature of dominant nationalism that presents itself as pluralist and rational, 
resulting in a politics that disregards difference even as it claims to speak for everyone. The 
much-invoked democratic ideal of rational consensus, as it is applied to condition of 
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subalternity is, in fact, partial, dissentious, and equivocal. Thus nationalism was a discourse 
that shaped the struggle for self-determination, the purpose of which was to install justice and 
increase the chance being heard and seen. This struggle represented an admixture of 
millenarian, religious, economic, and cultural forms of politics that did not discount the use of 
violence.  
It is useful to revisit the modalities of nationalism to determine their double bind and radical 
possibilities. The first three notions of nationalism are built around the tacit concepts of 
territory and “naturalized history” that unify people through an ideology of supposed 
belonging. They convey a sense of community, in this case, a political community, which 
both Zygmunt Bauman and Derrida recognized as a conflicted construct. Bauman notes that 
the narrative of nationalism relates to the construction of the nation-state that needed a basis 
to override the various self-determining communities, ideologies and interests, whatever ends 
it strives to attain (Bauman, 2000, p.172-3). Here, nation refers to a group of people who 
believe they are a part of a political community built by nature, history or ethnic origins. 
Arising from biological and cultural heritage, this idea of nationalism, as seen through 
Bauman, embraces a “verdict of fate,” in which people find themselves in or bound up with 
something that they cannot choose to deny. This suggests that the naturalization of that which 
binds or unifies takes precedence over differences that can never be larger than the sum total 
of the unity posited. Bauman’s criticism of nationalism lies in his belief that the 
preponderance of unity over recognition of differences is far from being a stable bond as 
when such is sealed by “confrontation, debate, negotiation and compromise”(Bauman, 2000, 
p.177-8). He sees this kind of nationalism as incompatible with the accelerated expansion and 
mobility of capitalism, which are among the elements of what he calls “liquid modernity.” 
The latter, which describes a social condition of uncertainty and ambivalence, demands a 
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pluralistic approach. Bauman’s assessment shows that the narrative of nationalism naturalizes 
history, culture and democracy from where nationalism also derives its credence (Bauman, 
2000, p.173). The circularity of this approach renders the concept closed because it makes the 
acknowledgement of difference and dissent extremely difficult (Bauman, 2000, p.174). 
Bauman’s argument supplies a counterpoint to Habermas’s idea of the public sphere and his 
theory of communicative action. Applied in the context of a nation, Habermas’s notion of 
unity is mediated by law and the constitution; with the latter having the capacity to bind 
disparate political agenda and disagreements into a rational coexistence and mutual respect, 
aside from providing legitimacy to the constituted state (Habermas, 1996, p.104). However 
this interpretation of unity should be seen in the context of Habermas’s concept of 
communicative democracy, which finds expression in the interaction in the public sphere. In 
Between Facts and Norms, Habermas is keen to argue that laws and constitutional guarantees, 
under ideal conditions, can be subject to discussions and deliberations in the public sphere 
from where they can be subject to an agreement for their validity and relevance to society. By 
marrying constitutionalism and democracy, in a relation of mutual implication and enabling, 
Habermas provides a condition from where individual freedom is guaranteed and pluralism, 
assured (Habermas, 1996, p.128; Thomassen, 2006, p.178). What this holds for the narrative 
of nationalism is that the legal frameworks can sufficiently unify a nation and ensure the 
exercise of individual rights and rational interaction, elements that all index a functioning 
democracy.  
Nationalism, in Habermas’s sense, is implicit in the presupposed agreements that interactions 
and representations are oriented to because, in a communicative democracy, what is most 
important is the rational goal of communication rather  than what is being communicated. If 
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democracy and legal guarantees are not in place, the discourse of nationalism is constrained in 
the public sphere, or may even be excluded from it. But when considered reflexively, 
nationalism could stand as a unifying force accomplished through deliberation, indoctrination 
and calculation. I believe the potential pitfall in Habermas’s notion of nationalism lies in the 
fact that it could countenance constitutional authoritarianism, because it sees nation building 
goals as the domain of the few who are in-charge of the state machinery. As Bauman has 
warned, nationalism is wedded to the instrumental goals of democracy. 
Bauman and Habermas’s idea of forging a nation or political community arises from how they 
see variations of nationalism in Europe, or generally in the West. Bauman reads a dangerous 
contingency on the framework of nationalism -- the concept is bound to lose its cachet when it 
is out of synch with the acceleration of global capitalism that, ironically, has the same goal as 
nationalism, that is, the erasure of heterogeneity (Bauman, 2000, 187-8). I argue that 
Bauman’s notion of a nation has traces of primordialism, although he maintains that it is a 
construct built on anterior ties, identities and affiliations that resonate with a group of people 
who share a particular history (Bauman, 2000, p. 172-5).  These ties are prior to the setting in 
of modernity marked by territorial conquest and colonization. On the other hand, Habermas’s 
communicative democracy implies that nationalism can be channelled intersubjectively, or 
through the process of reaching common understanding that could preserve the precarious 
bond of a nation. Nationalism prioritizes a universality that finds expression in the laws, 
democratic procedures and guarantees of human rights, and which is therefore construed as 
rational. Habermas’s commitment to universalism also brings him to see nationalism as 
waning in the expansion of global markets that challenge the particularism of the nation-state. 
In The Postnational Constellation, Habermas argues that democracy and self-determination 
could also be realized beyond the context of the nation-state, and that it is possible to 
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symbolically construct a collective belonging beyond filiation and common territory 
(Habermas, 2001). In this sense thinking outside the premises of the institutional form of the 
nation-state, would help secure cosmopolitan rights and representation for citizens 
(Habermas, 2001, p.76). This is made possible by networks, which are built to speed up the 
exchange of commodities, money, persons and information, feeding into a bigger, pluralist 
and transnational lifeworld built upon universally shared notions of “mutual understanding, 
intersubjectivity and collective values” (Habermas, 2001, p.82-3). But while Bauman and 
Habermas advanced the notions of nationalism and democracy beyond the liberal’s discourse 
of nation-building, they cannot fully account for the subaltern’s views of nationalism, which 
are solicited by the attempts at consolidation of political and social order, which cannot fulfil 
the promise of a democratic polity and social equity. In this sense, nationalism, as a mode of 
collective interpretation that shaped the postcolonial enterprise, remains haunted by binaries 
that reflect contradictory ontological demands – and it is this haunting that has defined the 
politics of nationalism in the Philippines after colonialism. 
Derrida’s recursive critique of language, which proved relevant for contemporary postcolonial 
theory, is useful to my argument as it looks at universalising narratives and claims to 
homogenising unity (Syrotinski, 2007, p.14; Derrida, 1998, p.15). Underscored in the nation-
building agenda of postcolonial regimes are bonds based on kinship, shared language, 
territory and other cultural ties. Not only did Derrida insist that they are arbitrary, but that 
they are also imbued with “the brutality of unilateral decision” (Derrida, 1998, p.15). In this 
sense, the nation, which connects together such bonds, inscribes a form of violence when it 
decides what should be included by reason of numbers, filiations and conformity. In The 
Politics of Friendship, Derrida’s deconstructive politics proposes a departure from notions of 
primordial origins and binaries that underlie the narrative of nationalism. Origins and 
163 
oppositions are more concerned with inclusions and exclusions, and much less, with the 
“other.” Derrida maintains that the concept of origins tends to naturalize the fiction of “the 
people,” producing hierarchies and, in the process, subordinating and repressing oppositions, 
unreasonable strangers and outsiders (Derrida, 1997, p.93-4). Origins and hierarchies make up 
presence or identity; they preside and determine the value and limits of terms, appearances 
and relations. Nationalism, Derrida has cautioned, is founded on social bonds that are 
presumed natural and oriented to origins that are then perpetuated and repeated as fidelity and 
homage to one’s ancestors (Derrida, 1997, p.99-100). However the ties that bind a nation or a 
community are synthetic and easily subject to manipulations to render opaque their 
dispositions. Similarly, the concept of democracy falls into schemas of hierarchy and 
opposition; it also marked itself mainly by turning to numerical calculation to convey 
presence (Derrida, 1997, p.101). The turn to numbers can be linked to a problematic of 
Western democracy that was transposed into postcolonial conditions. It is an idea that actually 
says more of a predisposed majority than an indication of constraint-free political 
participation. Hence for Derrida, democracy is irreducible to the force of the greatest number 
or what he calls as the “approbation of the multitude,” otherwise it could slide to indifference 
and equivocation thereby sidestepping the responsibility, duty, and hospitality to the “other.”  
What Derrida brings to the postcolonial theorising, that would bear on the Philippines’s 
experience, is the element of defiance in the refusal to accept patently coherent narratives. By 
unsettling hegemonic discourses, a space is opened up for the reimagining and reformulation 
of double binds. His strategy is not to supplant the narrative of nation building with a new 
one; rather it is about providing a strategy of how to think of what might constitute the 
discourse in its iteration. This set off a chain of reconfigurations, with the caveats, rejoinders, 
and ripostes, as effects presupposed in representation. The thrust of the replication suggests an 
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impossibility of fixing and, to return to the concept of nation and democracy, the experience 
of equality, freedom, and inclusion that always fall short of what they signify. As such, it is 
always impossible to posit a terminable point of origin or an end point of a condition because, 
either way, it is an unjust exercise of power. Hence, Derrida’s idea of anticipatory democracy, 
or “democracy to come,” is an engagement with a radical future that is unprogrammable. 
Neither a majoritarian game nor the consilience of interests, this notion of democracy invites 
questions and unremitting judgments on certain truths, representations and the tyranny to 
numbers that exert “homogenizing calculability” and forced unity (Derrida, 1997, p.105-6). 
Democracy, we are then reminded, presents a terrifying possibility that we have to welcome 
unconditionally. 
Subaltern’s democracy, in Derrida’s terms, recognizes popular impulses beyond the 
parameters set by authority. Applied in the context of postcolonial Philippines, this 
democracy emanates from the experience of subordination of classes and communities cut off 
from genuine social participation. These include peasants losing their lands to transnational 
agriculture ventures, workers without decent wages, and the mass of urban dwellers left 
behind by the modernizing growth of the nation. The demands of these classes were often 
regarded as disruptive of the nation-building agenda because they are mainly expected to cast 
their votes and acclaim politicians. The hegemonic construction of nationalism renders the 
subaltern’s nationalism proscribed and disavowed, even though it has always existed 
alongside that of the elites.  
I maintain that nationalism is presupposed in subalternity. The subaltern’s notion of 
nationalism is not an “other” but constitutive of the dominant nationalism as a supplement.  
The impression of subalternity settles in whatever form or arrangement nationalism is brought 
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to bear upon. Nationalism and democracy, as modes of thought and action, have been part of 
subalterns’ demands for social inclusion and participation all throughout the colonial period 
and afterwards. While nationalism is regarded as a modern political phenomenon linked to the 
formation of the postcolonial state, the subalterns’ sentiments of belonging to a shared past 
predated the state machinery and the conceptualizations associated with elite nationalism. In 
this sense, language, common ancestry and cultural identity, even with their legal mandate, do 
not suffice to constitute a nation despite their power to universalize identity and naturalize 
hegemonic nationalism. The interests that prevailed as objectives of nation building are shared 
by the owners of the means of production. The notion of nationalism that emanates from such 
social relations was unavoidably exclusionary in its insistence on universalism, consensus, 
and prescription. However they also give rise to the idea that such condition is not inevitable. 
In the Philippines, the triumph of elite nationalism came about alongside the expansion of 
capitalism that also demarcated democratic practices and spaces. Tied to conditions of nation 
building and surplus accumulation, democracy became hostage to the privileged territory of 
formal representation that is far from inclusive in its scope. Differences are regarded as 
anomalies that needed to be tamed, primarily because civil society is invaded by irrational and 
sometimes unrepresentable sectors that posed a threat to the system of profit making. As a 
result, subalterns became the “other” of the dominant nationalism and the omitted component 
in the narrative of the nation. This idea of the “other” underlies the hegemony that operates 
through specious consent, and carried out not only directly by the state but also through 
mechanisms of representation in the realms of the economy, education, culture and new media 
technologies. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony remains valid even if we argue that coercion can 
also be exercised without an overt display of force, such as through the laws, state institutions 
and economic relations that allow dominant representations to be naturalized (Landy, 2009, 
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p.117). Coercion can be disguised as consent. Consent and coercion thus buttressed each other 
in the service of the ruling group. For Derrida, the law brings secondary violence because it 
cannot be dissociated from the structure that begets it (Derrida, 1997, p.132-40). 
Subaltern nationalism is summoned through what Derrida designates as a “recount,” which is 
a play on “re-counting” as inventory and retelling that provides a chance for re-presentation 
(Derrida, 1998, p.44-6). In Monolingualism of the Other, Derrida sees iteration as inherent in 
new media technologies, where such recount could be possible (Derrida, 1994, p.98). For 
Derrida, new media technologies supply the public sphere with contingencies when they  
“invent and bring up to date, inaugurate and reveal, cause to come and bring up to light at the 
same time, there were already there without being there: it is the relation of the concept of 
production to the ghost without being there” (Derrida, 1994, p.98). The reference to a ghostly 
promise recognizes the precipitation and interplay of representations to include images, texts 
and their analogues that enable their heterologic shifts. In the next section I will expand on 
this spectral element of new media technologies, with emphasis on how they enable a space 
for imagining a nation and instantiating the possibilities of democracy in the public sphere.  
4.3    Spectral New Media Technologies and the Fate of the Public 
Sphere 
New media technologies played a crucial role in the production of representations and the 
installation of the postcolonial public sphere, thus sealing an incontrovertible connection 
between culture and politics in the construction of a nation. This was evident in the role new 
media technologies played in the years following the granting of nominal independence from 
the United States in 1946. What follows is an exploration of the effects of new media 
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technologies within a constrained postcolonial public sphere where only a modicum of rights 
and civil liberties were guaranteed. 
In Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson argues that postcolonialism can be understood 
in relation to how new media technologies developed alongside the growth of capitalism and 
the construction of rational bureaucratic machinery. The growth parallels the movement of 
commodities seen in the process of production, distribution and consumption, and has directly 
contributed to the formation of a national consciousness (Anderson, 1983, p.37-40).  His 
notion of “imagined communities,” is the result of the comingling of the print medium with 
the system of production and productive relations of capitalism, and the flexibility, diversity 
and endurance of language (Anderson, 1983, p.43; 5-6). The rationalisation of the dominant 
ideology is facilitated by the print economy that codifies language, making it more precise, 
established and efficient (Anderson, 1983, p.44). This resulted in the emergence of dominant 
languages, a decision which, I contend is more a function of hegemony than convention. 
However,  Anderson’s treatise on print capitalism needs to account for an expanded narrative 
of new media technologies’ emergence in a postcolonial context like the Philippines. While 
print capitalism can define an epoch, it has to be linked to other media technologies. The case 
of the Philippines showed that the latter have as much of a role to play at a time when their 
pace of growth had been extraordinary. Radio, television and films, which rely on electronic 
signal, are essentially different from print medium but they are very much part of the culture 
industry that have been behind both alienating and emancipative postcolonial representations. 
For example, radio’s growth in the Philippines had been phenomenal, targeting the semi-
literate audience with limited purchasing power (Lent, 1977, p.78). A similar case in point is 
the proliferation of comics: text-based materials that target semi-literate audience (Lent, 1977, 
p.72).  
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The difference between print and electronic media is evident in the way that they functioned 
in the context of nation building. For example, print capitalism is concerned with the material 
fixing of meanings while electronic media brings intangible forms where meanings are 
gleaned from particles, signals and sound waves.  For ease of comparison, it was common to 
term the latter as “new media,” to differentiate them from the “old” media of print technology 
in the form of linear texts found in books, newspapers and other printed formats. This 
designation is problematic because the material constitution of technologies becomes the basis 
for this presupposed hierarchy that appears to discount the possibility of their mutual 
contamination. Simply put, a medium is shaped by its “other” that it excludes hence there can 
be no conceptual purity (Derrida, 1997, p.62-63). What dissolves the difference between the 
two mediums is the concept of iterability, which names the condition for the possibility of 
being “new” despite the actuality in history. In other words, “newness,” as a condition of 
possibility, has marked the media themselves, regardless of their material constitution, with 
“newness” being presupposed in the conceptual construction. While “newness” is always 
open to question, this identity conveys more of its renewability rather than the purity of the 
term. Thus, the term “new” in new media technologies, as it applies here, has less to do with 
their technical and automated constitution than with how they are renewed when they provide 
new platforms for engagement.  
In the Philippines, new media technologies have an uneven growth, which reflects the social 
landscape. The diffusion of new media technologies in the Philippines complements the 
growth in the infrastructure– roads, telecommunications, aviation and shipping. The 
expansion is not only about the growth of the audience share of new media technologies and 
consumer markets but also the pool of agents and adherents of comprador capitalism as the 
vehicle by which modernization is possible. To reiterate a previous point, print capitalism 
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shared with other forms of media technologies the same postcolonial matrix of uneven 
capitalism, technological orientation and a common linguistic and cultural pool. Moreover 
that they have been simultaneously shaped not only by the emerging dominance of national 
consciousness, but also of other forms of representation that emerged to imagine a nation, 
points to their simultaneous availability and responsiveness. 
In a sense, the cultural, economic and political elements responsible for the presence of new 
media technologies are hard to distinguish from each other, let alone fix within the project of 
cultural nationalism. As Derrida’s deconstructive politics would remind us, hierarchy or any 
order of subordination leads to a binarism that privileges one thing over another. He seeks to 
end that by “displacing” and “overturning” the order of domination to allow more leeway and 
scope for intervention and transformation (Derrida, 1976, p. 232-4, 252-55). For Derrida, 
acknowledging other forms and modes of representation, other than the habitation of binaries, 
allows the recognition of alterity or difference that could bring about new relationships, 
meanings, and promises of freedom. The modification of relationships with the multiplied 
possibilities that deconstruction produced for the political, also extends the possibilities of 
challenging the hegemony of nation building pursued by the dominant class.  
The public sphere that grows out of the conditions of postcoloniality in the Philippines is 
laden with unevenness in terms of access and participation that have all got to do with the 
process of representation. The tension lies not only in relation to class but also in the 
deployment of mechanisms of representation. As mentioned, new media technologies are 
complicit with the ideology of elite politics with concessions to liberal democracy and the free 
market economy. Thus, print capitalism occupies a hegemonic position in the culture industry 
of postcolonial Philippine society because of the medium’s ability to fix the forms of 
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representation. There are, however, apparent differences between codified and hegemonic 
forms of representation that utilized the print medium, and the growing popularity of 
electronic media in which technical texts and images supply more possibilities for meaning 
making in the manner of their transmission and simulation. In the context of nation building, 
print capitalism was conveniently deployed by the ruling class to secure hegemony while 
assigning to electronic media an entertainment function. As mentioned, this valorization 
narrows the analysis of new media technologies, but even more problematic is the neglect of 
their political possibilities. 
It is useful to bring back the concept of representation that is relevant to postcolonial 
suppositions. Derrida brings representation close to his idea of iteration (Derrida, 2007, 
p.105). Spivak’s insight into Derrida’s notion of alterity is useful when she notes “every 
repetition is an alternation” (Spivak, 1996, p.86). This is not about the multiplication of 
presence but the alteration of presence’s repetition. Representation thus suggests a return, or a 
restoration of an absence, be it a trace, ghost, symbol or a sign, and this is possible though 
diverse modes or forms (Derrida, 2007, p.106).  If representation is the basis of presence, then 
repetition, which is the basis of representation, alters presence. If we maintain that 
representation is generally understood as the process of meaning making, then the sense 
offered by repetition turns the process into the solicitation of myriad meanings. This means 
that representation can never be a self-contained process in relation to its intention, function 
and the meanings it offers, and it is impossible for consensus to be preserved in the process of 
meaning making. Derrida asserts that there is no purity in representation because, in this 
process, the represented is always already a representation or a simulacrum (Derrida, 1997, 
p.49-50). If representation solicits several meanings, this multiplicity is irreducible, and, thus, 
it is impossible to think of a representation as having unitary, determinate meaning without 
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being transformed. This leaves us to conclude that representation is a radical operation that 
has the capacity to subvert and displace prohibitions or the supposed prior presence. Hence, 
applied to the mediatic function of new media technologies in the public sphere in the 
Philippines, representation as “return” is instantiated by the presence of spectres whose effects 
–publishing and broadcast discourses, performances, narratives and symbols -- undermined 
the dominant representation. Thus, while the ruling elite programmed new media technologies 
to generate consent and legitimacy, spectres defy calculation and prior determinations. Thus, 
through spectres, which are the effects of new media technologies, there is a chance that 
representation can be turned against its programmed goals. 
Spectres emerged from the representational possibilities of new media technologies along 
with their homogenizing codes. However, since spectres cannot be separated from the 
technicization brought by capitalism, their consequences may yield ambivalence. This is 
unavoidable, considering that the narrow motives of profit and parochial interests were also 
present in the public sphere. However, among the consequences of spectres are the 
representations of subalterns, or the articulation of their demands. In the Philippines, this 
means the public sphere being opened up to counter discourses, contrary voices, and various 
genres that counteracted the dominance of English language newspapers and magazines, for 
example  (Ofreneo, 1986, p.132-3). These independent media are spectral in nature as they 
bring in the voice of the missing “other.” As such, new media technologies provided the 
subalterns with the presence and legitimacy in the spirit of representation. In a way, new 
media technologies have burst open the boundaries between public and private by allowing 
the unreasonable “other” to find their “private” voices in the public sphere. In the context of 
nation building, this enabled the political to think of categories of belonging and self-
determination other than being just be counted and made to vote. 
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I argued that the postcolonial representations, which have developed along with the growth of 
new media technologies, are constitutive of the process of constructing a nation. Thus, the 
question of nationalism no longer has to do with citizenship or blood ties in the same way that 
democracy would have to do with numbers and calculation. The spectrality of new media 
technologies displaces such determinations by inscribing in their place unexpected impulses 
that yield to a possibility of their articulation and concretisation (Derrida and Steigler, 2002, 
p.65). This is because the convention of new media technologies disregards the prescription of 
means and the direction of ends as well as blurring the lines between inheritance and 
contingencies. Therefore they could undermine manifestations of hierarchy and state agency 
of postcolonial order, in the manner that they solicit the spectres of justice, myriad meanings 
in representation and suppressed voices of the “other” in the Philippines. 
Given new media technologies’ capacity to reproduce modes of representation, accelerate the 
transmission, and multiply technical effects, Derrida wants us to think about “another space 
for democracy” (Derrida, 1994, p.212). But this gesture of summoning democracy, if it has to 
respond to the demands of the dominated groups, has to resist a counter-hegemonic thinking 
that is the obverse of what is negated. Derrida’s consideration of new media technologies’ 
openness to engender transformation is in keeping with his deconstructive politics that pays 
attention to the “other” as he advances an idea of opening up to the possibilities of radical 
politics and avoiding a programmable future. Derrida gave a visual metaphor for these 
possibilities – a wave, which “rolling up on itself,” “increasingly incalculable,” and 
“accumulates strength and mass as it accelerates” (Derrida and Stiegler, 2002, p.71). Simply 
put, he wants us to embrace the spectral contingency of new media technologies, along with 
the acceleration of their amplitudes, the multiplication of their representation and the myriad 
meanings they could summon. For Derrida, the acceleration and rhythm of new media 
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technologies are bound up with the acceleration of the social, thus the latter has to contend 
with presence-absence of spectres. The process of conjuring up spectres is done through the 
technicization inherent in new media technologies, where meanings, interpretations and 
interventions can be other than what is posited (Stiegler, 2011, p.215). In other words, these 
technologies are capable of outwitting prohibitions and exceeding limits, and thus, according 
to Stiegler, they are a “launching pad for access to new possibles” (Stiegler, 2011, p.203). 
Conclusion 
One way of understanding postcolonialism is to consider how a nation constructs itself in 
relation to new media technologies where representations of discourses of modernization, 
nationalism, and so forth, are transmitted. It is also through these mechanisms of 
representation that aporias of constructing a nation are inscribed. Nationalism, as shown in 
preceding sections, should not be equated with the version of a dominant group where the 
underlying premise is exclusion of the “other.” As I have shown, the ambivalent effects of the 
different constructions of nationalism, which exist alongside and confront each other, points 
to the undecidability of postcolonialism as an event. This undecidability, however, offers the 
possibility of a decision, suggesting that the experience of impossibility brings the possibility 
of judgment, a future and an “other.” Thus postcolonialism can be thought of as the passing of 
colonialism, and yet the strains of the latter continue to exist and shape the narratives of a 
nation and its idealizations of democracy. Postcolonialism becomes a period when a persistent 
imagination of nation is evoked to deal with political aporias. The logic of haunting can be 
located in the convention of new media technologies. In examining the historical and political 
configurations of the spectral nationalism, I took notice of the unrealized aspect of 
democracy, that is, the recognition of the alterity, or the otherness of the other.  
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In this engagement with postcolonialism, I also explored how the field could be different from 
the ways it was previously known. Postcolonialism was explicated here by looking at other 
models of resistance. Adorno sets the stage for Habermas and Derrida in declaring the opacity 
of reason when subjected to the logic of capital, such that its universal promise of freedom 
became the basis for domination of modern society. Habermas provides hope by highlighting 
the rational goals of communication that are crucial to the constitution of democracy, through 
the presence of the public sphere, which citizens also desire along with progress. On the other 
hand, Derrida’s offers an alternative to communicative rationality because not only does it 
lend itself to domination, but also limits the possibilities of transformation. All three have 
established the link between representation and communication, or between meanings and 
new media technologies, but it was Derrida who theorized their transcendence as spectral 
communicative tools. Following Derrida, I have indicated that the condition of postcoloniality 
has therefore been opened up to unknowable possibilities, with all the attendant tensions and 
aporias that would require more than just a rethinking. It simultaneously demands political 
judgments for and by those who were considered irrational, different, unreasonable and the 
“other.” 
The overall discussion of new media technologies in this chapter is an attempt to theorize 
postcolonialism through the aporia solicited by spectres, or effects of new media technologies. 
I have argued that this analysis is postcolonial for two reasons: first, it was oriented to issues 
and methods of postcolonial theories even though my analysis is not “textual;” and second, it 
demonstrated that by theorizing postcolonialism through new media technologies, I am 
recasting the former to make it relevant to a particular history and to the age of networks that 
it foreshadowed. In other words, this is a work on postcolonial theorizing because of its intent 
and the aporias within the condition of postcoloniality that it examined.  
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                                                                                                                     CHAPTER  5 
NEW MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES AND THE AUTHORITARIAN 
REGIME 
Introduction 
Hannah Arendt’s words could best describe the kernel and fate of the authoritarian rule of 
President Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines when she wrote: “The extreme form of power 
is All against One, the extreme form of violence is One against All” (Arendt, 1970, p.42). 
However her statement needs a reorientation: the clauses should switch places to reflect the 
rise and fall of the Marcos dictatorship, its use of violence and its eventual overthrow in a 
bloodless uprising. Other than that, Arendt’s argument stands because, indeed, power and 
violence, as well as their materializations and consequences, shaped the narrative of Marcos’s 
authoritarian rule. I will argue that the Marcos authoritarian rule is a form of postcolonial 
politics that has taken a violent exclusionary route in its disregard for justice and the “other.” 
By its use of violence alone, the authoritarian rule of President Ferdinand Marcos was often 
regarded as a reversal and disruption of the country’s democratic tradition, and not as a 
consequence of an existing social order that it affirmed. This is evident in the Marcos 
regime’s human rights abuses – a record of 70,000 arrests, 35,000 cases of torture, and 3,500 
killings of which 2,500 were tortured before they died (McCoy, 1994, cited in San Juan, 
2009b). Equally stark was the regime’s perversion of legal and legislative structures that was 
also seen as an aberration rather than a logical outgrowth of the country’s post-independence 
politics. Thus, it is easy to miss the parallel between the Marcos dictatorship and that of his 
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predecessor, because he had flouted the basic political guarantees of the liberal regime such as 
a free public sphere, suffrage, and the separation of powers in government. More than just a 
betrayal of liberal tenets, the authoritarian rule was a solicitation of the irrationality that 
liberalism holds, particularly its preoccupation with overcoming differences whose goal is, 
according to Marcuse, the “all-encompassing harmony of the whole” (Marcuse, 1968, p.8). 
The latter conveys a social unity derived from a rational plan that everyone is expected to 
understand as pre-given, and to submit to, at all costs (Marcuse, 1968, p.13-15). Thus if 
Marcos easily violated the country’s democratic tradition, this was not because of the fragility 
of civil institutions that he tore down; rather, it is about how an authoritarian ideology can 
arise from liberalism’s rationalist underpinnings. Simply put, both elite representative 
democracy and authoritarian rule belonged to a continuum of the country’s postcolonial 
politics, sustained by asymmetry of power, wealth and violence. 
Marcos was elected president in 1965, he declared martial law in 1972, and remained a 
dictator until 1986 when he was unseated by an uprising. His authoritarian rule drew its 
legitimacy from two sources of power – the support of the military and a legal system 
reconfigured around his dictatorial powers. In the former, civilian rule was infused with 
military-like thinking, and where every command requires obedience rather than questioning, 
a logic reminiscent of Hannah Arendt’s description of totalitarian governments (Arendt, 1958, 
p.370-379). Marcos came up with decrees that sanctioned his exercise of arbitrary power and 
ignored existing laws. These self-binding commands allowed him to arrest, detain and kill 
anyone presumed as a threat to his rule.  These two sources of authority were conjoined in the 
declaration of martial law wherein Marcos invoked the power bestowed on him by the 
Constitution, as the commander in-chief of the armed forces, as the basis for his authority to 
create laws and edicts, and exercise of “powers and prerogatives appurtenant and incident” to 
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his position (Official Gazette, n.d., online). In other words, the existing laws sanctioned these 
acts; all that Marcos did was to bring out the full extent of their compulsion. 
The strategic violence resorted to by Marcos is part of the controls that other postwar, 
postcolonial regimes have imposed. The commonalities between them can be made explicit 
when the Marcos regime is examined in its historic singularity, to prove its cogency as a 
particular variant of postcolonial authoritarianism. To grasp the authoritarian regime is to 
delve into its complexities, mindful of the political, ideological and economic forces, 
including the historical condition of unequal and combined development that shaped the 
regime’s distinctiveness (San Juan, 1996, p.199). This is what this chapter will do: an 
appraisal of an authoritarian logic, which is discernible from critical perspectives that have 
examined the contemporary problematic of reification, but in terms of a particular constitution 
of authoritarianism. Reification, in this sense, is crucial to understanding how domination is 
sustained and exercised through the political and technological conditions of a postcolonial 
society. 
Often taken as synonymous with alienation, the notion of reification, however, carries a larger 
theoretical responsibility because it indicts a concept, like society, for instance, with its 
inability to live up to what it stands for (Rose, 1978, p.27,45). A reified concept presents itself 
as sufficient to describe an object or a social phenomenon, even though it falls short of 
representing the substance that constitutes that object. As reification is a social category, it 
suggests that this way of thinking is shaped by relations of power. Reification is what Adorno 
meant by “false wholeness,” and also when he described a condition where an “individual is 
subsumed under the plan,” analogous to how a particular concept is dissolved in a general 
category (Adorno, 1974, p.50; Held, 1980, p.202, author’s italics). A reified consciousness is 
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misled into thinking that reality can only be known in a certain way while a reified society is 
one in which social exchanges are constrained so that autonomous and critical consciousness 
can never emerge at will (Rose, 1978, p.48-49). Consequently, a free public sphere could 
never exist, in the sense of Habermas’s description of a “public” sphere, because what holds 
sway is authoritarian control, which, in this account, is Marcos’s machine of terror. 
Surveying the Marcos authoritarian rule from possibilities that Marcuse has opened up, that 
is, through the idea that authoritarian rule is presupposed in a liberal order, brings a new route 
of inquiry with several challenges. The first challenge is to elucidate the specificity of 
Marcos’s imposition of martial law, which was regarded as a rupture of democracy, or at least 
of the Philippines’s adherence to democratic practices. However, in the previous chapter, I 
argued that the post-war regimes were less of an ideal embodiment of democracy than a 
succession of elite rule, characterized by infighting and competition over the rewards of 
power. The use of force was built into their administrations and had many times been 
deployed against the communists, insurgents, and unreasonable “others.” All of the tendencies 
from where the authoritarian administration derived its power, such as intolerance of dissent 
and exclusionary politics, were already given rational justification by previous regimes.  As 
they are bound up with the class interests of the ruling elite, such regimes did not exemplify 
an equitable order in the Habermasian sense of communicative democracy (Schirmer and 
Shalom, 1987, p.125-126; Habermas, 1989). When democracy is more of an afterthought than 
the central facet of governance, premised on exclusion, fear, and silencing, then the shift to 
authoritarianism becomes almost inevitable as a strategy to mobilize power (Marcuse, 2009, 
p.11-13). In fact, Marcos was not the first president to declare martial law or its present-day 
variant – Jose P. Laurel did the same in 1944 while Gloria Macapagal Arroyo declared a state 
of national emergency in 2006 (Philippine Gazette, n.d., online). Thus, instead of saying that 
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martial law was unprecedented, one could argue that the Marcos dictatorship pushed the 
limits of what can be understood as a form of elite representative democracy, with its recourse 
to laws and violent means in order to stay in power. This is not to say that the Marcos 
authoritarian rule was the same as the previous regimes; certainly his was a different kind of 
governance given, for instance, its record of violence. The point is that they all shared the 
same positive laws from where their authority to exercise state power emanates, although the 
execution of the laws varies as to the degree of violence and intimidation were used. In other 
words, there is no lack of legal and repressive apparatuses for a despot who would want to 
integrate them into his or her repertoire of authoritarian rule, and this is where Marcos’s 
craftiness stands apart from his predecessors.  
The second challenge is to differentiate Marcos’s rule from the previous administrations in 
terms of their postcolonial goals of building a modern nation. This element is significant 
because martial law was justified as the sine qua non to modernization because, according to 
Marcos, a disciplined order lays the basis for prosperity. The latter is primarily associated 
with the expansion of markets that strives to attain material measures of growth through the 
“trickle-down effect” (Constantino, 2007, p.26). In other words, Marcos’s authoritarianism is 
associated with the goals of domestic growth bound up with global capital, a process driven 
by the logic of surplus accumulation. At first, there were civil society groups that warmed to 
the idea of progress peddled by Marcos. For instance, as he laid the groundwork for his 
repressive strategy, a year before he declared martial law, Marcos met with business leaders 
and academics, apparently to convince them of the rationality of his intention (Official 
Gazette,  n.d, online). The rationality quickly vanished. When Marcos took over private 
companies, including those of his political rivals, there was no public outcry partly because of 
the absence of an independent press. However, Marcos easily got the support of foreign 
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investors whose interests were left untouched. In fact, less than a week after the declaration of 
martial law, a cable from the American Chamber of Commerce wished Marcos “success . . . 
to restore peace and order, business confidence, economic growth . . .” and assured him 
support and “cooperation in achieving these objectives . . .” (Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, 
p.229-230). In his move to protect American capital and economic interests, Marcos was like 
his predecessors who believed in the dominant development discourse of that time: foreign 
aid and investments are vital because the Philippines was without sufficient capital, let alone 
the managerial skills and technology to modernize (Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, p.230; 
McCarthy, 2009, p.195). Because he did not threaten the foundation of the capitalist order, 
which is the private ownership of the means of production, Marcos enjoyed the goodwill of 
American capitalists who did not mind his strategic use of violence. What made the Marcos 
regime different from previous administrations was its endorsement of a technocratic 
rationality, whereas the previous administrations relied more on the appeal of nationalism as 
the unifying discourse of modernization. Under the tutelage of the U.S. and international 
financial institutions, Marcos recruited American-educated Filipino technocrats and allowed 
them to set growth targets, although he did override their decisions to favour his cronies 
(Kang, 2004, p.81). Technocratic thinking is linked to the idea that economic development is 
essentially an exercise in problem solving and objective reasoning; it is also a belief that 
progress is impossible without the use of technologies to overcome nature and anachronistic 
traditions (Marcuse, 1964; Horkheimer, 1974). This approach to modernization evokes an 
idealization that is obsessed with carrying out programmatic and calculable means to achieve 
goals that were not so much economic or technological, as political. 
The third challenge to understanding the Marcos authoritarian rule lies in how it produced 
representations to fit its codes of control, which supplemented the authoritarian strategies of 
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modernization. I am referring to propaganda as a process of representation, which is mediated 
by the culture industry. It is not that propaganda was never deployed in the past; rather, under 
Marcos, it became studied, methodical, and heavily reliant on the culture industry. The 
regime’s propaganda project, under the slogan of “New Society,” performed a dual function: 
it justified the technological rationality that underlay the regime’s economic agenda, and 
attempted a consensus that martial law was legitimate and necessary. The propaganda strategy 
involved the manipulation of symbols, images, concepts and practices through genres offered 
by the culture industry: newspapers, magazines, films, art and music. They were absorbed into 
the authoritarian regime’s moves to normalize these representations so that, ideally, no direct 
coercion is needed. And yet physical violence was ever-present. When martial law was 
declared, those who bore the brunt of repression were the prominent journalists; many of them 
were imprisoned, and their news organizations were shutdown. Censorship then came into 
effect in newspapers that were allowed to operate while radio and television broadcasts were 
strictly monitored. News criticizing the regime, or Marcos himself, could only be published or 
broadcasted clandestinely (Pineda-Ofreneo, 1986, p.141-144). However, there was space for 
independent artistic expression in films, music and art. With Marcos’s wife, Imelda, as the 
self-appointed patroness of the arts, the latter became the showcase of cultural freedom that 
was used to deflect international criticisms against the dictatorship (David, 2008, location 
6717, e-book).  
The elements that were enumerated, to differentiate Marcos’s rule from the previous 
administrations, seek to show that while they both developed teleologically along the same 
lines, which is the pursuit of modernity alongside the consolidation of the ruling class, the 
authoritarian regime differed in terms of its structure of authority, and the use of violence and 
culture as disciplinary mechanisms. This particular system of authority was shown in the 
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manner that Marcos shaped the laws, institutions and representations around his repertoire of 
power, in which those who were subjected to them had little control over decisions taken on 
their behalf. In other words, the Marcos regime was different to the degree that it overrode the 
legal mandates and made a mockery of the structures of accountability. This found expression 
in the regimes’ propaganda techniques, which were obsessed with framing what should be 
said, seen and known, as was evident in the direct propaganda styles common in the early 
years of martial law that relied heavily on exaggeration and overstatement. Eventually, this 
approach gave way to a more subtle and sleek manipulation of messages that was partly 
accomplished by the use of so-called experts, technocrats among them, who lent an objective 
and scientific air to their message, and also by the culture industry, which extended the 
regime’s credibility with its positive representations.  
In the sections that follow, I will discuss the ways in which the Marcos regime represented the 
political, economic and cultural imperatives of modernization in the Philippines by its 
particular style of technocratic logic. Marcuse describes the latter as what underlies 
“destructive politics,” in which technology becomes an instrument of pacification rather than 
of the freedom that it promises (Marcuse, 1964, p. 234-240). Its goal is the withdrawal of 
imagination and judgment in favour of authoritarian precepts, in which the relationship 
between concepts and reality can be described as incongruent, illusory, and opaque (Marcuse, 
1964, p.235-236). This is an instance of reification that, for Adorno, is a “determinative social 
process,” wherein meanings are derived from a closed hermeneutic circle, and thus are 
restrictive, overbearing, and predisposed to misrecognition (Rose, 1978, p.144-145). I will 
sketch how reification becomes a necessary condition in a specific mode of authority, that is, 
the Marcos authoritarian regime, which perpetuated the longstanding social inequalities that 
he also stamped with his brand of terror and deception. Adorno’s idea of reification, as an 
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element of technological rationality, finds expression in Marcos’s “New Society,” which is 
designated as the new order to reform the elite-dominated and traditional society. While there 
is no easy correspondence between reification and instrumental reason, and Marcos’s 
dictatorial politics, they shared a range of meanings that imply an instrumental rationality is 
behind the violence of an enforced progress. For instance, Marcuse’s idea of instrumental 
rationality comes close to the Marcos regime’s ideology of “new society,” which was inclined 
to prescribe rules for political engagement and representation that discouraged judgment and 
contestation. Marcos had these commands repeated to ensure their saturation and emphasize 
their immutability. By its disregard of flexibility and the free reign of repetition, the Marcos 
regime attempted to inhibit the flow of intersubjective meanings that would have allowed free 
play, subversion, aporia, and the development of their virtual and implicit possibilities. 
However, this prohibition is untenable in the long run because it had solicited political 
actions, sometimes in their unforeseeable and unsparing forms. 
Technocratic control was behind the Marcos authoritarian regime’s hold on power but it was 
also part of its downfall. As representations and violence have to be repeated, their prescribed 
interpretations and instilled fear were undercut in the process of their iteration. First, 
hegemonic representations are increasingly undermined so that even if they are widely 
circulated, their believability is diminished. Second, the interpretative aspect of 
representations can never guarantee control over the production of meanings; hence a 
subversive possibility resides in every process of interpretation. Third, counter-hegemonic 
representations produced by political groups have emerged to challenge the seemingly 
monolithic production of meanings. The process of disruption, however, has less to do with 
contesting the truth of an authoritarian representation, and more to do with exposing the 
illusion of representation that purports to provide the universal ground for interpreting reality. 
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The unraveling of the representational codes, commands, and styles of the authoritarian 
regime culminated in the popular uprising in 1986 that ousted Marcos. Rather than fear, the 
manipulation of the vehicles of propaganda to posit unitary views of a reality in order to 
restrict movement and interactions, bred dissent, subversion and other intractable actions 
resulting from uncontrolled encounters. The latter had drawn in political movements and 
groups from the underclass, who believed that there is clearly a freer future. The variability of 
the encounters and actions had undermined the structures and styles of power that, even when 
these were repeatedly enforced and imposed, they lost so much of their forcefulness and 
superiority that they ended up being mocked, parodied and dismissed for their absurdity.  As 
Derrida would remind us, the representation of authority is not an operation of exact 
duplication and equivalence (Derrida, 2007, p.112-113). Destabilization could be thought this 
way: the meanings were detached – just enough – from determination to provoke questioning 
and revision.  
The logic of iteration and variability, as essential sources of political critique and agency, will 
anchor the account of the possibilities of new media technologies in the period of 
authoritarian rule. The first section of this chapter will outline the growth of new media 
technologies alongside the emergence of the authoritarian rule that employed the culture 
industry as vehicles for propaganda and control. The second section relates the historical 
account of authoritarian rule and new media technologies to Adorno, Habermas and Derrida’s 
thoughts on democracy and the public sphere that the Marcos regime tried to eclipse. The 
third section discusses specters as the effects of new media technologies under an 
authoritarian order, particularly how the specters breached the limits of representation, and 
respond to the present impossibility of representing suppressed political and ethical demands, 
as well as the prospect of exceeding such demands. 
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5.1    Repression and Representation  
The Marcos authoritarian regime lasted for fourteen years, from 1972, when martial law was 
declared, until 1986 when it was overthrown by a popular uprising. Among its first acts was 
doing away with the means of formal and aesthetic representations by abolishing the national 
legislature and closing down the media – the two arenas which demonstrated the country’s 
concession to liberal democracy (Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, p.164; Teodoro, 2005, p.25). 
Soon after, Marcos imprisoned his political rivals and some prominent journalists. The 
immediate effects of the crackdown were the silencing and the effacement of the liberal 
tendencies of elite politics. The violent politics of the Marcos regime can be summed up by its 
grim human rights record of tortures, arrests, and summary executions in which some bodies 
were dumped publicly, making death a macabre spectacle that awaits those who challenge 
authoritarian power (San Juan 2010, p.8-9). The use of force and repressive laws were 
emblems of a rule distrustful of the representational capacity of bourgeois politicians, 
students, professionals and journalists. This distrust is not without basis because common 
among them is their ability to stage modes of representation, which disturb the self-referential 
power of the Marcos regime. Marcos was aware of the extent to which these groups’ 
articulation of social issues could embolden the political choices of the many. 
Marcos was described by historian Alfred McCoy as having “punctilious public concern for 
legal proprieties and a regular recourse to extra legal violence” (McCoy, 1994, p.16). In other 
words, the use of force goes along with the legal instruments that Marcos used to secure 
legitimation for his rule. Ideally, legitimation is the process of deriving authority from citizens 
that presupposes being challenged by them (Habermas, 1988, p.46-47; Barker, 2001,p.22-24). 
In Marcos’s case, only the first half of the definition holds. Despite the available powers to 
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install a dictatorship, Marcos rewrote the constitution that set no limit to his powers or stay in 
office. He also had the constitution approved by hastily assembled village referendums 
(Schirmer and Shalom, 18987, p.191-193). With his own stable of elite politicians, Marcos 
created a national legislature in 1978, six years after he abolished the old Congress. By 
manipulating the national polls, Marcos’s political party, the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (New 
Society Movement), won overwhelmingly and gained the status of a rubber stamp, although 
the legislature enjoyed some legitimacy because of the token presence of independent 
members that functioned as a counterweight (Brownlee, 2007, p.115-116). Because of its 
attention to secure the legal basis of dictatorship, the Marcos regime was designated as a 
“constitutional authoritarianism,” which sounds benign and legitimate because the phrase has 
“constitutional” as the defining term. The authoritarian regime, as the phrase conveys, 
occupied an ambiguous political space between authoritarianism and constitutional order as 
formal freedoms were curtailed by the fear of violence most of the time.  
It was said that the widespread indifference to martial rule in the Philippines could be 
explained by the masses’ instrumental disregard of the alienating postcolonial bourgeois 
politics (Kerkvliet and Mojares, 1991, p.7-8). However, the assessment would only hold if 
election, which was the main driver of elite politics, is the only agency available for 
representation, and other mechanisms of contestation, such as the public sphere, new media 
technologies, and other symbolic modes, are discounted. More importantly, in the early years 
of martial law, hegemony effectively worked through violence and propaganda to exact some 
form of consent. Simply put, the conditions left the many with little choice but to submit to 
authority.  
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Marcos justified martial law as a response to an imminent communist insurrection and 
Muslim rebellion, but historians claimed these threats were more imagined than real 
(Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, p.164; Boudreau, 2004, p.71). At that time, communists and 
Muslim secessionist rebels did not have enough firepower to threaten the state; rather, it was 
under the repressive climate that the threat of rebellion grew (Boudreau, 2004, p.71-72). 
While there was an upsurge of radicalism among students and some sections of the middle 
class, this could be attributed to the exercise of constitutionally guaranteed bourgeois civil and 
political rights. The spirited exchange of ideas and debates in the media points to a 
functioning public sphere. It appears that Marcos played on the anxieties of class war, 
religious differences and anti-communist hysteria to justify his iron rule (Schirmer and 
Shalom, 1987, p.165). 
Marcos relied heavily on the culture industry to hold on to power. Under authoritarian rule, 
the culture industry was harnessed for propaganda, but its intent is less of persuasion than the 
perpetuation of power (Ofreneo, 1986, p. 125). It was basically used to drown out voices that 
challenged the Marcos’ power. In other words, the culture industry, under Marcos, concealed 
and suppressed the subversive impulses and antagonisms on which it rests. The deployment of 
the culture industry not only highlighted the extent of state control and the wide-ranging 
styles of technologically mediated representation available to the Marcos regime, but also the 
interweaving of the political, ideological, and economic forces that reinforced the 
authoritarian ideology (David, 2008, location 6732, e-book). 
One of the propaganda techniques used by the regime was the use of feudal themes in 
reconstructing the narratives of beginnings.  Marcos did away with the existing imaginary 
bonds of the nation and came up with an equally fictive narrative of the “New Society,” which 
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claims a break from the “old” institutions, practices and representations.  This new order 
promised a reform-oriented and modern society to replace the “old” one ridden by elite 
politics, colonial ties, and feudal oppression. However, the fictive construction was not 
prescient of a new social formation or social order because much of the existing one was 
intact; rather the so-called new society was only meant to operate on the level of meanings 
imbued with a disciplinary function (David, 2008, location 6762, e-book). In other words, the 
so-called “new society” was primarily a discourse of authoritarianism. What was behind the 
narration of newness is the attempt to control representations of a nation, by unsettling their 
sense of origin as though the new indigenous “we” had always existed. In Derrida’s terms, 
such invention is part of the ruse to dominate because it inscribes and delineates the “who” 
and “what,” or who is a friend and who is an enemy (Derrida, 1997, p.106).  
Another propaganda technique of the regime was the use of colossal montage where Marcos 
and his wife, Imelda, were projected as benevolent rulers rather than the conjugal dictators 
that they were. The scale of cultural production resonates with what Guy Debord in The 
Society of Spectacle termed as “concentrated spectacle,” which signifies capacity of the 
propaganda machinery to project control through “scale, magnitude and numbers” 
(Debord,n.d., p.31). Such construction was also evident in grand parades, murals, edifices, 
and celebrity events, like the 1975 boxing match between Muhammad Ali and Joe Frazer in 
Manila that earned the dictatorship favourable global news coverage. Indeed, the cultural 
productions conformed to a programmable goal of being filmed, photographed and written 
about in order to confer legitimacy upon Marcos. In Debord’s sense, the bigger and more 
concentrated the spectacle, the larger is its capacity to alienate and deceive (Debord, n.d. 
p.117). Analyzed through Benjamin’s concept of aura, the autocratic aesthetics, which 
collapses distance by its sheer enormousness, has nothing to do with giving the masses access 
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to modes of expression. Rather it had more to do with overwhelming viewers with meanings 
that have no depth or horizon, thus leaving them no time for critical reflection (Benjamin, 
1968, p.222-224). Tied to authoritarian politics, this style of artistic production aims to 
astound perception to the extent that it induces dread rather than appreciation. In all, the 
culture industry privileged the passive and compartmentalized consumption of images, ideas 
and representation. With the absence of a public sphere where interchange is possible, the 
delusive effects of the simulacra and spectacles were assimilated into the lifeworld, 
reinforcing the authoritarian modes of thinking and actions that they prescribe. 
The authoritarian order’s politics, composed around perpetual fear, served the strategic 
interests of the United States very well. The dictatorship was put at the service of the 
economic, political and military agendas of the U.S. that benefitted from the Marcos regime 
(Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, p.165-168; Constantino, 1990, p.93-94). For all its claim to 
have installed democracy in the Philippines, the U.S. did not repudiate Marcos for declaring 
martial law. Marcos played his Cold War cards very well when he justified his dictatorship as 
necessary to eliminate the threat of homegrown communism, which was part of the “red 
menace” spreading in Asia (Boudreau, 2004, p.81). During the Vietnam War, from 1956 and 
up to its end in 1975, the U.S. had to maintain its security presence in Asia and the two major 
military bases in the Philippines proved useful in projecting that military might. In return for 
guaranteeing the unhampered use of the bases, the Philippines enjoyed an increase in military 
and economic aid (Constantino, 1990, p.71-74; Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, p.249-260). 
There was no capital flight when martial law was declared; American business even approved 
Marcos’s move (Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, p. 229-30). In 1972, the foreign relations 
committee in the U.S. Senate claimed that the iron rule will introduce the “needed stability,” 
and that the “familiar government and military bases are more important than the preservation 
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of democratic institutions which were imperfect at best” (Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, p.168). 
This policy was consistent with the Orientalist stance of the U.S. who, since colonial times, 
painted the Philippines’s democratic practice as deficient, chaotic and irrational, and thus 
requiring a disciplinary model. Equally propitious is the success of the accompanying import 
of the American culture industry – films, music and print media – that flourished during the 
martial law years (Constantino, 1990, p.85). The authoritarian regime did not see an intrinsic 
conflict between the casually liberal values portrayed in the foreign culture industry and its 
own constrained ones. This may have been because American cultural products were 
conveyed as exemplars of modernity. They were generally untouched by censors; only local 
films, books and other reading materials were monitored for their political messages and 
subtexts. 
The modernization mission of the Marcos dictatorship came with the disregard of 
accountability. Using extra-legal means, Marcos took over a number of strategic businesses, 
especially those of his political rivals – media, power and utilities, sugar trading, and airline 
companies, among others – and delivered them to his associates who were assured of loans 
and bailouts (Rocamora, 1995, p.xv).  The state-led modernization was so inflationary and 
deficit forming that, along with corruption and skewed income distribution, it proved to be 
economically disastrous. The inflow of foreign aid and loans shored up the economy but 
saddled the country with repayment of loans funnelled to questionable projects, among them a 
nuclear power plant that was never operated because it sits on a major earthquake fault 
(Bulatlat, 2004). Marcos hired technocrats to implement his grand visions of progress, but it 
turned out that many of them either used their position to enrich themselves or failed to 
perform in office (Rocamora, 1995, p.5; Kang, 2004, p.80). If anything, these technocrats 
made sure that the fiscal prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund and the World 
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Bank were followed, especially foreign debt repayments (Constantino, 1990, p.27; Schirmer 
and Shalom, 1987, p.261-267). For their role in perpetuating postcolonial dependency, 
Filipino historian Renato Constantino called these technocrats “comprador intellectuals” 
(Constantino, 2000, p.134).  
Technocratic rationality, however, goes beyond mere motives and allegiance to a political 
order. Habermas’s treatment of the term tracks its evolution, from a way of understanding the 
function of technology in society, to its emergence as a matrix for societal control. In 
Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas roots technological rationality in the ideology 
that privileges the objectivism of science to the neglect of human interests (Habermas, 1971, 
p.310-311). Despite professing autonomy and objectivity, this thinking lends itself to the 
concept of self-preservation that originates from the will to dominate nature (Habermas, 1971, 
p.311-312). Hence, when this rationality takes hold of work, language and power, it precludes 
self-reflection and critical questioning (Habermas, 1971, p.314).  Applied to Marcos’s 
authoritarian rule, technocratic rationality’s fixation with its design provides a justification for 
domination. In other words, its main task is the maintenance of hegemony in the economic 
realm, for the benefit of Marcos, his associates, and the global system of capitalism. 
The Marcos dictatorship was a beneficiary of the post-Cold War programs of the World Bank 
and IMF, two multilateral institutions that oversaw the growth of former colonies as they 
were integrated into the global production system of capitalism (Bello, 2004, p.2). These 
institutions provided loans and economic directions to spur economic growth based on a 
country’s advantages on labour, land, and technology resources. The IMF and World Bank 
policies were reflected in the Marcos regime’s growth strategy, which is the export-oriented 
and import-dependent industrialization apparent in the proliferation of plantations of export 
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crops and export zones for garments and electronic goods. The industrial enclaves were 
notorious for giving low wages, banning unions and employing women for their perceived 
docility. Subcontracting was the norm in the garments industry, while the threat of heightened 
automation in electronics kept the salaries low in order to preserve jobs (Constantino, 1990, 
p.15). In 1980, a decade after the entry of multinational corporations, the promised jobs and 
technology transfer were not realized. Licenses and patents remained with foreign companies 
and their subsidiaries while outdated and unsuited technologies were sold in the Philippines 
(Constantino, 1990, p.35). Transnational capital did little to improve the country’s productive 
forces, other than setting up the assembly lines of the export-oriented factories that took 
advantage of cheap labour and unregulated repatriation of profits. This growth strategy fits a 
condition described by David Harvey as a “spatio-temporal” fix to ease the crisis of 
capitalism in the metropoles (Harvey, 2006, p.422-35; Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, p.232). 
Technocratic logic, put to use in areas where capitalist growth is uneven and irregular, 
brought penury. In rural areas, feudal relations persisted while peasants were subsumed into a 
flawed modernization project. Marcos came up with a land distribution scheme but did not 
break up the sugar estates and plantations (Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, p.178-181). The 
“Green Revolution” attempted to modernize agriculture but tied farmers to chemical products 
of the U.S. agrochemical industry, pushing them deeper into usury and poverty (Constantino, 
1990, p.64-5; Sison and De Lima, 1998 p.49). Technology hardly spurred growth in 
agriculture as it was beyond the reach of small landowners and peasants (Constantino, 1990, 
p.68-69). Thus, to ease rural unemployment and avert economic unrest, Marcos encouraged 
overseas employment that easily assumed a “predominantly female character” – domestics in 
the Middle East, Hong Kong and Singapore, entertainers in Japan, and nurses in America 
(Aguilar, 2000, p.8; San Juan, 1996, p.174; Constantino, 1990, p.58-59). This phenomenon of 
193 
Filipino women migrant workers, according to postcolonial critic San Juan, expresses an 
aspect of the “productive consumption of labour power,” in which the latter designates an 
exchange value of labour differentiated by gender and race (San Juan, 1996, p.180). Overseas 
employment came with social costs such as the brain drain, cultural alienation, and family 
breakup; but the dollar remittances of overseas workers shored up the country’s economy and 
paid the foreign debt. By 1984, two years before the Marcos regime fell, there were 350,000 
Filipino workers abroad with combined dollar remittances that outpaced the country’s 
traditional export earnings (San Juan 1996, p.174). 
The Marcos modernization agenda has affected other subalterns who were previously 
voiceless or at the fringes of the nation’s politics (Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, p.199). Among 
them are the indigenous people, comprising about twelve percent of the country’s population, 
who resisted when Marcos allowed dams, logging, mines, and industrial farms in their 
ancestral lands. The first groups to openly criticize Marcos were the Catholic and mainline 
Protestant churches, which are known for their solid hierarchy and international links. Priests 
and pastors, who were radicalized by repression, became revolutionaries and activists. In 
1974, a church-backed human rights organization, “Task Force Detainees,” drew international 
attention for its work in documenting and helping victims of human rights abuses like torture, 
disappearance, killings, arrest and detention (Boudreau, 2004, p.137; Schirmer and Shalom, 
1987, p.221-3). The paramilitary groups displayed some extant millenarian practices that were 
exploited in counter-insurgency drives. Known as folk-religious fanatics, they were notorious 
for gruesome killings.  
The strongest organized resistance against Marcos came from ideologically committed 
groups, namely the Islamic and communist rebels. In the southern Philippines, the Moro 
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National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) grew when 
subjected to repression during the martial law years, while the expansion of the Communist 
Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the New People’s Army, was attributed to the 
radicalization of peasants, trade unions members and students. Even with U.S. military 
assistance, Marcos failed to break the backbone of the communist-led rebellion in the 
countryside that, by 1986, communist guerrillas were found in sixty-three out of seventy-five 
provinces in the country (Sison and De Lima, 1998, p.15). The overall growth of anti-Marcos 
resistance could be summed up in this manner: repression drove moderates to armed struggle, 
while the enlargement of democratic space broadened dissent among the middle class and the 
poor in urban centres (Boudreau, 2004, p.180).  Political activities took all sorts of forms to 
outwit censorship and breach the limits of repressive laws. This also saw the emergence of 
guerrilla forms of artistic expression -- theatre, songs, humour, and rumours -- the ordinary, 
common forms that were refashioned to embody political aesthetics.  
So, the question now is this -- how can these established forms of representation break the 
authoritarian modes and bring to the fore their reification, which would then become the 
matrix of illumination? In his analysis of artistic forms, Walter Benjamin develops an 
argument about how “insignificant” representations become significant when appropriated by 
those who recognized their uniqueness.  In his essay “The Rigorous Study of Art,” Benjamin 
argues that art can be contemplated in the ordinariness of its form that, even so, supplies a 
stimulus to its environment (Benjamin, 2008, p.69).  Accordingly, the commonplace forms 
become extraordinary because they are “bound up with their material-content,” and this 
“unexplored marginal realm,” if examined, may yield as yet unknown positions -- a process 
that Benjamin termed as “reciprocal illumination” (Benjamin, 2008, p.70-71). This idea of 
sensing these neglected elements of representation is useful when looking at how new media 
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technologies can wrest political momentum from the dominant productions of the culture 
industry by incorporating into its fold the various contents and techniques that undermine the 
aura of authoritarian aesthetics. It also provides an insight on how technology, when 
appropriated, becomes a variant of itself as it experiences the process of historical utilization 
and contestation; put differently, its newness lies in how it is seen and renewed (Peters, 2009, 
p.17-18). What is being highlighted here are the shifts taking place in the culture industry, the 
possibility of its revitalization, or the way that it is opened up to admit the unrecognized 
aspects of itself –  allegories, ambiguities, and spectralities, and the meanings that they hold. 
This insight is germane to the experience of the Philippines under Marcos, where new media 
technologies negotiated the range of possibilities within the limited freedom of the public 
sphere. In what follows, I will provide an account of that possibility. 
The Marcos rule is now referred to as the dark era of Philippine media. News media were 
silenced by the closure of news organizations, the detention of prominent journalists, and 
censorship (Ofreneo, 1986). With the latter, news had to fit a universal technological logic to 
be free of value judgments and partialities. For the authoritarian regime, a freewheeling press 
obstructs modernization goals because it creates discord. Thus, information should be limited 
to that which maintains public order and a compliant political consciousness. For instance, 
news is defined around a “national security” dictum, which can mean anything, from the ban 
on criticizing Marcos and his wife to writing about crimes, cholera outbreaks, and the effects 
of the curfew on strip joints (Ofreneo, 1986, p.138). Intimidation and harassment continued 
throughout the Marcos years, even when anti-Marcos protests were spreading, so that in 1985, 
a year before Marcos was ousted, journalist Antonio Ma. Nieva summed up the condition of 
the Philippine media as being “under siege,” while men and women in the media were 
working “under the shadow of death itself” (Nieva, 1985, p.xiv-xv).  
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The absence of a democratically constituted public sphere highlighted the crisis of 
representation that perennially placed the Marcos regime’s legitimacy in question. The crisis 
is derived from the sense that the masses were voiceless, despite the presence of an authority 
that speaks in their name. Rather than demanding better or improved representation, within 
the parameters set by Marcos, various elements of the protest movement created their own 
public spaces -- the so-called parliament of the streets, where representation is not delegated 
but direct, and where a prefigured public sphere allowed subaltern demands to be articulated 
and repeated. Years of breaching the controls had generated multiple spaces and forms of 
protest for the growing ranks of dissenters. However, it is within the bounds of the culture 
industry that an observable shift in political representation took place, wherein existing 
communication technologies were combined with emerging ones and, together, as new media 
technologies, they sought new modes of representations.  
One such shift in the culture industry was the rise of the “mosquito press.” Generally referred 
to as the anti-Marcos media, the mosquito press, which included weeklies, tabloids, 
magazines, community-based news desks and newsletters, was so named because it connotes 
being small but with annoying sting. The mosquito press positioned itself as the alternative to 
the “crony press,” or the censored and controlled mainstream press. In the wake of anti-
Marcos protests from 1983 to 1986, the mosquito press enjoyed a substantial readership but, 
as expected, it experienced raids, confiscation, surveillance and arrests of publishers and 
writers (Pineda-Ofreneo, 1986, p.166-167).  The mosquito press was primarily print-based, 
and this could explain the convenience, mobility and inconspicuousness afforded by the 
medium. In contrast, electronic broadcasts were vulnerable to official control, and were 
jammed and prevented from airing critical news. Owners of the mosquito press included 
journalists and church groups backed by some opposition personalities and business 
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organizations. The journalistic and literary genres used were myriad, as were the tactics for 
survival. But common among them was giving a voice to the anti-Marcos movement; they 
risked publishing censored stories, views of opposition leaders and releases of international 
wire agencies that did not see print in mainstream newspapers. The mosquito press functioned 
almost underground. Despite the limited circulation, the mosquito press enjoyed high pass-on 
readership. This was partly possible because of the availability of photocopying and photo 
stencil technology that enabled the electronic multiplication and transmission of facsimiles 
(Tuazon, 2007, online). The presence of the mosquito press prefigured a public sphere in a 
condition that prohibits its installation. It also opened up spaces for the articulation of 
suppressed political sentiments. As a result, the established newspapers, upon seeing the 
success of the mosquito press, started to publish stories critical of the authoritarian rule, after 
experiencing the decline of their credibility, readership and advertising revenues (Pineda-
Ofreneo, 1986, p.168-169). The economy of the mosquito press presaged the logic of spectres 
that is presupposed in new media technologies, will be discussed again in the final section of 
this chapter. What is being highlighted meantime is how the culture industry, through the 
mosquito press, renewed itself and in so doing reconfigured the terms of representation under 
the authoritarian regime. 
The upsurge of resistance against Marcos’s authoritarian rule came after the assassination of 
Benigno Aquino, a political rival of Marcos. Aquino’s death became the rallying point of 
opposition forces in the Philippines and precipitated the two other events leading to the 
downfall of Marcos -- the snap presidential elections and a military mutiny that resulted in a 
popular uprising. Marcos sought a fresh mandate through the polls where he faced off with 
Aquino’s wife, Corazon, who was backed by the Catholic church, business and bourgeois 
opposition. With the decline of Marcos’s popularity, the U.S. saw an alternative in Aquino as 
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against the communist-backed groups (Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, p.333-334). The 
communist party and the openly Left organizations decided to boycott the presidential 
election, calling it a sham because they believed that Aquino’s platform was incapable of 
articulating subalterns’ demands and resisting U.S. intervention (Brownlee, 2007, p.191). It 
was a decision that communists regarded as a tactical error; but it could also be thought as a 
narrow orientation to control the modes and outcomes of representation, a vanguardism of a 
sort. The election was turned into a nationwide protest, a repudiation of Marcos, which meant 
that his manipulation of votes backfired. Marcos claimed victory amid the opposition’s 
complaints of massive poll fraud (Brownlee, 2007, p.191-192).  At the same time that Aquino 
called for nationwide civil disobedience, a military mutiny was pre-empted, endangering its 
leaders who happened to be Marcos’s top military and defence officials. The Catholic church 
called on the public to support the mutineers. In no time, thousands found themselves facing a 
column of Marcos’s tanks, guns and troops. What emerged was the spectacle of a multitude 
with rosaries and flowers facing the firepower of the dictatorship in outright defiance. On 
February 25, three days after the start of the uprising, Marcos was spirited away to Hawaii by 
two U.S. fighter planes, and Corazon Aquino came to power. 
The preceding account of the rise and fall of authoritarian rule in the Philippines provided the 
context for thinking about the possibilities of new media technologies under conditions of 
repression. New media technologies have created spaces for political intervention and 
contestation that political groups then seized to render presence, as well as to re-articulate 
their collective demands. This dual sense of representation, which brings into presence what is 
absent as well as to “re-cite” an existing hegemony, is a condition of representation that is 
undecidable or open to the unknown and unforeseeable (Derrida, 2007;Thomassen, 2006). By 
implication, this duality is inherent in the convention of new media technologies, or the way 
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in which they indicate the form and content of representation. The possibilities of 
representation were perceivable among groups in the Philippines that had ranged across all 
political persuasions, from the bourgeois elite opposition to communists, and also activists, 
writers and artists. Common among them was the awareness that new media technologies 
could be a reserve of political power once they are subjected to choices and judgments. In 
other words, political agency was enabled by the effects of new media technologies, and also 
by the social interchanges that they had made possible.  
In the next section, I will supply the arguments on how authoritarian power subsumes the 
techniques of representation to convey the appearance of nominality. First, I will revisit 
Adorno’s thoughts on how authoritarian control is revealed in the logic of reification. 
Secondly, I will look at how the public use of consensual reason, which frames Habermas’s 
theory of communicative action, bears on authoritarian rule. The last part will deal with 
Derrida’s conception of spectro-politics, especially its relationship to the representation of 
subaltern constituencies in the post-colonial terrain of the Philippines. This politics doubles as 
a promise to be repeated and cited, an act presupposed in new media technologies, that haunts 
– which means being nearly absent but also being present everywhere. The backdrop of this 
discussion is the exploitation for surplus value that has determined the uneven landscape of 
capitalism’s growth in the Philippines. This historical condition affects the ways in which new 
media technologies have staged inescapable contestation, diffusion and rethinking amid the 
relentless sea of changes that took place in the period of authoritarian rule. 
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5.2    Dictatorship and Democracy: Legitimation and Contestation 
It needs to be reiterated that despite Marcos’s successful seizure of state power, he also made 
attempts to secure legitimacy for his rule through election and parliamentary means. While 
these exercises were rigged in his favour, they gave a semblance of legitimacy to his rule. 
However, the issue needs to be explored further. If legitimation can be secured through the 
constitution of hegemony via representation and electoral means, why was it necessary to turn 
to authoritarian control that entails more political costs? The case of Marcos invites more 
questions about why legitimation, secured through a liberal regime that guarantees some 
exercise of civil rights and political participation, was supplanted by authoritarianism that 
constrained democratic practice. Moreover, when he seized power, he could have done away 
with the legal mandate, as had other dictators of his kind. However, it might have been that 
Marcos also knew that the absence of open and organized resistance, during the first half of 
his 14-year rule, does not guarantee legitimacy or translate to political support. In short, his 
position became untenable. This would explain why the regime had allowed the elite to 
participate in parliamentary elections, and was mindful of its international image that was 
increasingly sullied by his human rights record and draconian prerogatives. 
Underlying the authoritarian regime’s programme of control were the indelible demands of 
justice and equity. The decades of exposure to the liberal tendencies of elite democracy led to 
the general acceptance of civil liberties and the parliament as necessary conditions of 
representation in society. While it was earlier argued that the authoritarian logic is implicit in 
liberalism, or that the authoritarian order had merely revealed another face of modernity, the 
gap between them is a condition of possibility. This means that there are elements that cannot 
be incorporated into the shift of power structures, because they represent a trace of ethical 
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recognition or that which stands apart from what can be subsumed by certain controlling 
codes. In concrete terms, while the post-war regimes in the Philippines had mainly secured 
political gains for the ruling class, the regulative ideas of public good, national interests and 
accountability have not been lost. The democratic promise and practices made such inroads 
into the national consciousness that they became the yardstick by which the Marcos regime 
was measured by the protest movement. The latter, along with conditions of economic 
deprivation, added mass and momentum to the anti-Marcos resistance, as shown by the rallies 
and marches that mobilized thousands around the country. While Marcos had won over some 
factions of the ruling elite, when he revived the parliament, staged elections and granted them 
economic favours, the absence of democratic spaces for deliberation and dissent had rendered 
the political concessions hollow. 
There were some noticeable equivocations in the authoritarian regime’s exercise of control to 
induce political consensus that, somehow, encouraged the breaching of its limits. Marcos 
sought legitimation through the use of repressive state instruments, but he deployed them 
selectively. This was evident in his ambivalent stance toward the Catholic Church, which was 
the sole institution capable of challenging him, given its established hierarchy, international 
links and moral ascendancy (Boudreau, 2004, p.137). From within the church, a range of anti-
Marcos activities grew, from denunciatory prayers to some priests and nuns joining armed 
struggle. The church’s hierarchy was silent on the latter, but throughout the Marcos rule, the 
clergy preached about human rights and social justice and provoked a rethinking of the 
political situation. The bishops may have adopted a centrist position but the community-based 
church groups tended toward radicalisation. The authoritarian regime did not threaten the 
church authority’s spiritual mission, let alone go after its resources that were used for political 
organization and mobilization of the faithful (Boudreau, 2004, p.137). In this manner, the 
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church became a catalyst, gradually forming a mass of believers who disapproved state 
control. The bourgeois opposition also found support from the church that, in turn, linked 
them up with other classes, ethnic, and political groups to broaden their political base. This 
alliance favoured the restoration of the post-war elite representative system of government 
that Marcos had abolished. But what the bourgeois opposition shared with the church 
hierarchy is the distrust of the communist’s ideology that, in the time of Marcos, was gaining 
ground in the countryside (Brownlee, 2007, p.191). This distrust, I believe, should be linked 
to how the Church regarded the infallibility of its teachings; communism, with its promise of 
emancipation, has stepped onto a soapbox reserved for God. Overall, the stance of the 
Catholic Church effectively eroded the authoritarian regime’s legitimacy while its particular 
imprint on the anti-Marcos struggle further strengthened its hold on the nation’s politics, a 
privilege that it enjoyed since colonial times. 
It was in the cultural sphere where Marcos maintained his grip by ensuring that the culture 
industry continued to communicate the values of the authoritarian regime. The process of 
translating these values into the concrete ideological representations of authoritarian thinking, 
then made to accept the naturalness of repression (Marcuse, 1964, p.106-108). So how was 
repression naturalized, and, in the case of Marcos, prolonged? The thrust of the argument, to 
answer the question, lies in the denigration of difference, which is opposed to a universality 
that makes up the basis of political institutions, practices and representations of modernization 
under the Marcos regime. In the latter, concepts were devised to disregard paradoxes, 
differences and incongruities, because no alternatives are allowed to transform reality. This is 
how the rationality that is behind an authoritarian terror, should be examined. As 
representation is about presence, the Marcos regime occluded it in two ways. First, it rendered 
representation static and tied to determinations of power, and, second, representation is denied 
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the ambiguity that is essential to it. Representation then becomes propaganda, filtered through 
a cultic aura, which immediately demands submission (Benjamin, 1968, p.241). This means 
that in authoritarian representation, meanings and associated terms emanate from a single 
source or subject position, so that they can never become something else. The sense of 
representation is also defined by its fixity rather than the ability to alter and reposition 
presence. The intention is for representation to be mirror-like, wherein images embody the 
exact copies of what they designate hence, the elements collapse into a banality of sameness. 
What emerges is the opacity of representation on several levels. First, representations are 
conveyed as universal, pre-established, and oriented toward a particular interest, hence 
violence and contradiction are left out because what should predominate is reified equivalence 
(Adorno, 1973, p.4). The intention behind this rigidness is to produce subjects that conform 
and passively consume representations within a totalizing system of meaning-making 
(Adorno, 1973, p.5-6). Second, representations under authoritarian order are not opened up 
for public discussion and criticism; hence they are unable to reach new understandings 
developed out of consensus (Habermas, 1984, p.398). Without their interpretive conditions, 
the representations are merely aligned with instrumental reason, and steered with power and 
money. Third, representation is built around the denial of difference in the course of 
homogenization and silencing (Derrida, 2007, p.94-95). What authoritarian politics did to 
representations was to designate them as absolutes, unchangeable essences. This closes the 
door to the presence-absence of difference, a condition best summed up by Derrida in the 
phrase “brutality of the unilateral decision” (Derrida, 1998, p.15). 
The Marcos authoritarian rule typifies an order distrustful of the ambiguity of representation. 
Under it, the concepts of nationalism and democracy have their redemptive capacity put into 
abeyance. As concepts that comprise the ideology of the state to maintain its hold on power, 
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they were stripped of their recursive aspect to become mechanical parts of the hieratic whole. 
Nationalism became an admixture of the authoritarian agenda for modernization that intends 
to mould the national consciousness toward the “acceptance of the existing social order and 
one’s place in it” (Constantino, 1982b, p.26). Similarly “democracy,” in an authoritarian 
sense, eliminates the necessity to think, speak and act because to do so resists subservience to 
authority of any sort (Constantino, 1982a, p.18).  
As in politics, Marcos worked out a basis for his rule in the economy by delimiting 
participation. Areas in the economy were opened up to limited ownership, mostly to Marcos’s 
associates (Constantino, 1990, p.27). In the competition over economic resources, Marcos has 
strongly intervened but mainly to lessen competition in favour of his associates. However, 
Marcos allowed foreign businesses to operate with less restriction, a decision that is more 
political than economic (Constantino, 1984, p.95). The purported aim of attracting foreign 
investors was technology transfer, but transnational corporations ignored this responsibility as 
patents and licensing agreements were confined to their subsidiaries and were not meant for 
the public domain (Constantino, 1990, p.35). Domestic control was extended to labour which 
was banned from organizing independent unions and holding strikes especially in export-
oriented industries (Constantino, 1990, p.97). In other words, the suppression of workers’ 
rights was intended to bring efficient outcomes for capitalism that, therefore, made violence 
the necessary premise of the authoritarian rule.  
The inscription of violence in the period of authoritarian rule has to be examined to bring to 
light its distinctiveness, consequences, and possible subversions. The thoughts of Habermas, 
Benjamin, Arendt, and Derrida provide some qualified arguments about the violence that 
accompanied the rise of tyrannies in the West. They have analysed violence and power, two 
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elements constitutive of an absolutist domination that took on many forms in various contexts. 
For Habermas, violence occurs as a result of distorted communication, a condition wherein 
estrangement, misunderstanding and deception become so acute that trust disappears 
(Borradori, 2003, p.64). He says: “The spiral of violence begins as a spiral of distorted 
communication that leads through the spiral of uncontrolled reciprocal mistrust, to the 
breakdown of communication” (Habermas, 2003, p.35). Habermas blames the impossibility 
of dialogue on unbridled capitalism and social inequality that rationalize not only the 
economy but also the whole society. Despite the reifying tendency of these conditions 
however, Habermas believes they are not beyond repair as long as individuals commit 
themselves to the practice of constraint-free communication (Habermas, 1984, p.100). This 
value of intersubjective understanding is embodied in Habermas’s idea of the communicative 
rationality that resides in the promise of modernity, which is built upon the Enlightenment’s 
call for the public use of reason. Reason, according to Habermas, can be repositioned to 
commit to the common good of “justice, general welfare and peace” (Habermas, 1974, p.258). 
In this way, reason rouses human consciousness toward “the direction of emancipation” 
(Habermas, 1974, p.276). Thus, if reason is divorced from contingency and purged of 
instrumentality, violence could always be postponed. This can be deduced from Habermas’s 
concept of a society that is capable of attaining communicative rationality, which is oriented 
toward consensus and where antagonism is never permanent. This suggests that instrumental 
reason is a self-correcting mechanism, its maladies are able to stabilize themselves. But it now 
appears that violence shares the same premise as the process of legitimation, that is, the 
attention to rules, facts and efficiency for the maintenance of a social order. 
If we grant Habermas the belief that reason can triumph over domination, taking the 
Enlightenment’s promise to have the courage to be rational, we would see less of structural 
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injustices, only the failures of societal integration and inadequacies of the law. Moreover, this 
would mean that no control could ever be absolute because representation can decisively 
mediate the way in which power relations are regulated. While this argument cannot be 
rejected outright, its interpretive scheme should not go unchallenged. If we go by Habermas’s 
idea of communicative rationality and what it suggests, might we not condone the silencing 
and invisibility of subalterns? The harshness of the law and the absence of justice under the 
Marcos authoritarian order can hardly be counteracted by institutional and representational 
forums that it offered. In addition, the Marcos regime disregarded the demands that 
challenged its exclusionary policies, which emanated from the coercive legal mechanisms. 
Under conditions of repression, the idea that laws and constitutional guarantees means relief 
is illusory. Although it does supply some ideals that social interaction could be oriented to, 
the reformism of Habermas’s theory could offer little in recuperating an administered society, 
in terms of democratic possibilities that he had in mind. 
In “Critique of Violence,” Benjamin’s reflections on violence and messianism has implicated 
in the ambiguity of the law itself, which introduces violence every time it seeks to eliminate 
violence (Benjamin, 1978, p.287-288). Benjamin’s analysis of violence went beyond the 
rationalization of the economy and society; it indicts the authoritarian structure behind it all, 
while the presence of the technologies of representation, like films and photography for 
instance, only served to intensify the domination (Buck-Morss, 1977, p.171-172). In 
Benjamin’s terms, violence inheres in a programmatic goal of progress, which is domination 
concerned within the production and maintenance of laws that repress dissent and frustrate 
revolution (Benjamin, 1968, p.257; 1978, p.300).  His argument supplies hope when it noted 
the impossibility of maintaining the integrity of the law because the same law justifies 
violence. However, along with the decay of the law is the emergence of a condition that has 
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the capacity to annul violent laws by all means possible, including the use of “unalloyed 
violence” (Benjamin, 1978, p.300). Benjamin’s idea of freedom negates authoritarian 
violence, which is rationalized, codified and maintained; it moves from a teleological concept 
of time toward a concept of history which opened up to possibilities from a standpoint of 
redemption, or a Messianic revelation (Benjamin, 1968, p.297). 
Derrida’s ideas on violence can be gleaned in his essay Force of Law, where he claims that 
the external foundation of authority and law brings “violence without ground,” which then 
suggests the possibility of their being imposed by force that has hollow basis (Derrida, 2002, 
p.242). It is not that the law and authority are legal or illegal, but that they are 
“deconstructible,” or “insure the possibility of (their) deconstruction” (Derrida, 2002, p.243) 
Thus, they are not absolute because they are essentially undermined by the violence of their 
founding (Derrida, 2002, p.254). Simply put, the law, which affirms an authority, also puts 
that authority in doubt, by reason of its anterior claim to legitimacy. Violence is always a 
supplement of the law, whose origin requires some extra-legal means of control to sustain 
itself.  Derrida sees both the law and its supplements as products of a milieu hence they bear 
the limits, ambiguities and emblems of the order that deploys them. What can transcend their 
finitude and absoluteness is justice that Derrida designates as a promise that unfolds even 
though it appears unattainable. 
To return to the Marcos regime, particularly its violations of human rights and armed 
offensives against communist and Moro insurgents, we can say that the state repression 
represents the violent force of the law. What Derrida’s thoughts about the law would bring to 
the discussion on democracy, in relation to authoritarian rule, is the idea of justice that has to 
be addressed in relation to the workings of the law or authority. Unlike the law and authority, 
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justice does not claim self-presence because it is irreducible to claims of legitimacy. In 
Derrida’s sense, the law is always imperfect and the conditions where it is applied are always 
far from ideal. However, that does not stop the law from attempting to perfect the kind of 
justice to which it is oriented. As Derrida says: “Justice is an experience of the impossible. A 
will, a desire, a demand for justice whose structure wouldn’t be an experience of aporia would 
have no chance to be what it is, namely, a call for justice” (Derrida, 2002, p.244).   
This question of justice extends to representation, which is another realm where Marcos’s 
authoritarian rule faced contestation. The imposition of dominant symbolic representations 
makes the regime’s instruments of control just as pernicious as the law and authority. 
However, unlike law and authority, representation requires no formal legitimation because 
propaganda can easily be mass-produced and transmitted without the legal groundwork. In 
this sense, production of propaganda can be understood as the discursive nature of 
authoritarian repression. The latter is an outcome of a structural organization of power in 
which representation has ceased to provoke critical responses from the populace, and become 
a self-legitimizing, repetitive repertoire of images. This is revealed in conditions where 
representations became the products of questionable fiats divorced from the process of 
reflexive understanding, an operation that could have been provided by the public sphere.  As 
Habermas thinks that it is through deliberation that individuals can build themselves a 
democratic order, his theory of the public sphere can provide a basis for the demand of 
recognizing dignity and autonomy in society.  
In The Politics of Friendship, Derrida brings another dimension to this argument on 
repression as “autoimmunitary” violence. The inflexion of autoimmunity refers to something 
that threatened from within itself (Derrida, 2003, p.94). It is revealed in social institutions and 
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direct coercive measures but also in representation, which is built upon an ideology exercising 
some form of control over society (Derrida, 1997, p.80). If representation is the way in which 
meanings are produced, subtended by the social relations, then it follows that repression is 
presupposed in the supplied meanings. Thus, representations in times of repression are 
hegemonic, in the sense that they try to dissolve individual identities in their respective 
narratives of beginnings, in order mask hierarchies and inequalities. However, Derrida sees 
this strategy as yet another way of inscribing invented identities, because the simulation of 
genealogical ties and affinities are similarly constructed for a certain purpose. Derrida termed 
this set up as “determined politics,” which is calculable and calculating because the 
beginnings they posit are always open to doubts and misgivings (Derrida, 1997, p.93). 
However, as the imagined bonds of a nation, friendship and family exist in language, as they 
are spoken about, passed on, and used to reconstruct the past, they also offer a space for 
thinking about democracy that goes beyond the dichotomies of friendship and hatred, and 
inclusion and exclusion. In other words, the conditions of control are fissured by their own 
rules. 
The Marcos regime’s propaganda strategy aims to frustrate differentiated views that could 
result in the formation of political consensus. The elimination of that possibility to articulate 
political beliefs retarded democratic practice, which is based on the ability to freely express 
oneself and hold authorities accountable. The demise of the space also meant the elimination 
of “publicness” that, in Habermas’s thought, stands against the state that it puts in check 
(Habermas, 1989, p.5, 25-26). The issue at hand is whether a public sphere existed in the 
Marcos regime, and, if it did, if it could measure up to its Habermasian model. It is 
convenient to say that the Marcos regime did away with the public sphere and installed the 
propaganda machine in its stead. However, such analysis implies that a public sphere is tied to 
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determinations of power that include an authoritarian order. It also ignores the existence of 
other spaces of social interaction that should be regarded as oppositional or subaltern public 
spheres. Hence the answer maybe what kind of public sphere could be installed in a 
constrained condition such as an authoritarian rule. I argue that Derrida’s idea of 
representation makes the public sphere hospitable to a wider spectrum of citizens with 
diverse, if not contradictory, views. Representation, in Derrida’s sense, is not only being 
present but also a presence that is open to further representation and articulation (Derrida, 
2007).  It is giving voice to the voiceless and also the chance to reiterate what is being said 
and could be said (Thomassen, 2006, p.116).  
Thinking about the public sphere, as a space of representation in Derrida’s sense, expands the 
concept and opens it up to more possibilities for participation and contestation. Derrida’s idea 
of representation goes beyond giving a voice; it is about soliciting a presence that is absent, as 
well as iterating the voices of those present and absent (Derrida, 2007, p.98-99). In other 
words, the public sphere is more than just a space for voices that might come together to 
disagree or agree over something; rather, it is also about representing and reiterating 
disavowed demands. The manner, in which representations bring undecidability, in the sense 
that meanings are multiplied and deferred so that no closure is expected, makes the public 
sphere a “space of difference,” where clashing and varied perspectives are presupposed. The 
same idea of the public sphere supports the possibility of its multiple existence over and 
above the larger public sphere guaranteed by constitutional, legal or civic mechanisms. This 
can be deduced from the attributes the public sphere can have as a realm of representation: the 
constitution of unrecognized identities, solicitation of spectres (subalterns, minorities, 
primitives and the unreasonable “other”), affirmation of difference, and recognition of similar 
spaces that interrelate or negate each other. In the next section, I will provide an account of 
211 
how a subaltern public sphere coalesces with the spectrality of new media technologies to 
install a public space disavowed by the authoritarian order.  
5.3    The Spectres and the Chance of Democracy 
The turning points of politics in the Philippines are oftentimes attributed to the presence of a 
leader or a group possessing charisma or fervour to mobilize people in great numbers. They 
even alluded to a religious imagery, often that of a messiah who stands up to oppressors. In 
this section I will show that a particular messianism highlights an inextinguishable chance for 
change in times of repression. However this messianic strand should not be seen in its 
millenarian or dichotomous vein, but rather through its productive, hence reproducible, link to 
the present. This is the concept of messianism as seen by Benjamin and modified by Derrida. 
In Benjamin’s Theses on the Philosophy of History, messianism is a consideration of the 
present that is neither predictable nor detached from its past. The present is an evaluation of 
the past, and a response that anticipates an unforeseeable future; it is a call connected to the 
idea of redemption that does not seek divine agency, only humans’ responsibility to 
themselves (Benjamin, 1968, p.254-255; Borradori, 2003, p.80). This suggests that there are 
unmet needs and promises of the past that have to be re-cited in the present, to orient the 
future.  Benjamin’s messianism, therefore, has to be seen within a specific historical 
conjuncture crisscrossed by reified binaries of exploitation, domination and contestation. 
Derrida was faithful to this historical proposition of Benjamin’s messianism. But what he 
brought into it was the notion of spectres, or the effects of the technological means of 
representing and engaging with the social milieu that anticipates the attainment of justice. 
Derrida argues that the iterative convention of new media technologies provides the promise a 
chance to be affirmed, negated, re-cited and witnessed, thus making a promise “open to 
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something other and more than itself,” (Derrida, 2002 p.83, 87). These effects deliver the 
promise, or the articulation of permanent demands and desires, into contingency, and thereby 
giving humans the chance to re-think their conditions of life and do something about it 
(Derrida, 1994, p.212). In what follows, I will provide an analysis of how these conditions 
unfolded in the Philippines.  
The anti-Marcos uprising took place on February 1986 just after the snap presidential election 
that eventually led to a military mutiny. Marcos decided to seek legitimation after thirteen 
years in power as the clamour for his overthrow had been growing since 1983 when his 
political rival, Benigno Aquino, was assassinated when returning home from a three-year 
exile in United States. Aquino’s death became the rallying point of a massive anti-Marcos 
movement that openly defied restriction to public assembly and discussion.  Protests not only 
drew huge numbers, they also grew confrontational in their tactics. In the countryside, the 
clandestine communist party and its armed group mounted attacks against government troops, 
but the offensives had more propaganda than tactical value. The economic crisis spawned by 
the Marcos regime spared no one. From 1980 to 1986 the economy hobbled through a series 
of crises -- from the oil crisis in 1978, the growing trade deficit, inflation and foreign loan 
repayments. Meanwhile, Marcos’s health was failing to the point that political opposition 
seized this as an opportunity to raise the issue of succession (Brownlee, 2007, p.193). This 
initiative came from elite opposition groups who only wanted to replace Marcos and return to 
the pre-martial representative politics, in contrast to the communists and their allies who 
wanted to set up a coalition government. It was also a time for the broadening of protests. 
While before the armed struggle appeared to be only way to topple the dictatorship, the 
multiplication of the forms of struggle, standpoints and political groups also increased the 
“return” of representations. The culture industry, which was opened up by the mosquito press, 
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had assimilated the emergent technologies of communication. Altogether, they embodied the 
logic of new media technologies. This needs elucidation.  
The technological base of the new media technologies has been largely the same as those that 
existed in the years prior to the authoritarian rule, except that their speed of transmission have 
intensified further the distribution of texts, images and sounds. However, about this time in 
the Philippines, duplicating and photo-imaging technologies, such as the photocopier, Telex, 
photo stencils and, later the fax machine, proliferated, such that they provided novelty to the 
existing print and electronic media. In such technology, the composition of images and texts 
was a departure from the existing forms that they provided new ways of reception and 
interpretation. They enabled graphical distribution of the text-based messages taken from 
fixed sources like books, periodicals and photographs. The technology of facsimile converts 
printed images into electronic impulses composed of minute dots that, if magnified, reveal 
spaces and gaps on surfaces where alterations and modifications are possible.  
A technology can also be designated “new media technology” when it re-presents traditional 
forms of texts and images. However, I maintain that the designation should refer more to how 
they enabled new forms of contestation among groups resisting the authoritarian rule and less 
to their technical constitution, however novel this may be. In this manner, the interpretive 
realm of new media technologies can be viewed as a space for the limitless return of a 
representation where meanings are infinitely multiplied. Thus, the possibilities of these 
technologies not only reside in their synthetic effects, that is, how abstract electronic impulses 
of dots and intervals compose conditional meanings and unrestricted judgments in political 
terms, rather they are also revealed in the manner in which new media technologies have 
served to provoke impressions, judgments and interventions. To understand this kind of 
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representation is not to cognize the dots and spaces inscribed on a surface, but to read their 
innumerable projections in the public realm where their meanings are significant. What 
Derrida said in Echographies of Television about the mediatic role of radio, television and 
newspapers, in relation to their time in history, resonates here: “This other time, media time, 
gives rise above all to another distribution, to other spaces, rhythms, relays, forms of speaking 
out and public intervention”(Derrida and Stiegler, 2002, p.6-7).  
We can now say that new media technologies exhibit a spectrality that reconfigures a chance 
for the political transformation in the Philippines, years before the February 1986 uprising 
took place. Spectres are the technical effects of new media technologies that disturb the 
balance of forces in the nation: they are the processes of articulation of the enduring demand 
for justice in uneven spatiotemporalities. This articulation is, necessarily, the operation of 
representation that was earlier assayed as an absent-presence. When representations are 
mediated by new media technologies, they enable them to become an iteration of themselves. 
Thus, we can say that these representations have neither presence nor absence but instead are 
presence-absence. This means that the ubiquity of representation simultaneously alludes to its 
absence, presence and the possibility of both. Accelerated repetition makes representation 
simply impossible to predict or fix (Derrida and Stiegler, 2002, p.71). In the context of the 
authoritarian rule in the Philippines, spectrality can be seen as a form of contingency that 
intervenes to represent what is excluded and who is silenced. New media technologies 
inaugurated presence when, as a result of injustice, it was inevitably absent. What this 
condition provided was the instantiation of mediated and direct symbolic exchange among the 
subalterns and the underclass who were able to reflect and discuss their plight in relation to 
the social order that oppressed them (San Juan, 1999, p.84). In other words, new media 
technologies cannot be directed solely in their technical form; they have to be in a relation 
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with individuals who aware of the technologies’ potential to become democratic (Street, 1992, 
p.196). The spectrality of new media technologies renews the interpretive capacity of 
individuals and communities, giving the capacity to produce representations with limitless 
iteration. Such reconstruction pushes individuals from the confines of their private selves to 
the public sphere that they have prefigured. In a way, the spectres solicited by new media 
technologies asserted a bigger, all-inclusive subaltern public sphere to enact a promise of 
democracy. 
In the four days of the uprising that unseated Marcos on February 1986, new media 
technologies played a crucial part in precipitating the gathering of tens of thousands on the 
streets of Manila to give support to military mutineers. Filipinos made a revolution by 
standing up to Marcos’s soldiers and tanks. By this time, no political groups could claim the 
lead role over the spontaneous mobilization of the multitude that took part in the uprising as 
everyone recognized each other’s worth, which is a public sphere ideal. This occasioned new 
media technologies to demonstrate how the logic of the spectre lives up to an event that is not 
quite predictable and intelligible. It displayed the capacity of new media technologies for 
limitless iteration that was put to use when the whole nation tried to make sense of what was 
happening. This time while newspapers did provide analysis, the instantaneity of radio and 
television was dramatic in its transmission of accounts and images, testifying to the flexibility 
and variability of forms available to various anti-Marcos groups. Marcos tried, and succeeded 
briefly, to block the signals of a radio station owned by the Catholic Church that broadcasted 
updates during the first hours of the uprising, but the station managed to return on air from a 
secret location. The bloodless uprising also enjoyed international coverage with the presence 
of the foreign press. All told, there is a connection between the sharp decline of regime’s 
popularity and the installation of the public sphere, formed from a network of subaltern public 
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spheres, where those who are politically aware can find their voices, and who moved the 
revolution along without a predetermined sense of the nature and direction of the engagement. 
Conclusion 
Many of the local accounts of the aftermath of the February uprising were interlaced with 
religious imagery and symbolism, not only because the Catholic church played a major role in 
the uprising but also due to the messianic nuances of the event that showed how, in the midst 
of disorder, unpredictability and crisis, a political transformation was possible. However, the 
analysis should go beyond simple allusion to piety, which the Philippines had no shortage of.  
Hence it would be instructive to return to the notion of messianicity that Derrida linked with 
the aporias of new media technologies whose effects cannot be addressed in merely technical 
terms. When the event is confined to the identification of either religious symbolism or 
technological accounts, it is reified. Derrida argues that religion, like reason, has developed 
alongside the promise to respond to the “otherness of the other” as well as the advances in 
technoscience (Derrida, 2002, p.66). In other words, political discourses that addressed faith 
are also contaminated, if not mediated, by technological effects; they hold as many limitations 
and possibilities derived from such a relationship of co-implication. Derrida sees religion as 
always understood in relation to time, which suggests that it is revealed in the everydayness of 
life and of the world, that is, history as such. This conveys the capacity of history for iteration, 
in the sense that it addresses something hidden and obscured in order that it will be embraced, 
rejected or modified.  
The work of spectres of soliciting the chance for democracy in repressive times, such as the 
Marcos regime, relates to the structure of the promise of an unexpected that, in Derrida’s 
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term, is “messianicity without a messiah,” or the “waiting without awaiting itself,” paying 
intimate and urgent attention to the demands of justice (Derrida, 2002, p.56). Neither 
circumscribed nor detached, this promise means fidelity to faith; it inheres in the practice of 
repeating the material, a chance that is offered by the convention of new media technologies. 
In other words, repetition underlies the making of the promise because the latter can only be 
broken or fulfilled if it is witnessed, affirmed, confirmed, or reiterated (Rafael, 2008, location 
11941, e-book; Derrida, 2002, p.80,83). When spectres breached the limits of the constrained 
fields of representations under the Marcos regime with their ability for iteration, this 
repeatability simultaneously multiplied meanings and their possibilities in uneven political 
spaces.  It can be argued that these spectral impulses were present in the momentum of the 
February uprising and had the capacity to provide a chance for political renewal: “No faith, 
therefore, no future without everything technical, automatic, machine-like supposed by 
iterability,” says Derrida, adding that “the technical is the possibility of faith, indeed its very 
chance”(Derrida, 2002, p. 83). However, being receptive to spectres requires awareness that 
their consequences are unforeseeable, and that they cannot be presupposed in any way.  
Uprisings are probably difficult to theorize as direct political actions because of their 
spontaneity, timing and breadth. But writing about mass strikes as the revolution unfolded in 
Russia in 1904, Rosa Luxemburg’s portrayal of an uprising somehow presaged Derrida’s 
concept of an event that is used here to explain the 1986 uprising against Marcos, which 
thrives on the repeatability (Derrida, 1994, p.125-126). Luxemburg notes that a mass strike 
comes after a long period of political struggle, a series of actions that culminates in a 
revolutionary wave, which is “unhindered and unrestrained, in a sprit of reckless radicalism” 
(Luxemburg, 2008, p.164). Its spontaneity, which defies formulas and pre-set plans, 
demonstrates an awakened class consciousness (Luxemburg, 2008, p.160-161).  
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Manuel Castells, in his trilogy, The Information Age, describes the emergence of a “network 
society” made up of interwoven connections that shift, fragment, and regroup, depending on 
the changes of social, economic and political realms (Castells, 1998). In his later work on the 
public sphere, Habermas sees the latter more as a “network for communicating information 
and points of view” (Habermas, 1996, p.360). In both depictions of a network, new media 
technologies play a role to mediate the transmission of representations so that they make 
sense to those who access them. Networks, by their nature, are attuned to the logic of 
Derridean spectres. Habermas sees their porosity, while Castells underscores their flexibility, 
decentralized execution, and horizontal reach that is made possible by the accelerated 
exchange of information. It is in the latter that a democratic possibility resides because it 
allows the breakdown of codes and hierarchies that inhibit the networks (Castells, p.372). 
Following Derrida, networks can thus be thought as communities of people soliciting the 
spectres of new media technologies because they happen to know their democratic 
possibilities.  
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                                                                                                                      CHAPTER  6 
THE SPECTRES AS THE HOPE FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF 
NETWORK TECHNOLOGIES 
Introduction 
Democratization, in the wake of authoritarian rule in the Philippines, was a kind of exorcism. 
After the unmasking of authoritarianism as domination in the name of reason, democratization 
was an effort to rethink the system of power that permeated the structures, institutions, and the 
national consciousness in the Philippines. Along with this came the removal of vestiges of the 
Marcos rule whose evildoing had to be cast out. Or at least this was the belief of the new 
leaders, who assigned themselves the task of recuperating democracy through political 
reform, which was attempted by reversing and transposing authoritarian representations. 
However, eschewing the pernicious practices of authoritarian rule was more easily said than 
done. What happened was accommodation, rather than repudiation, of the political and class 
interests of the remnants of the dictatorship. Thus, the traces of despotism easily slid into the 
new order – practices, structures, and meanings – which then mutated into another form of 
domination that coordinated political freedom with the logic of invasive markets and 
technologies.  
New media technologies were among the major beneficiaries of this process of 
democratization. They opened up avenues of expression after fourteen years of censorship 
under Marcos. However, the condition of freedom also presented a dilemma because their 
democratic role was constrained by the pecuniary laws of the market. In other words, while 
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new media technologies were expected to articulate demands for justice, they battled for their 
survival, which was defined by how efficiently they transmitted simulacra and desires tailored 
to the contingency of market choices. There was much to lose in this trend, especially because 
new media technologies had reverted to the character of the culture industry, which 
consequently affected the interactions in the hard-won public sphere. This is not to say that 
the activism of the “mosquito press” was forgotten; rather the complex conjuncture of 
political and economic interests weakened the moral basis of the democratic role assigned to 
new media technologies. Both politics and the market offered them excessive material and 
experience for commodification, that they have reworked to become more seductive, 
sensational, and slanderous, to fit the format of “infotainment.” The underlying premise was 
that individuals, as consumers, should be given what they want – commodities and symbols of 
identity shaped around the values of excess, ambivalence, and apathy. Certainly, these values 
have long been disseminated by the culture industry but, under the condition of the 
accelerated global expansion of capital, which coincided with the post-authoritarian period in 
the Philippines, they acquired more intensity and breadth.  In what follows, I will sketch how 
new media technologies that developed in the Philippine economy are predisposed to a 
particular techno-mediated politics. 
As the Philippines embarked on “democratization” in 1986, global economic changes were 
taking place in the world, after heady decades of post-war growth. Capitalism, in the 60s and 
70s, suffered from chronic overproduction and overcapacity, which, in the 1980s, was 
absorbed by the global expansion of the market (Wood, 2003 p.130-133; Harvey, 2005, p.11). 
This spatio-temporal fix, characterized by the rapid movement of capital, brought complex 
and technologically mediated, relations of domination and subordination (Wood, 2003, p.133-
134; Bello, 2002, p.xii). The other name for this trend is globalization, viewed in economic 
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terms. This meant the adoption of agreements on global trade, policies on international 
finance, and styles of governance prescribed by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Trade Organization (WTO). These multilateral institutions secured the 
assent of states to international finance and development strategies intended to bring “global 
prosperity” (Bello, 2003, p.xi). Globalization is the hallmark of neoliberalism, which is a 
political theory that coordinates human freedoms with “strong private property, free markets, 
and free trade,” (Harvey, 2005, p.2). The role of the neoliberal state is to preserve economic 
hegemony by creating and sustaining the conditions for the free movement of capital (Wood, 
2003, p.xi).  
After the fall of the Marcos regime, the Philippines was all set for neoliberalization. Its new 
rulers looked to a new growth model, after a long time under a dictator, who, together with his 
technocrats and associates, closely intervened in the economy. The Philippines joined other 
Third World countries that accepted neoliberal economic conditions, so that they could be 
fully integrated into the global system of accelerated capitalism. It is not that these countries 
rejected capitalism in the past; rather, global financial institutions wanted an end to state-
brokered capitalism, which restricted the flow of goods and investments from industrial 
countries, especially the United States, whose economic interests are apparent in the policies 
of the World Bank, IMF, and WTO (Bello, 2002, p.3). The insertion of corporate driven 
market forces into the uneven landscape of capitalism in the Philippines, where the 
fundamental issue is the distribution of wealth and power, brought far more unintended 
consequences than could have been imagined by global financial institutions in the West. The 
adverse effects of prescribed economic programs became evident as soon as they were 
applied, especially in “residual” or peripheral sectors of the economy (Angeles, 1999, p.368). 
For instance, without safety nets, the flood of imports in agriculture ruined small farmers and 
222 
traders, whose products could not compete with highly subsidized ones from Western 
countries. Moreover, the high demand for export crops resulted in further degradation of the 
nation’s commons. Instead of alleviating poverty and boosting confidence in the economy, the 
deregulated market brought uncertainties and constraints on the country’s economy (Bello, 
2002, p.xii).  
For its adherence to neoliberalism, the Philippines, by extension, is a neoliberal state that 
pledged to advance the right to individual private property, civic order, and free trade 
(Harvey, 2005, p.64). The country embarked on a programme of deregulation in the economy 
and privatization of public services that entailed withdrawal of the state from provision of 
welfare services. In governance, the parallel move was decentralization in the early 1990s, a 
process of devolving authority and services of the national government to local government 
units that were expected to generate more revenues, much like business corporations. It 
translated to the government backtracking on its social obligations, and subjecting them to the 
laws of the market. The overall effects of this neoliberal turn chimed with what David Harvey 
called the “creative destruction” of society (Harvey, 2005, p.3). In Empire of Capital, Ellen 
Meiksins Wood describes the role of neoliberal state as “extra-economic force.” While the 
state does not intervene directly in the relations of labour and capital, it indirectly sustains 
such relations (Wood, 2003, p.4-5). This idea of the state as an agent of globalization found 
expression and theoretical cogency in the Philippines that even exceeded Wood’s projections. 
The government had intervened in some labour disputes by invoking “national interest,” that 
often favoured capitalists. It has to be mentioned that, since 1986, the succession of 
administrations in the country were strong advocates of neoliberalism, whose logic and 
circumstances they have pushed in all directions regardless of its consequences.  
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Globalization is often seen as a process of standardization and integration into an imagined 
global community, to borrow Benedict Anderson’s iconic phrase. Though in vogue in the last 
twenty years, the term globalization merely magnifies the features of multinational capitalism 
that has increased its presence in the new markets it opened. In the Philippines, globalization 
is bound up with the colonial history of establishing capitalism, accomplished through the 
reconfiguration of existing modes of production, formation of classes, and global trade. While 
capitalism and colonialism have undergone changes, they have sustained the logic of 
“commodity exchange for the sake of profit” (San Juan, 1999, p.261). Put differently, the 
accumulation and expropriation of surplus value are a constant within uneven, but compliant, 
spatiotemporalities. The latter include the classic combination of cheap and docile labour, 
natural resources, and an amenable government that opens up the economy to a deluge of 
imported commodities. While it is true that the Philippines had long been a ready market for 
Western, mainly American, products, there are still enough spaces to saturate with fungible 
but branded commodities. Brands, according to Naomi Klein, are a function of the nominal 
strategy of homogenization, where the focus is not on “things” but brand images and their 
meanings (Klein, 2000).  Brands are not only applied to commodities, they can also be ideas, 
people, and lesser life forms. 
The Marxist’s notion of the combined and uneven development of capital argues that 
capitalism’s growth is best understood as irregular, unbalanced and conflicted, rather than 
unvarying, homogeneous, and smooth (Luxemburg, 1951; Mandel, 1970; San Juan, 1999; 
Wood, 2003; Harvey, 2004; Harvey, 2005). This simply means that capitalism thrives on the 
conflation of several different factors that crucially shaped its distinctiveness. To explain the 
latter, and bring the concept of uneven development to bear on neoliberal debates, David 
Harvey emphasized two elements that he attributed to Marx: spatiality and the conjunction of 
224 
abstract and concrete labour.  The first one, space, is what capitalism needs to grow, so once 
the space contracts, capitalism will try to expand it (Harvey, 1982, p.391-393). Put differently, 
capitalism expands within its host or predetermined space but when it finds this space 
constricting, it actively reproduces it, not physically but technologically. While this point was 
not explicitly articulated by Harvey, I argue that capitalism enhances and extends space 
through representational forms generated within new media technologies in order to expand 
surplus value. The second element, which is the simultaneous occurrence of concrete and 
abstract labour, refers to reduction of skilled, or concrete, labour to simple, or abstract, labour, 
where the latter becomes replaceable and undervalued (Harvey, 1982, p.59). Skilled labour 
and specialized work are transformed to resemble assembly line tasks, which are repetitive 
and require only limited skills to perform. This logic reorganizes the hierarchy of labour 
process and assigns corresponding value to all types of work (Harvey, 1982, p.392). It relies 
on location advantage that is inseparable from factors like colonial history, racism, and state 
politics. The Marxist notions of space and labour, in the time of globalization, explain the 
emergence of overseas Filipino workers in affective work and the proliferation of call centers 
and similar jobs, issues that I will discuss in length later. 
The role of new media technologies can be deduced from this global development, 
specifically the way in which the neoliberal ideology is naturalized when its dominated 
subjects become part of media-technological networks and systems of representation (Harvey, 
2005, p.3). Fredric Jameson calls this shift the communicational focus of globalization, while 
Jodi Dean termed it “communicative capitalism”; both concepts convey how neoliberal ideals 
are articulated through new media technologies (Jameson, 2009, p.436-438; Dean, 2009, p.22-
23). The Philippines has shown how these transformation of new media technologies 
negotiated the neoliberal terrain. In the 1990s, the discourse of democratization coincided 
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with the early years of Internet diffusion. Activists, cyber enthusiasts and non-government 
organizations (NGO), many of them veterans of the anti-Marcos struggle, shaped the nascent 
practices of the Internet and, to some extent, the use of mobile phones in the Philippines. 
Information sharing gestures toward political activism, which carries the Habermasian ideals 
of the public sphere – openness to rational critical debate, disregard of differences in status, 
and the cultivation of consensus. It was thought that new media technologies could become a 
mechanism for democratic participation, or at least, provide an online platform for political 
demands (Lovink, 2011, p.158-159). This activist platform proved its worth when mobile 
phones were recognized for their role in the overthrow of President Joseph Estrada in 2001 
because they coordinated the mobilization of thousands of protesters (Celdran, 2002, p.94). 
The possibilities of mobile phones reside in what Paul Levinson calls “omni-accessibility,” 
which refers not only to the fact that they are handy but also because they are “telepathic” 
(Levinson, 2004, p.xii-xiv). The latter conveys a certain spectrality because communication 
can be carried out through means other than physical senses and presence, and across time.  
Soon after the 2001 uprising, the market forces, that intently followed the rapid diffusion of 
new media technologies, brought ambivalence to technologically mediated activism. The new 
media technologies’ convergence with the culture industry, the popularity of “user-generated” 
content, “informatization,” the reliance of money capital on communication platforms, were 
among the features of what is now called Web 2.0 (Hardt and Negri, 2000, p.284). The latter 
refers to the era of networked new media technologies, whose distinguishing interfaces are 
embodied in these buzzwords: “user-friendly, social media, real time, and search-and-share” 
(Lovink, 2011, p.4-5). It is also the time of surveillance for security, but more for the benefit 
of the market because online user profiles became the commodities sold to advertisers and 
corporations (Lovink, 2011, p.5). And yet, despite their ambivalent effects, new media 
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technologies, now ubiquitous, were still perceived as having profound possibilities for change 
in the Philippines. The online presence of all sorts of political movements, groups and 
individuals supported this claim. In other words, it was no longer a question of whether new 
media technologies could be part of change, but how and when they can be deployed; it was a 
question of means and ends. 
This relationship between new media technologies and the chance for change requires a closer 
look. Associating new media technologies with democracy restricts the understanding of their 
possibilities, and while the practice of democracy and convention of new media technologies 
are mutually determining, they are not identical. It narrows democracy’s sense to the 
exchange of information in the public sphere so that other aspects of politics, such as class 
rule and its exercise of state power, would be less noticeable. This presumed congruence 
carries the logic of identity thinking that, as Adorno has warned, leads to reification. To recall, 
the latter designates a “coercive rationality” that exemplifies capitalism’s notion of exchange 
value, wherein concrete things become abstract and replaceable (Adorno, 2005, p.200; Cook, 
2004, p.40). For Adorno, the concept broadly refers to the effacement of heterogeneity, a 
condition wherein incommensurable objects and individuals become identical because 
sameness is assumed in the relationship (Adorno, 1973, p.135; Jay, 1984, p.68; Buck-Morss, 
1997, p.26; Rose, 1978, p.45). This principle of equivalence, which extends to many aspects 
of social relations, supports domination and absolutization as well as restrains autonomy, 
spontaneity, and specialization (Jameson, 2010, p.204). Adorno expands the concept of 
reification to cover how people relate to technologies, and he came up with the phrase “veil of 
technology” to define a condition in which technologies become so dominant they are 
regarded as the solution to all the problems in society – a fetishization of technology that 
accompanies domination (Adorno, 1991; 2005, p.200-201). This is not the place to discuss 
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Adorno’s idea of fetishism, but what I want to highlight is technological messianism, a 
thinking that considers technology as having the capacity to set directions of change in 
society, and the latter has no choice but to adapt and be absorbed by its instrumental logic 
(Street, 1992, p.30-31). In other words, humans have to cede their agency to the workings of 
technologies and their rationale (Street, 1992, p.26).  
It is useful now to bring up the difference between Habermas’s concept of democracy 
provided by the public sphere, and Derrida’s democracy to-come. Democracy in the public 
sphere operates with pre-set goals – intersubjective understanding, public use of reason, truth 
as underlying motive for communicating – that establish ideal conditions for interaction. It 
remains a normative ideal because such restrictive conditions could be realized if enforced. 
By setting preconditions and rules for rational interaction, Habermas narrows the reaches of 
democracy and contradicts its emancipatory impulses. Moreover, consensus in the public 
sphere is often influenced by spectacles, simulacra and spin, and there is no shortage of 
pundits who say that these types of representation weakens political agency. On the other 
hand, Derrida’s idea of democracy to-come is about the future that is unfolding in the present 
(Derrida, 1994, p.98-99). It is linked to the question of justice that needs to be realized. In 
other words, democracy serves the interest of justice that while it is unrealizable at the 
moment, it has to be established at once. Democracy to-come sets no boundaries or 
preconditions; it favours unconditional hospitality and acceptance of heterogeneity (Derrida, 
1997, p.104-106). 
Democracy is a paradoxical practice; while it strives for plurality and integration, it is 
simultaneously complicit with homogeneity and exclusion (Derrida, 1992, p.100).  However 
for Derrida, the concept of democracy should encompass the complexity and conflictual 
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nature of inclusion and consensus, and pay attention to otherness, difference and the 
unforeseen. Derrida’s assessment should be considered in the light of his deconstructive 
politics that does not propose an abandonment of democratic ideas but their constant 
transformation. There is no guarantee that democracy will not be exclusive, or that new media 
technologies will not use their “techno-economic power” to render false representations of 
reality (Derrida, 1992, p.92). However, Derrida believes it is possible to locate a point where 
a chance for democracy exists in the same reified condition. This chance is offered by 
iteration. When representations are posited and transmitted, it is doubtful that the meanings 
they engendered can form one coherent interpretation or remain the same throughout. Thus, 
they become frontiers for semantic exploration, experimentation, and modification. The 
process is accomplished by repetition, resulting in the transformation of common notions and 
dominant discourses, a gesture that privileges diversification of meanings and revitalization of 
worn-out concepts and relations. 
While offering no guarantees, Derrida’s suggestions point to the chance of democracy through 
the effects of new media technologies. New media technologies carry the possibilities of the 
logic of iteration. If the world is awash with representations that could be repeated, rehearsed, 
and made recurrent, and this process is neither mechanical nor mimetic, then new media 
technologies, which are mechanisms of representations, epitomize this kind of iteration. The 
technological process of representation involves synthesizing, processing, and transmitting 
that, when representations are converted into sequences of images, sounds, and texts, enable 
modification and customization. In other words, new media technologies reconfigure the basic 
suppositions of representation, where meanings can never be singular or fixed, because 
innumerable versions are always put into play (Derrida, 2007, p.127-128). In Spectres of 
Marx, Derrida sees new media technologies as having the capacity to solicit a space for 
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democracy through the use of tele-sciences or tele-technology (Derrida, 1994, p.212). He 
depicts specters as those which bring possibility to a condition of reified authority. These 
spectres evoke hidden meanings, traumas, promises and prospects that have destabilizing 
consequences for society: they affirm a messianic promise that arises from the shifts and 
progression of the past and the anticipation of the future. Spectres persist because justice has 
been unrealized, hence the haunting continues. 
The preceding discussion of reification and spectres orients the analysis of the political 
possibilities of new media technologies in the Philippines that I will provide in this chapter. 
As the plurality of representations, practices, and aesthetic experiences compete for attention, 
there exist recurrent, spectral demands that are projected onto new media technologies from 
where messianic hopes are restaged. New media technologies are not merely regarded as 
vehicles for social movements and platforms of political groups; they are also seen as having 
the intrinsic capacity to precipitate reflection and action.  This chapter will examine the 
transformative potential of new media technologies, with the aim of discovering new models 
of resistance, new metaphors of change in the postcolonial context, and novel hypothesis for 
Derridean specters. In the section that follows, I will give an account of the conditions in the 
Philippines, how specters manifest themselves as the country retraces its democratic steps and 
deals with the compulsions of globalization. The second section examines the fate of the 
public sphere and the consequences of its saturation carried out by new media technologies. 
Finally, the third section looks at the logic of new media technologies and the political 
possibilities they offer.  
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6.1    Spectral Media Technologies, Neo-liberal Regimes, and the 
Reification of Democracy 
If there is a sign that it would not be an easy return to authoritarian rule in the Philippines, it is 
the presence of new media technologies that have the capacity to breach the controls of 
information that any potential despot installs. It is not that suppression of free expression did 
not take place again, as the nation found out belatedly; rather, the attempts have not been fully 
successful and were accomplished only briefly. One reason for this resiliency is the openness 
of new media technologies’ interfaces that crisscrossed the many forms of representation.  
The growth of these technologies in the Philippines was attributed to the liberal climate in the 
economy, politics and culture, after the restoration of civil and political rights in 1986. But the 
changes also brought ambivalence. In the economy, this translates to the policy of opening up 
the country to neo-liberal strategies that accord primacy to the operation of markets. The area 
of culture follows the rationale of commodification, where the assignment of value underpins 
the development and production in the culture industry. However, local aesthetics has to 
compete for space and attention in an increasingly globalized and technologically mediated, 
hence depersonalized, public sphere. The deluge of Western cultural products has brought 
novel forms of expression, which, although tied to consumerism and the spread of Western 
hegemony in art and technology, also enabled experimentation and innovation in the realm of 
culture and politics. 
Technological developments in the culture industry in the Philippines, in the late 1980s and 
1990s, followed the emerging Internet culture, but it was the diffusion of personal 
communication technologies that was most significant. In a country where only one in a 
hundred was able to make a telephone call in the 1980s, the growth of mobile telephones was 
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remarkable. As of 2001, two years after the introduction of SMS (short messaging system), 
the country had seven million mobile phone users, sending 65 million SMS or “text 
messages” a day, that in that same year, it was called the “texting capital of the world” 
(Celdran, 2002, p.91; Mirandilla, 2007, p.8). The diffusion of mobile phones was a market-
driven decision but it also had a social dimension. It cashed in on the steady growth of 
Filipino communities in diaspora (Madianou and Miller, 2011, p.461). A consequence of the 
international division of labour, the diaspora refers to labour migration, mostly women, to 
Western and developed countries mainly  to work in the “care industry” as nurses, domestics 
and the like. The phenomenon of diaspora links emotions to human labour that is shaped 
around technologies that overcome space and time barriers (Madianou and Miller, 2011, 
p.460; Pettman, 2006, p.39). I will return to this point later but, in the meantime, I will focus 
on affective labour as an essential component of the accumulation of surplus value and the 
uneven development of capitalism. 
The Philippines’s economic growth rate lagged behind other countries in Southeast Asia but, 
in terms of the telecommunications industry, it experienced exponential growth as shown by 
the ubiquity of mobile telephones, increase in Internet access, and the proliferation of 
Business Product Outsourcing (BPO), which is another name for call center (Wallace, 2007, 
p.179).  The growth in the industry was noteworthy but the statistics tells little about the 
reason for their rapid expansion. For example, the Philippines ranked eighth in the world for 
the proportion of Facebook users per capita: almost one in four Filipinos has a Facebook 
account (Stockdale and McIntyre, 2011). Users in other social media and location-based 
interfaces, such as Twitter, LinkedIn and PinInterest have increased too (Socialbakers, 2012). 
So popular were these interfaces that, in 2011, the country was dubbed as the “social 
networking capital of the world” (Stockdale and McIntyre, 2011). This appellation is 
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conveniently attributed to Filipinos’ ingrained behavior of being amiable and expressive of 
their feelings, but, I argue, there is no tenable basis for this claim. 
The trends in the development of telecommunications infrastructure show more how new 
media technologies, including the Internet, mobile phones and their eventual convergence 
with mass media, were established, when the Philippines was on a fast track to 
neoliberalization via deregulation, privatization, and free market policies (Mirandilla, 2007, 
p.3).  Their proliferation provides an insight into how capitalism operates in a society 
characterized by the uneven growth of markets. These technologies were set up to become the 
backbone of accelerated real-time market transactions, because of their capacity to store, 
analyze and transmit databases that can influence financial decisions (Harvey, 2005, p.3). 
However, given the Philippines’s weak manufacturing and industrial sector, the new media 
technologies were harnessed for the service sector, mainly for communications, and the 
maintenance of symbolic ties. In other words, telecommunications companies shifted the 
burden of surplus accumulation, by seeking profits in the forms of communication and reified 
desires they had created. 
Under the existing growth strategy, the Philippines was primarily seen as a huge market for 
the telecommunications industry, notwithstanding the country’s deep urban-rural disparity 
and the poverty that is experienced by a third of the population (Mirandilla, 2007, p.6). This 
unevenness in the capacity of the economy to generate surpluses remains the same to this day. 
Despite the veneer of urban middle-class lifestyle, twenty-three million Filipinos are 
considered poor, which nine million are on subsistence wages (Virola, 2011, online). Poverty 
was the push for Filipinos to go abroad to seek jobs and better lives. There are about ten 
million Filipinos living outside the country, which some two million have work contracts, the 
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majority of them as nurses and domestics. In 2010 alone, the government estimated that they 
sent home 141 billion pesos (about £2 billion) to support the families they left behind 
(National Statistics Office, 2012). On the household level the money is spent on consumables, 
in addition to school fees, communication gadgets and services to maintain the frail ties of 
geographically separated households (Madianou and Miller, 2011, p.466-468). On the 
national level, the remittances became a major source of foreign exchange to alleviate fiscal 
deficits, trade imbalance and the national debt (Pernia, 2007, p.222; Aguilar, 2000, p.7-8). To 
return to the discussion of the proliferation of call centers, which appears to be the only viable 
employment for young people around this time, the Filipinos’ uniqueness, which springs from 
their competency in English, university education and affinity with American or Western 
lifestyle, has become a marker of deep of cultural alienation (San Juan, p.24-25; Hardt and 
Negri, 2000, p.291-292). San Juan argues that such generalized statements of Filipinos’ 
advantage over their Asian counterparts, masked class conflict, ethnocentrism and racial 
prejudice, while at the same time highlighting a mode of Orientalism that sees Filipinos as 
easily assimilated postcolonial subjects (San Juan, 2009, p.24-25).  
How capitalism regulates labour power, as well as labouring bodies, is key to understanding 
alienation in Hardt and Negri’s concept of  “immaterial labour” (Hardt and Negri, 2000, 
p.291-292). In the Philippines, the concept applies to labour found in call centers, which 
currently employ some 350,000 persons; the established practice is to cut costs by farming out 
work to casual labour employed in temporary contracts. This work mirrors the shifts in the 
labour process that are bound up with the emergence of information as a commodity. In the 
overall set up of globalized capital, the presence of outsourcing companies indicates a weak 
position of the country in the global division of labour. In Hardt and Negri’s Empire, call 
center work typifies immaterial labour, which is, in this context, labour power concerned with 
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the production of services, cultural products, knowledge and communication (Hardt and 
Negri, 2000, p.290). Hard and Negri further delineated outsourcing work by quoting Robert 
Reich: “symbolic analytical services . . . problem solving, problem-identifying, and strategic 
brokering activities” (Reich in Hardt and Negri, 2000, p.291). Immaterial labour is vital to the 
accelerated global competition of capital; its alienation lies in its power of abstraction which 
accomplish the removal of workers from the object of their labour, thus turning them into 
number crunchers, human answering machines, and complaints’ absorbers (Hardt and Negri, 
2000, p.291-292).  
Meanwhile the culture industry’s success of bringing its audience under the influence of the 
market was even more intensified under neoliberalization in the Philippines. The rapid, 
simultaneous, and networked way of transmitting meanings pushed the culture industry to 
adapt the logic of globalization – of being fast, first and fungible – that constitute the new 
ideology of the times. Since the 1990s, news media in the country have grown dramatically in 
terms of circulation, styles and formats. The number of nationally circulated newspapers 
multiplied, but tabloids also began to enjoy a substantial following; radio kept its place as the 
medium of the masses, while television was hugely popular for entertainment (Coronel, 1999, 
p.90). This development in the culture industry, which shaped the news along a form of 
populism, saw the rise of celebrity politics. The latter marries popularity with patronage, and 
translates them to political power through the agency of election. Celebrity politicians in the 
Philippines fall into two categories: those in show business who want to enter politics, and 
those in politics who use show business techniques. However, it was easy for the two 
categories to conflate, as was the case of an actor-politician, Joseph Estrada, who was elected 
president in 1998; he proved that the trend became a norm rather than the exception, in a 
nation that, to this day, cannot decide if celebrity politics enhanced or damaged democratic 
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practice. Celebrities personify commodity value, particularly its enigmatic and irrational 
aspects, that appear as innocuous and pleasurable when, in fact, in Adorno’s words, they are 
“illusory and mendacious,” even with some “semblance of political legitimacy” (Adorno, 
1991, p.33; Taylor and Harris, 2008, p.133-134). 
While the commodified culture industry got the upper hand, this did not preclude new media 
technologies from reviving the “mosquito press.” Some journalists embarked on investigative 
journalism, a reporting genre whose primary goal is to uncover a wrongdoing, and by drawing 
attention to longstanding social issues, mainly corruption and abuse of power, that were 
glossed over by infotainment. Through investigative genres, media technologies contributed 
significantly to the democratization discourse of the 1990s, as part of the entrenchment of 
neoliberalism in the country. However, except for Estrada, who was the subject of 
investigative pieces that led to the erosion of his legitimacy and subsequent overthrow in 
2001, the stories did not result in bringing other corrupt officials to court. At best, the series of 
expose’ accomplished some kind of public shaming.  
The breadth and impact of anti-corruption reportage had generated an illusion that new media 
technologies, can fix democracy by exposing cases of corruption. However this reportage has 
tragic consequences when tried out in communities where political power and economic 
resources are dangerously concentrated in the hands of warlords and local elites – it saw the 
rise of cases of harassment and the killing of journalists.  Since 1986, there have been 124 
journalists killed, but the most heinous, single attack took place in 2009 when 32 journalists 
died. The prime suspect was a local official belonging to a powerful political clan considered 
an ally of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. For many years now, the Philippines has been 
considered as one of the world’s most dangerous places for journalists.  While the 
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practitioners are under attack, new media technologies, however, shielded the public from 
physical harm with the anonymity of their interfaces such as emails, text messages, online 
polling, and comments. The risks of confronting structures of power, where political violence 
is a fact, were minimized with the convention of new media technologies, where the identity 
of interlocutors became secondary to their opinions. The anonymous interfaces, which 
provide synchronous and asynchronous interaction, connected users to the public sphere as 
well as the news organizations thus, creating a discursive network of intersecting agendas. But 
at the same time, this network of mediated interaction, emanating from personal 
communication interfaces and gadgets, opened up possibilities for purposive encounters, 
given the increased awareness of other interlocutors that respond to similar issues.  
New media technologies have inaugurated new ways of interacting in the public sphere 
although, if infotainment is considered, this only reflected part of their rational and technical 
specifications. To recall, Adorno notes that the technologies of the culture industry are shaped 
for and by the logic of unregulated market and commodity exchange that was true in his time, 
and, in fact, is even more relevant in the time of globalization, where technology is essential 
to the growth of capital. However, this also breeds a technological rationality known as 
technological messianism. The latter is a form of technological determinism, which is a belief 
that technologies, mainly through their material constitution, bring progress independent of 
social relations (Feenberg, 2010, p.8; Wayne, 2003, p.39-40; Street, 1992, p.30-31). 
Technological messianism was common in the 1990s, when new media technologies were 
growing ubiquitous, even though a similar thinking has been earlier criticized by Marcuse as 
ahistorical and one-dimensional. Technological messianism is a belief in the redeeming power 
of technology an agent of transformation that has an enormous capacity to effect change, and 
that transformation is inevitable even though the conditions for change are embryonic. While 
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giving assent to the redemptive power of technologies, this view, however, is naïve and lapses 
into consumerism because of its positive opinion toward technological diffusion. 
Technological messianism tends to be triumphal, which is taken to mean that technologies are 
regarded as agents, or the telos, of neoliberalism, that Francis Fukuyama has sanctified 
(Derrida, 1994, p.85-86). 
Technological messianism has underpinned discourses of technologies in the Philippines. The 
country is often cited as a case wherein new media technologies, particularly mobile phones, 
were harnessed for political change (Rheingold, 2008; Levinson, 2004; Morozov, 2010). The 
uprising to unseat President Joseph Estrada, on January 2001, was partly credited to the use of 
mobile phones, particularly their SMS (short message service) or text messages that 
transmitted political messages and appeals for people to join protests.  As a result, more than a 
million gathered on the stretch of highway that, fifteen years ago, hosted a similar uprising 
against the Marcos regime. (Estrada was impeached for abuse of power, but a botched trial 
angered many who then demanded his resignation. He was subsequently jailed, convicted of 
plunder, but pardoned in 2007). The 2001 uprising is often cited as an example of mobile 
communication technologies having a political impact because of their “disruptive political 
potential” (Rheingold, 2008, p.225). Mobile phones were crowd gatherers; they facilitated 
consensus of political action through the networks they created (Shirky, 2008, p.17-20).  
These networks were construed as publicly situated, not unlike Habermas’s idea of the public 
sphere, which is a space for deliberation and political participation. Common to accounts of 
the mobile phones’ mediation of Philippine politics is their ubiquity that carries hope for 
political change and democracy (Celdran, 2002, p.95-99; Rafael, 2008, location 11353, e-
book). Although in a less dramatic way, the same was said of other new media technologies 
that were popular at that time, particularly the Internet, which hosted websites, digital 
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newspapers and blogs of political groups with all sorts of ideologies. The argument is simply 
that the democratic promise of new media technologies lies in an inherent diffusion that could 
outrun attempts to suppress their message. 
 As mentioned, technological messianism is an example of technocratic rationality. Bound up 
with capitalism, this rationality masks a totalitarian tendency because it aims for 
classification, quantification and domination (Marcuse, 1964, p.xviii). Technological 
messianism, with its rudimentary analysis, sees technologies as the decisive way by which a 
networked society attains progress. In a neoliberal regime, information is vital as commodity 
and cultural item; its storage and transmission influence decisions in the marketplace (Harvey, 
2005, p.3). Technological messianism in the Philippines misread the relationship of 
technology and society by reducing technology to an instrumental power, as the work of 
Celdran and Pertierra have suggested (Celdran, 2002; Pertierra, 2007). For instance, Celdran 
argued that in 2001, with the Philippines being the capital of SMS of the world, the more than 
ten million mobile phones are gadgets of democracy (Celdran, 2002, p.91). If this claim were 
at all valid, then social transformation follows the cycle of introduction and diffusion of new 
media technologies.  
I believe that technological messianism has gained ground in the Philippines for several 
reasons. First, rationalization has not expelled elements of the sacred as influenced by 
Catholicism, folk, and pre-Christian beliefs. Second, political discourses have been 
contaminated with religious overtones, and faith-based ethics have also been invoked in many 
political decisions. Third, churches, religious movements and sects, by the strength of their 
number, exerted some moral influence on the secular public sphere at crucial periods in the 
country’s history and, in fact, provided the matrix from where identities were constructed. 
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Fourth, neoliberalism supplies the bases in which articulation and “return” of religion can be 
relevant because of the reifying conditions it had produced in the economy, politics and 
culture. Fifth, the effects of new media technologies solicited certain forms of secular 
eschatology, which could be seen as manifestations of alterity that repudiated hegemonic 
representation and activated a messianic agency.  
In Politics and Technology, John Street argues that there is no single perspective that could 
sufficiently explain the relationship between technology and politics (Street, 1992, p.45). He 
argues that uncertainties are intrinsic to the evolution of technology, including its design and 
social consequences (Street, 1992, p.119). Paradoxically, these uncertainties are engendered 
by the technical decisions taken on machines or tools such as design, costs and profit; and yet 
these limitations anticipate interventions, dangers and agencies, arising from the use of 
technologies (Street, 1992, p.118-119). Therefore, acknowledging the uncertainties in the 
technologies is to be aware of the technical and social decisions that accompany their use. It 
also to recognize that while they are shaped around instrumental interests they do not 
necessarily perpetuate those interests, either as means of social control or capital 
accumulation. In other words, technologies, despite their constitution and convention, are not 
programmatic per se. 
If not by their material form and quasi-religious predisposition, how does one understand the 
possibilities of new media technologies in the Philippines? In his essay Faith and Knowledge, 
Derrida proposes a radical contingency that he calls “the messianic without a messianism,” 
which refers to the unconditional construction of history – it is “opening to the future or to the 
coming of the other as an advent of justice, but without horizon of expectation and without 
prophetic prefiguration” (Derrida, 2002, p.56). Derrida rewrites the terms of messianism by 
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introducing indeterminations in the technological and political realm. His version is a secular 
strategy of interpretation that repeats the possibility of religion without a religion, or “faith 
without dogma” (Derrida, 2002, p.57, 61). The messianism that Derrida offers is a 
messianism that prophesies the “other.” This presaging, also called witnessing, is a form of 
responsible intervention that is infinite and opens up to the absolute future (Derrida, 2002, 
p.98).  
The preceding discussion also leads to the question of the presence of new media 
technologies. Presence, for Derrida, signifies being simultaneously committed to and 
independent of the demands of representation or, in other words, being absent and present at 
the same time. In Writing and Difference, Derrida correlates writing to presence wherein the 
latter conveys being involved, but an involvement that cannot be specified in advance by the 
logic of inscription (Derrida, 1978, p. 13-14). What this implies for the analyses of new media 
technologies is that political proposals and speculative perspectives, which are projected into 
them, are largely technical or mechanical in their approaches. They have overlooked the 
demands of social forces that tend to stray from the pre-set or demarcating codes of 
technologies. But the judgments that new media technologies negotiate are complex, and the 
same is true with effects they give rise to, hence they simply defy neat and qualified 
assessments. Derrida notes that contradictory motivations found in new media technologies 
require a certain ethical discretion that he termed “vigilance of the unconscious” (Derrida and 
Stiegler, 2002, p.135). The phrase drew much from its etymological roots, that is, the work of 
remembering an inheritance that can be repeatedly accessed to bear on political judgment and 
action. While it appears to be subjective, this vigilance instantiates its power if exercised 
intersubjectively, or in the public sphere where its power is multiplied. And yet Derrida also 
retained the unknowable element in that aporetic phrase because, he believes, actions could 
241 
have effects beyond their lucid and conscious modalities because mobilizations may not 
always presage emancipation (Derrida and Stiegler, 2002, p.136-137). Awakening, recalling 
and remembering have, according to Derrida, spectral traces, as they enabled the re-
presentation of “collective memory and political ghosts” that might have been absent, but 
might just spring into the view again, in yet another arrangement or guise (Derrida and 
Stiegler, 2002, p.137).   
It is not as though spectres, or the technical effects of new media technologies, cannot reveal 
their existence in the present, and are taken to mean that they are simply spirits devoid of 
actual existence. In fact, the Derridean spectres rest on the presumption of materiality. 
Spectres derive their presence from signs, which include images and texts transmutable into 
digital data that are suited for transmission and manipulation. Digital formats transform 
representations into programmable signs that are simultaneously “mobile and modifiable,” 
and consequently allow a relationship among a community of interpreters or meaning makers 
(Manovich, 2001, p.174). This relationship relates to the arrangement of space and time that 
spectres have successfully disrupted. The spatiotemporal displacement is the consequence of a 
lopsided and hierarchical development of capitalism from where the materiality of new media 
technologies emanates. From within this unevenness, the specters articulate what can be said 
and unsaid. The situation that emerges cannot be described as the disintegration of aura that, 
for Benjamin, means a representation that is proximately cut off from its natural and symbolic 
anchors in society (Benjamin, 1968, p.224-225; Lunn, 1982, p.169-170). Instead of the 
detachment that Benjamin perceives, spectrality appears to be a re-enchantment of the public 
sphere, or a reconnection with history, because digitization is a condition of possibility.  
Digitization, like archewriting, makes human expression and thought possible. This 
possibility has less to do with content or the material constitution of the object itself, but how 
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it provides the matrix for something to appear, happen or be known. I believe that this 
spatiotemporal orientation solicits effects of new media technologies that give rise to the 
transformation of conventional identities and the hegemonic structures of political order. This 
is because the same effects enable individuals to look inward into themselves in relation to the 
object of their gaze, so as to invest it with meanings. Benjamin’s idea of the demise of aura as 
the compression and constriction of space brought by technological mediation, also brings an 
insight that the elimination of distance actually enables intervention upon a representation to 
disrupt the latter’s material and discursive constitution (Benjamin, 1968, p.222-224; 
Manovich, 2001, p.174). In other words, new media technologies can inaugurate a different 
relationship of distance-nearness in which objectification and disruption are possible.  
When taken in relation to the public sphere, new media technologies not only enlarged this 
discursive space but also reconfigured the terms of its interactions, and allowed dissension, 
differences and spectres of the “other ” to emerge. This is how I see the shifts enabled by new 
media technologies in the Philippines; they defy the messianic politics that facilely linked 
technologies with the conflictual changes taking place in the neo-liberal order. Their effects 
are the spectres that articulate the enduring demand for justice, beyond the binaries that reflect 
the tension of the uneven development in the growth of capitalism. In the next section, I will 
address the political consequences of spectres in the public sphere. 
6.2    Spectral New Media Technologies and Democratic Politics  
The line-up of administrations that replaced the Marcos regime begins with an Aquino and, to 
date, ends with an Aquino. Corazon Aquino was swept to power with an uprising in 1986 
while her son, Benigno Simeon Aquino, was elected president in 2010. The Aquinos’ brand 
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of democracy strengthened the power of the elites, with Corazon Aquino restoring the 
structures of formal representation, and the younger Aquino affirming them. Fidel Ramos, a 
former Marcos martial law general who succeeded Corazon Aquino, was remembered for his 
strong adherence to neoliberal prescriptions for the country’s economy. Then came Joseph 
Estrada, with his populist style of politics that inclined to favour a circle of associates. Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo, who stayed as president from 2001 to 2010, harbored authoritarian 
tendencies when she briefly placed the country under a state of emergency and staged a 
crackdown on left-leaning activists and communists. 
The five administrations have many things in common in their approach to democracy. They 
generally considered communist and Muslim rebellions as terrorism requiring military 
intervention. Social justice, in terms of land distribution and recognition of workers’ rights 
were dissolved under the national agenda of global market competitiveness. Thus, for 
example, vast tracts of land were made available for export crops, while trade unionism is 
discouraged. All the five administrations also viewed poverty not in terms of class inequality, 
but a condition that can be made bearable by the extended family system and overseas 
migration, the two safety nets that enable the country’s poor to deal with a level of poverty 
that, at 25 percent in the late 1990s, was one of the highest in Southeast Asia (Bautista, 1999, 
p.385-387).  Since then, the poor became recipients of state dole-outs ranging from rice 
rations to petrol rebates. Some scholars termed these measures “coping strategies” of both the 
government and the poor, but for the latter it is simply a way to survive, more instinctual than 
voluntary (Bautista, 1999, p.388).  Poverty and its attendant issues hardly figure in the 
discourse of democracy, as the latter is linked entirely to formal conditions of free speech, 
legal rights, and elections. And yet poverty, I will argue, is the main obstacle to full 
participation in the public sphere in the Philippines, as it leads to high levels of 
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marginalization and exclusion. It is not that agency, or political autonomy, can never be 
realized in conditions of deprivation; rather poverty provides the underlying reason why 
subalterns are prone to fatalism and manipulation, out of need, ignorance, or a combination of 
both. All told, the poor bore all the risks of the neoliberal order, while the rewards of progress 
insinuated in the catchphrases “catch up” and “trickle down,” could not stand theoretical 
scrutiny.  
The neoliberal sponsored democracy, as I argued, inhibits the democratic potential of the 
public sphere as a space for constructing an autonomous public debate. Aside from the realm 
of social integration, Habermas conceptualized the public sphere as having a steering function 
in material production and democratic practice that affects, and is shaped by, the existing 
networks in society. In other words, the interchanges in the public sphere, cannot be divorced 
from instrumental demands posed by what Habermas himself called the “economic-
administrative complex” that impinges on public interaction and the lifeworld (Habermas, 
1987, p.33). The governmental and economic structures, steered through power and money, 
can override the genuine debates and commodify the interaction to fit the mould that 
Habermas termed as “functional rationality,” a variant of the Frankfurt School’s instrumental 
rationality (Edwards, 2004, p.117-118; Habermas, 1987, p.304-305). This logic underlies 
Habermas’s thesis of “colonization” that, in the context of Western capitalism, gives rise to 
problems in all areas of the social, including the mechanisms of representation. The latter can 
be implicated in what Habermas calls “cultural impoverishment” and “loss of meaning” in the 
lifeworld, which supplies interpretive resources to society (Habermas, 1987 p.302). This 
instrumentalism in the public sphere strikes a chord in the works of Naomi Klein (2000) and 
Jodi Dean (2002) who separately pointed out that when public spaces, in the time of 
neoliberalism, yield to corporate money and power, instead of public deliberation, what 
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occurred were private acts of consumption. Moreover, in lieu of democratic governance, there 
exists a public life tied to the market ideology. Dean maintains that the “public sphere has 
become the weakest link” in a networked society, which Klein observed as thriving in a 
“climate of cultural and linguistic privatization” (Dean, 2002, p.13; Klein, 2000, p.281, 284). 
While Klein was primarily referring to consumption of branded commodities, her argument 
also touches on the effects of the functionalist logic that neoliberalism has made hegemonic. 
Dean went on to argue that the public sphere, by the way it transmits commodified and 
democratically deficient discourses, becomes complicit with the dissemination of the neo-
liberal agenda, and thus has become the opposite of its putative aims (Dean, 2002, p.12-13). 
The conduct of Philippine politics exemplifies the reification of the public sphere, showing 
that the means for producing alienation and repression are not in short supply. The “liberal-
minded” presidents have not delivered on their promise of social justice and political reforms 
but instead pandered to partisan interests and the U.S. strategic agenda. If there is one thing 
that runs through all neoliberal administrations, it is their assent to the deployment of migrant 
labourers everywhere in the world, to ease the unemployment problem that they have failed to 
solve. There are at least ten million Filipinos working in some two hundred countries around 
the world, and seventy five percent of them are women working as domestics, health workers 
and semi-skilled labourers; they comprise ten percent of the country’s population (San Juan, 
2009, p.157; Madianou and Miller, 2011, p.459). Since the time that President Corazon 
Aquino called overseas workers the “new heroes,” in recognition of their contribution to the 
country’s dollar reserves, the label stuck, along with its incongruousness. By shifting the 
terms of the exclusion to the valorization of labour power in other countries, the neoliberal 
regimes glossed over the inequalities, the primary reason why Filipinos go abroad. On the 
other hand, the accelerated global expansion of capitalism has also increased the demand of 
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variable capital on some areas of work, the care industry, for instance, as a means of 
accumulating surplus value and abating the effects that globalization has engendered. These 
issues, along with the existing demands for land, jobs and justice, were articulated by growing 
ranks of activists and political groups that also rehearsed various ways of confronting the 
sitting power. These demands arise from what Derrida termed in Spectres of Marx as “plagues 
of the new world order,” or the conditions of injustice that haunt the global neoliberal order 
(Derrida, 1994, p.100).  
Marx’s spectres have inspired the Philippines’ communist struggles for decades but, in the 
early 1990s, they went through a bitter ideological schism that ended in a split, giving rise to 
several groups with various ideological tendencies. Although the issues appeared to be 
hermetic, arguably they were affected by the “end of ideologies” syndrome, which came with 
the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the onset of globalization. At first glance, it appeared 
like a death knell to the Marxist ideals that many had died for during the Marcos years. 
However, the ideological split can be seen positively, in the light of what Derrida called the 
“second interpretation,” which is “putting into question again, in certain of its essential 
predicates, the very concept of the said ideal(s)” (Derrida, 1994, p.108). Indeed, some points 
raised by Derrida in Spectres of Marx speak to the Left in the Philippines, which tried to be 
faithful to a certain spirit of Marxism. Derrida calls for a Marxism without genealogical and 
ideological closure, one where “time is out of joint,” or always renewing itself, past 
dogmatism and adventurism, beyond the insularity of party politics, and toward a “new 
international” which attends to the “innumerable, singular sites of suffering” (Derrida, 1994, 
p.106-107). More than an organization, the new international is a “public” renewal of ties to a 
certain Marxism, whose spectres haunt the persistent demands for justice among subalterns in 
the Philippines. What is now apparent was the plurality of tactics and engagements that the 
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various groups from the Philippine Left had initiated against the succession of neoliberal 
regimes. Taken together, they have been active in putting arguments in the public sphere to 
solicit aporias and push democratic practices quite beyond the boundaries set by the neoliberal 
administrations. In keeping with Derrida, I believe that the crisis of the Philippine Left was a 
timely renewal and radicalization of a certain spirit of Marxism. 
The presence of political groups with various demands and expressions of political agency has 
also brought some unpredictability to the public sphere in the Philippines. In neoliberal times, 
the public sphere was constructed around the historical demand for unfettered discourse, but it 
was also shaped by unbounded rationalizations of the market, in which technology plays a 
pivotal part. At the same time, this metaphorical realm attends to the contradictory tensions of 
unimpeded representation and exclusion. Capitalism, with its market values, shaped the 
interactions in the public sphere that, in turn, guaranteed the interlocution of democratic ideals 
for as long as market freedom is assured and the structures that support it are intact. In this 
sense, the terms of engagement in the public sphere can be seen as more like choices that an 
individual has to make within a limited range, and in a manner not unlike the cost-benefit one 
considers when buying a commodity. In the end, the person becomes atomized, less of a 
citizen but more of a consumer entrapped in web of commodification, a fate that Adorno so 
described as the net effect of instrumental rationality. Thus, the commitment to install 
democracy, in the aftermath of authoritarian rule, is denied its full extent insofar as 
deliberation in the public sphere offers little of what could pass as communicative democracy.  
However an awareness of the gap between representation and inclusion gives rise to a radical 
way of understanding the reification of the public sphere in the time of neoliberalism. The 
lack of participation in the public sphere can be assessed in the many ways in which new 
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media technologies sustain or undermine this lack. In the Philippines, it is widely believed 
that the activist mode would prevail in the public sphere, given the political role once 
accorded to new media technologies in undermining the instrumental power of the Marcos 
regime. Thus, new media technologies were regarded as vehicles that can surmount the 
barriers to communicative democracy. For example, interfaces such as social networks, 
micro-blogging, citizen journalism, and the online communities guarantee some participation. 
Habermas, however, was cautious his assessment of this claim when he said: “Mediated 
political communication in the public sphere can facilitate deliberative legitimation processes 
in complex societies only if a self-regulating media system gains independence from its social 
environments, and if anonymous audiences grant feedback between an informed elite 
discourse and a responsive civil society” (Habermas, 2006, p.411). Simply put, new media 
technologies cannot sufficiently meet the criteria for full deliberation in the public sphere 
although they shaped issues and framed the terms of the debate (Habermas, 2006, p.415). This 
suggests that, for Habermas, the flow of information and instances of aesthetic representation 
are not equivalent to discursive communication. He also sets the bar higher for what could be 
construed as communicative democracy. 
One could say that Habermas’s assessment is influenced by the thesis of the culture industry, 
but he is not alone in this. In The Net Delusion, Evgeny Morozov, similarly argues that 
placing hopes on new media technologies as catalyst of democracy is falling into the trap of 
“laissez-faire approach to democratization,” which is powerless against technology savvy 
despots, both enduring and resurgent (Morozov, 2011, p.ix). Jodi Dean provides a somewhat 
similar argument in her recent works that, for example, in Blog Theory, she reprised her 
notion of “communicative capitalism,” which is a “strange convergence of democracy and 
capitalism” in networked media (Dean, 2010, p.4). While the latter, according to Dean, have 
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instantiated some democratic values, they are primarily conduits of manipulative political 
messages and consumerist desires. Simply put, if the Internet is an information highway, it is 
not always paved with good economic and political intentions. Dean and Morozov’s thoughts 
are redolent of earlier criticisms of the belief that new media technologies, on their own, can 
bring society to a more democratic future. Both critics argued that new media technologies do 
not always have the potential for freedom unless, for Morozov, there exist conditions that 
require it and, for Dean, unless the repetitive transmission of information, images and desires, 
from where networked technologies derived their power, is disrupted (Morozov, 2011, p.xvii; 
Dean, 2010, p.30-31). While Morozov and Dean’s arguments would admit discord and the 
unforeseen in the deployment of new media technologies in the public sphere, Habermas 
framed interactions in the public sphere around intersubjectivity and rational consensus, even 
as it recognizes the hegemony, consumerism and individualism that take control of the public 
sphere and the lifeworld. For Habermas, intersubjective understanding is more important than 
the conditions or interfaces in which deliberation takes place. The norms of rational 
communication are more vital to the democratic organization of the public sphere than the 
mediation of information and the diffusion of viewpoints in the media (Habermas, 1998, 
p.362). And this is where the problem lies and what has set Habermas apart from cyber-
democracy theorists.  
Although new media technologies are expressive of resistive communicative rationality, they 
are not what Habermas has in mind. He places more importance on rational norms of 
interaction and the values of market and politics have to be subordinated to that logic. 
Habermas may have invested hope in the autonomy of individuals, but he overlooks the fact 
that if the circulation of public opinion is in accord with the unhampered flow of capital, the 
resulting consensus could be tied to the codes of domination. This condition leads to passivity 
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and apathy that typify the state of reification, which does not spare the lifeworld that supplies 
the interpretive elements of social interactions. Reification of the lifeworld, to recall Adorno’s 
discussion of the concept, would mean that an individual is capable of knowing reality but 
only within what is determined by the institutions, behaviours and social relations that rule 
out other ways of viewing reality (Rose, 1978, p.48). Reification is also reproduced in new 
media technologies that shared the interpretive function of the lifeworld. This happens when 
they are endowed with the capacity to posit and transform reality, while other factors are seen 
as secondary. The same conditions apply to the public sphere, which is also built upon 
interchanges and social relationships. Adorno raised an important point in his assessment of a 
constrained public sphere; that instead of being a realm that demonstrates the political 
maturity of individuals in society, it becomes just another commodified entity (Adorno, 2005, 
p.283).  
With Adorno’s evaluation of the public sphere, a bleak picture of democracy emerges in the 
context of a neoliberal order. The liberal ideals of democracy, such as free speech and 
freedom of choice, are projected into technologies and meanings that have less to do with 
enhancing vertical solidarities and more to do with free-floating individual choices that are 
detached from the possibility of critical thinking. Put differently, freedom has been 
repositioned to reflect the logic of the market in which the culture industry is its major broker 
in the promotion of a consumer culture of pseudo-individualism (Johnson, 2006, p.8). 
Bauman, who recognizes the denigration of public sphere by the neoliberal order, calls for its 
defense. He argues for the preservation of agoras because they are “the sites in which norms 
were created – so that justice could be done, and apportioned horizontally, thus re-forging the 
conversationalists into a community, set apart and integrated by the shared criteria of 
evaluation” (Bauman, 1998, p.25, author’s italics). Bauman’s prognosis implicates the culture 
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industry: it requires no hard sell to accept the reign of the market as what this requires is 
simply the diffusion of representations that effectively communicate that there is no 
alternative (Johnson, 2006, p.9).  
What the preceding discussion of the public sphere implies for Philippine democracy is that 
the neoliberal order, which embodies the strategy of control, has naturalized discourses, social 
relations, and representations. It points to the inadequacy of Habermas’s ideas to sufficiently 
articulate injustices because of his fixation on popular will and consensus. This analysis can 
be demonstrated in the phenomenon of overseas labour, which, as a discourse, has been 
naturalized as an acceptable social choice – the only question being how it is best 
implemented. On one hand, there is a popular acceptance of this condition, while on the other, 
it cannot be easily reconciled as a free choice of individuals. In other words, labour migration, 
which is a social consensus dispersed in the public sphere, and absorbed in laws and social 
interactions, emanates from a flawed condition of will formation that could be seen as 
aggregate choice of reified individuals.  
In Spaces of Hope, David Harvey revisits the concept of the spatio-temporal fix to explain 
how the mobilization of migrant labour alleviates the crisis-prone condition of late capitalism. 
The strategy of accumulation is not just about the search for cheap markets and labour in poor 
countries, like the Philippines; it also includes the use of affective migrant labour in 
industrialized countries. For Harvey, this demonstrates the how the compulsions of capitalism 
“pushed the limits of the working body” to “discrepant directions” (Harvey, 2000, p.103).  
Hence in the terrain of globalized capital, exploitation of this particular abstract labour does 
not only take place in countries where labour is cheap and capitalism’s growth is uneven, it 
also happens in industrialized countries where affective labour power is a necessary variable 
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capital. Affective labour is labour power servicing the industry of care in affluent countries. 
Hardt and Negri’s designation of affective labour as “labour in bodily mode,” is relevant to 
the experience of Filipino migrant workers, the majority of them women, and also resonates 
with Harvey’s theory of the unequal and uneven development of capitalism (Hardt and Negri, 
2000, p.292-293; Harvey 2000). Drawing from the work of socialist feminist Donna Haraway, 
with her postulation of “the body as accumulation strategy,” Harvey expands discussion of 
how the body, as a source of labour power, is shaped by exigencies of capitalism, in which the 
construction of race and gender are implicated (Harvey, 2000, p.106-109). In this case, his 
analysis of neoliberalism concerns not only the exploitation of labour power, but also the 
construction of the body from where the labour power emanates. This is all about how an 
individual’s capacity for warmth and empathy is turned into a commodity, or a transmutation 
of affect, which is a private act, into “emotion work” (Hochschild, 1983, p.118). 
Bodies, according to Harvey, are variable capital in the international division of labour that 
also regulates their circulation, discipline, and reproduction, both at home or sites of 
immigration (Harvey, 2000, p.108). Harvey argues that, under this set-up, capital’s formula of 
circulation is Money-Commodity-Money (M-C-M), where labour power is inserted as a 
commodity in the circuit whose goal is accumulation of more money. However, I agree with 
postcolonial theorist San Juan who argues that the classic Marxist formula of simple 
commodity production of C-M-C (Commodity-Money-Commodity), to describe the 
appropriation of bodies for capitalism’s expansion, is more appropriate.  In this circuit, the 
commodity of labour power expresses exchange value, in order to generate the money-form 
that is subsequently converted into consumer goods (San Juan, 1999, p.223). Another way to 
apply this formula is seeing affective labour as a commodity that generates surplus value for 
the employers, who then convert the surplus to expand commodity production, or capital. In 
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both instances, the exchange value of labour power takes over, and the profit motive is 
presupposed in the exchange. For Harvey and San Juan, affective labour is at once valorized 
and devalued – simultaneously in demand but belittled for its skills. The migrant workers’ 
alienation can also be located culturally – in the conditions of their work, in uncongenial 
foreign culture, and when buying consumer goods, thus highlighting the role commodification 
plays in nurturing ties that are dependent upon the fulfillment of financial and communication 
obligations (Madianou and Miller, 2011, p.460). This condition also underscores the fact that 
individuals become consumers and reproducers of the self (by selling their labour power) at 
the same time. As it is also widely acknowledged that the money sent by the migrant workers, 
sustained not only their families but also the Philippine economy, thus, I argue that the 
appropriation of their wages is also the expropriation of their bodies.  In this context, the 
intersection of sex, gender and race becomes an inscription of difference that matters within 
the terrain of the uneven growth of capital, in which bodies, as variable capital, are constituted 
simultaneously – racially and sexually. This difference traverses what Harvey identifies as 
two contradictory circulation processes – the first one is shaped by the historical movement of 
capital accumulation, and the second one is shaped by the current demand for production and 
reproduction of variable capital within a particular context (Harvey, 2000, p.109).  
Women, subjected to technologically accelerated capitalism, are what Haraway termed 
“cyborgs,” to name the intersecting women’s experience and the agencies enacted. Cyborgs 
are at once bodies and machines, designed for pleasure and responsibility (Haraway, 1991, 
p.140). As the embodiment of organic and machinistic functions and desires, cyborgs 
concretize the aporias in the relationship of bodies to technologies, temporality, science and 
space. Haraway sees this relationship as a “matrix of complex domination” that cyborgs have 
to negotiate, redefine, and subvert in their daily lives, and in political terms (Haraway, 1991 
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p.181). In A Cyborg Manifesto, Haraway argues that globalization may have compelled labour 
power to be amenable to the contradictions of techno-capitalism, but this condition also 
solicits the possibility of its repudiation (Haraway, 1991, p.163). Even as she sees 
communication technologies as indispensable in maintaining relations of power, Haraway 
also notes that disrupting communication constitutes the biggest threat to power (Haraway, 
1991, p.164). With cyborgs’ interlocutions as sites of political action, Haraway is implying 
that resistance to machinations of the market lies in how new media technologies bring to the 
public sphere the articulation of cyborg desires. 
It is through this implicit appeal for justice to labouring bodies that a public sphere becomes 
urgently transnational, or cosmopolitan, primarily as a response to conditions of subalternity 
of women migrant workers. Haraway appears to imply this when she wrote: “Cyborg gender 
is a local possibility taking a global vengeance” (Haraway, 1991, p.181). The public sphere 
cuts through borders, geographies and differences; its unconditional responsibility is to 
represent migrants’ conditions and to redress injustices at home or beyond. Put differently, the 
public sphere is not a given; it is always prefigured by those denied representation, both in the 
formal and aesthetic sense. The public sphere and new media technologies, which are the 
means of articulation, are essential to how migrant workers constitute and act upon their 
identity.  In other words, migrant workers’ articulations require interlocutors who can respond 
to the specifics of their longstanding and immediate demands. I believe that this response 
requires a commitment to transformation that can find a fair hearing in a globalized public 
sphere, but which is located in their country of origin. An extended public sphere gives 
migrants the space for the articulation of rights that they cannot exercise because of the 
marginality of the situation they experience. There is no denying that they endured racism and 
discrimination, but their alienation appears greater because the logic of the market operates 
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everywhere: they cannot escape the compulsions of capitalism back home, hence the need for 
a transnational public sphere that connects them to political movements in their home country. 
Moreover, the global structures were represented locally, both by the ruling elite bourgeoisie 
and the state. It is not that the migrant workers cannot channel their struggles into the 
oppressions they endured in their host countries; rather, the organic and social ties embedded 
in their identities are still valid and provide a chance for them to seek redress for injustices 
that have to be articulated within some kind of a public sphere. In the section that follows, I 
will discuss the capacity of new media technologies to solicit the articulation of the bodily 
desires and needs of subalterns under the conditions of capitalist globalization.  
6.3    The Spectral New Media Technologies and Global Networks 
Technological orientalism, which was sketched in earlier colonial and postcolonial historical 
accounts as a patronizing narrative of the gains of new media technologies on some corners of 
the globe, is a racialized perspective. In an interconnected world, technological orientalism 
posits that the “other” is different, but nonetheless can be part of global networks in order to 
be seen, heard and known. In this sense, being an “other “ has nothing to do with 
marginalization or invisibility; rather an “other” is one who is online, linked and tagged in 
communities, blogs and interfaces where techno-surveillance is possible. In other words, the 
“other’ is an “available other.” Identities are multiplied and formed around the networks of 
subcultures, defined by just anything “cool” or “likeable,” which are then bound up with 
commodified arrangements that electronically monitor consumer preferences online. The 
individuals’ use of a digital form or interface is primarily linked to how it can spur or 
maximize marketing transactions, given the length of time of exposure to advertising 
platforms online. This configuration of new media technologies in relation to global 
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capitalism alludes to what Fredric Jameson calls the “communicational concept of 
globalization,” a relationship that masks and transmits cultural or economic meanings” 
(Jameson, 2009, p.436). When the logic of market and new media technologies coalesce, to 
shape economic and social transactions, it gives rise to standardization of culture, imposed 
assimilation and massification of desires (Jameson, 2009, p.438).  
It is worth examining the fact that, despite the ubiquity of mobile phones, high television 
viewership and a marked increase of Internet connections in the Philippines, consumption 
patterns and frivolous aesthetics have not fully advanced to the state anticipated by Jameson. 
Offhand, one can cite some obvious social factors like poverty, uneven development of the 
market, continued dominance of the culture industry and the peculiar use of new media 
technologies. However, such analyses, while valid, should be interrogated through the logic of 
new media technologies, to include the spectrality that was earlier presented as having the 
capacity to initiate fundamental shifts in the process of representation. In other words, new 
media technologies should be appraised in both their social and technological effects, a 
complementary analysis that would provide a cautious and, hopefully, thorough evaluation of 
their democratic potential.  
There are some elements that showed how the uneven development under a neoliberal order 
supported exploitative and discriminatory representations in the Philippines. When neoliberal 
policies were embraced by the Philippines in the 1990s, under the aegis of the IMF, World 
Bank and the World Trade Organization, the country’s fiscal policies and banking system 
were revamped chiefly to stimulate growth, as if liquidity is the only reason for 
underdevelopment. The neoliberal policies have been criticized as having maintained 
impoverishment, especially in the rural areas where poverty stood at eighty percent, or about 
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half of the country’s population (IFAD, 2011). Poverty is stark among peasants whose 
backward agriculture exposed them to food shortages, ill health, and ignorance. Feudal 
relations have been maintained to grow crops intended for export. The removal of subsidies, 
privatization of state assets, and flood of imports affected them the most. The incursions of 
capital in the countryside was superficial because it came merely seeking markets and buyers, 
and not to transform production. The succession of administrations, adhering to neoliberal 
agendas, have pointed out that the country’s natural resources retain their competitive 
advantage in the world market. However, these resources – mining, fishing, and farming—are 
either marginal or so ecologically degraded that they can hardly provide employment or long-
term livelihood. There is a huge pool of free labour in the country but due to lack of jobs, 
there is high emigration (IFAD, 2011). It is from the latter that rural household members 
derive their sustenance. The remittances mitigated the risks of subsistence agriculture, like 
natural disasters and perennially poor harvests so as to pay for education in a country where 
eighty percent of tertiary or university education is in private hands.  But beyond survival, 
postcolonial critic San Juan sees the diaspora as a “process of metamorphosis occurring 
among marginalized, subjugated people,” where the migrant labourers, as “serfs of global 
bourgeoisie” (San Juan, 1999, p.xii). Migrant workers produce surplus value, for the 
employers and their countries, which used their remittances to pay the foreign debt, finance 
the privileges of those in power, and keep the consumption-driven domestic economy alive 
(San Juan, 1999, p.6-7).  
New media technologies produce dissonances, disjunctions and aporias that shape the forms 
and consequences of the representations that they produced. While they are capable of raising 
the political awareness of subalterns, and of offering a chance for subversion of dominant 
discourses, new media technologies also reproduce the reactionary and self-serving narratives 
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of neoliberalism. Their effectiveness lies in the way they inscribe the logic of the market in 
the lifeworld. Moreover, the values that underlie the interfaces they have built include 
consumerism, escapism and apathy. Thus, the growth of new media technologies does not 
necessarily translate into the improvement of the representational possibilities in society; in 
fact, it brings forth a costly condition that Stiegler notes as the “systematic and unlimited 
access to market” (Stiegler, 2011, p.2-3).  
Cyber theorists have credited new media technologies with constituting or keeping alive an 
idea of a nation that resonates with Benedict Anderson’s notion of an “imagined political 
community” (Anderson, 1983; Pentzold, 2010, p.705).  Simply put, a nation’s sense of 
belonging is held together by new media technologies and not by the bonds sealed from 
physical encounters. Anderson’s theory is in accord with cyber theorists who argue that the 
anonymity afforded by the technologies is crucial in maintaining the idea of the nation 
(Pentzold, 2010, p.706). Stiegler, however, notes the underside of this kind of connectivity in 
the context of globalization. Anonymous or otherwise, the connections, according to Stiegler, 
demonstrate the “loss of individuation,” as a result of being cut-off from society; the 
individual becomes a “technical individual,” primed for manipulation and “user profiling” 
(Steigler, 2011, p.4). Instead of the larger sense of an imagined nation, what emerges are 
“tribalized” ties as a result of this “hypersegmentation” that Stiegler sees as an “inescapable 
malaise” (Stiegler, 2011, p.4-5).  He further argues that the “malaise that submerges the 
public sphere” experiences an epochal re-doubling that suspends the unity of space and time 
(Stiegler, 2011, p.6-7). Like Derrida, who sees a condition of possibility in technologies, 
Stiegler also states that the possibilities of re-doubling construct a “new psychic and collective 
individuation” (Stiegler, 2011, p.7). Hence, Stiegler’s idea of social malaise, which is a 
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generalized anguish, is not an end state because its reproducibility allows for the modification 
and differentiation based on concrete decisions and judgments (Stiegler, 2011, p.221-224). 
Stiegler’s proposition that political judgments should be rendered upon new media 
technologies requires more than reducing them to an instrumental specification. In other 
words, new media technologies are not about computers and social media, or machines and 
softwares. They are also processes that incorporate social relations, contestations and utopian 
desires. The chain of meanings that they transmit also set up innumerable points of 
modification and iteration in relation to what can be thought of in a particular space and time. 
In other words, while new media technologies operate within the uneven geographical 
development of capitalism, they also transcend that development through iteration that gives 
rise to paradoxes and reification, which suggests the shape of a democracy to-come. Derrida 
is interested in the solicitation of these aporias, which convey “contingency, errancy, spacing 
and alterity” (Ryan, 1982, p.77). In Derrida’s sense, solicitation, which allows for incessant 
repetition, is a process that conjures up spectres of the subaltern. I have argued that specters 
are the effects of the process of articulation of permanent injustices within the network of 
particular national history. This process of iteration, inherent in the convention of new media 
technologies, has the capacity to disrupt binaries and ontological identities, and opens up the 
space for movements, groups, individuals, and the nation to reflect upon the contradictory 
tensions of unevenly developed global capitalism. Put another way, new media technologies 
exhibit spectrality in iteration, which allows for representations to be customized and 
contested, such that it would be impossible to posit sameness and unchangeability. 
The workings of Derridean spectres can be understood in Lev Manovich’s enumeration of the 
principles of new media (Manovich, 2001). The first three principles are numerical 
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representation, modularity and automation that involve the use of interfaces and algorithms to 
alter, enhance, animate and allow the interactivity of a representation (Manovich, 2001, p. 25-
27). For instance, Manovich calls digitization, a process that assigns numerical value to a text, 
image or sound, a crucial process in making representation susceptible to transformation 
(Manovich, 2001, p.25-27). Variability, the fourth principle identified by Manovich, is even 
closer to the concept of Derridean spectres.  Variability allows the creation of innumerable 
versions of the same representation, from elements that maybe related or agonistic 
(Manovich, 2001, p.35-40). For Manovich, variability grants new media technologies their 
emancipatory potential, as it allows users to decide on an ideology that is not preprogrammed 
nor in conformity with others. Finally, transcoding, the fifth and last principle, is the process 
of cultural reconceptualization or the application of the logic of technicization to society 
(Manovich, 2001, p.47). Manovich’s new media principles underscore iteration as central to 
social change.  Iteration is premised on the fact that digitization takes into account the 
interaction of numerical data with the symbolic, and their repetition inaugurates new ways of 
transmitting and reproducing meanings (Manovich, 2001, p.41). 
I need to briefly clarify the ways of spectres and to give a theoretical account of the particular 
reading I have offered of Derrida’s concept of spectrality. I argued that the convention of new 
media technologies, which brings spectre-like effects, holds a promise of change in the 
particular form of networked society that the Philippines has come to be. The starting point in 
the analysis is the recognition of unevenness and differentiation arising from how capitalism 
expands in a particular space, time and history. What I proposed was a notion of change as 
“return,” a concept taken from Derrida’s idea of representation as iteration, after 
acknowledging that representation also brings reification, enforced equivalence, spectacle, 
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and simulacra. Spectres cannot guarantee anything but they can have a redemptive capacity, if 
so recognized. 
Iteration prepares the ground from which transformation becomes feasible because it allows 
individuals to recognize the difference, reification, and ambiguity arising from representation. 
Repetition is a form of sensing meaning; it does not privilege universalism and equivalence 
but favours variance and multiplicity. Repetition, in this period, means technical simulation, 
digitization, and virtualization that have enormous consequences for representation and its 
meanings. Iteration presupposes a particular condition for interpretation; or that the political 
and epistemological potentials of a representation are derived from a particular historical 
situation – that can be accessed in the present from the period or time that preceded it. In other 
words, it is a representation that defies effacement, a spectre that returns to haunt the present. 
Derrida sees spectres as capable of soliciting changes that transform absolute truths, finality, 
naturalization, and the uniformity of experience. However alterity, or differentiation, is not 
the only outcome possible. Derrida connects the spectre to the demands of justice; its dual 
effect is to introduce hope when there is none, and guide change toward a redress of injustice 
(Beardsworth, 1997). This turn toward justice is what Derrida calls messianicity, an 
awareness that the condition of reification is also a space of renewal (Derrida, 1994, p.212). 
Spectres cannot guarantee anything anymore than new media technologies can eliminate the 
deficits of the present democracy. But together they can open up a space for rethinking and 
action. New media technologies can be the sites for constructing solidarities among groups, or 
symbolic communities, to constitute identities and take collective action.  
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Conclusion 
Under neoliberalism new media technologies in the Philippines manifest the social growth of 
communication technologies, including the culture industry, that have to keep up with the 
latest technologies for production, transmission and distribution, as well as the status demand 
of the social milieu that they are in. The effects of new media technologies are noticeable by 
the way in which they undermined conventional images and texts. Mentioned earlier were the 
mobile phones that instantiated the neoliberalist values – mobile, personal, and handy -- the 
values not exclusive to a technological process but to social processes as well. Mobile phones 
are not just gadgets of communication; they are mechanisms of representations, with the 
possibility of reaching understanding with others. In terms of communication, that is, the 
exchange of short, typed messages, mobile phones enable technologically-mediated writing, 
unencumbered by space and time. However, the “texts” also embody traces of earlier contexts 
of communication – time and space that include history, power, social relations and elements 
of the lifeworld, or the processes and forms of expressions and thoughts that can be taken as 
having the conditions of writing, which Derrida calls “archewriting.” While there seems to be 
an element of choice afforded by the mobile phones, the choice is not insulated from the 
imperatives that impinge on meanings and actions. And yet this communication, constrained 
by the logics of postcolonial and neoliberal operations of capital, may yield spaces in which 
alternatives can emerge. This means that difference and multiplicity are presupposed in the 
interchanges that, even if suppressed, exist in reserve, waiting to be summoned.  
Mobility, as the defining feature of communication, continues to evolve in the meaning and 
technological capability of mobile phones. The latter have come a long way from when they 
were credited as having played a role in removing a president in the Philippines. While 
technological evolution also occurred in other new media technologies, mobile phones are 
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distinct because they are, to use Heidegger’s neologism, “ready-to-hand.” It is “a little device 
with an enormous impact” (Levinson, 2004, p.xiii). Rather than the computer, mobile phones 
are even regarded as the “epitome of the information age” (Myerson, 2001, p.51). Subsequent 
new media technologies are designed around, integrated, and presented with mobile phones. 
What the concept of ‘being mobile’ holds for the Philippines is in seeing its potential as 
harbinger of new patterns of representation and action. These two possibilities can enhance a 
form of political autonomy that defies hegemonic channels of communication. What can be 
imagined are spontaneous, versatile, jocular, and subversive actions that, if collectively 
performed, may actually modify power relations in society.  
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CONCLUSION                                                                                                                   
THE POLITICS OF SPECTRES 
After having conjured spectres in the narrative of new media technologies in the Philippines, 
from the colonial times to the present, it is time to look forward to what they promise for the 
future. And yet, as Derrida reminded us, there is no way of telling what spectres can do, and 
there is no political programme or agenda that could set the terms or limits to what they could 
give rise to.  After all, one can never predict the irrepressible effects of new media 
technologies, even if these are reduced to the barest of their states – such as photons and 
neurons, from where light particles and human impulses originated. Spectres are everywhere, 
in gestures that could be taken as conditions of spectrality, which necessarily include almost 
all human expressions and thought. Spectres are also technological constructs emanating from 
new media technologies. They are omnipresent, and Derrida was right in saying that the 
future belongs to them, belongs to ghosts. The underlying question that orients my concluding 
remarks, therefore, is: to what extent might we embrace spectres, which is a form of political 
intervention that is based on radical openness and uncertainties? In other words, should we 
entrust our political futures to the ephemerality of spectres? 
Spectres are figurative devices that shaped my account of the political transformation of the 
Philippines; they are also the key to understanding its postcolonial condition. The narrative, 
which was presented in historical stages, has grounded deconstruction in a particular 
postcolonial society, with its various political configurations and spectral affects. Spectres 
constitute a framework for understanding the politics of new media technologies, whose 
effects manifest simultaneously in material and transcendental realms. These effects are 
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conditions of possibility, and their power lies in their iterability and messianicity. Iteration 
provides a chance for representation to redouble illimitably, in a manner that destabilizes the 
hegemonic form of “the real.” When dealing with postcolonial aporias – modernization, 
rhetoric of nationalism, and so forth – spectres express a larger implication than their material 
constitution and discursive capacity can offer, like when they unsettle existing contexts and 
dominant meanings. The messianic gesture of spectres is evident in the way they prefigure the 
future, as the time when injustices and other asymmetries can be redressed. Spectres also 
presage a transformation that is open-ended, differentiated, and deferred. They embody 
Derrida’s articulation of democracy to come, which simultaneously names the impossibility 
of realizing democracy, and the ethical responsibility of striving toward it as the horizon of 
human freedom. 
Spectres prefigure a public sphere when the latter is absent or effaced by institutional and 
discursive controls. By inducing an absent or repressed representation, spectres open up 
society to the task of installing a public sphere that indexes a commitment to democracy. In 
the Philippines, especially during colonial times and in the years of authoritarian rule, spectres 
sustained the democratic role of the public sphere by providing the conditions in which 
effaced and recalcitrant voices can be heard. The same function is possible whenever a public 
sphere exists, or at least when it is allowed to exist in less repressive times. In every figuration 
of the public sphere, spectres disrupt the existing arrangements to open the way to an 
interlocution that is not primarily concerned with communicative action, but which attends to 
its neglected and suppressed elements. It is best then for a public sphere to be served by a 
range of representations and discursive frameworks, however discordant these may be. If 
agonistic representation were allowed to confront the asymmetries of power that bind them, 
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perhaps new representations and imaginaries would set in, and real democracy, which 
concerns subalterns, could take place. 
Spectres offer a more radical politics as they operate on the premise that concepts and 
categories in history are not absolute truths because they can be undermined and reconfigured. 
While the same is possible through a Marxist dialectical analysis, there is a possibility that a 
dominant category represents a preservation of binaries. Thus, a synthesis allows a certain 
complicity with domination, given that it is a condition built upon dialectical structures 
salvaged from the past. On the other hand, Adorno’s negative dialectic maintains that the 
subordinate category offers the key to end the domination within a binary. However, a 
resolution does not eliminate the categories but preserves them, provided that a reified 
relationship is done away with. In other words, both dialectics retain the traces of a totalizing 
universalism that, when applied to the question of technology, posits that truth and closure are 
possible once, for Marx, the material conditions for technological domination are terminated 
and, for Adorno, when the thought process that sustains technological rationality is abolished. 
This is not to dismiss their insights; rather, I believe that given the dialectics’ adherence to 
universality, there is a danger that the chance of emancipation is also undermined because the 
categories somehow remained linked to each other, so that unity becomes authority by itself.  
On the other hand, Derrida’s spectres, which reveal the workings of deconstruction, articulate 
diversity and difference to expose the reified pairing and the structures that maintain 
hegemonic binaries.  
This study is aligned with postcolonial studies as shown by its intent and the issues it raised. 
The historical account that framed my discussion on new media technologies was oriented 
toward the interrogation of the aporias of postcolonial studies. The narrative seeks to prove 
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that displacing the postcolonial method of textual analysis supplies the prospects for a 
postcolonial theorizing that I have developed in relation to the era of networked technologies. 
My account of new media technologies in condition of postcoloniality provided the ground 
for the analysis of their iterability. By intersecting with postcolonial studies, the term “new 
media technologies” confronts its renewability in history, making it as relevant a 
terminological construction in the past as it is in the present. My aim was not to ratify the 
term “new media technologies”; but rather to render it free from the delusions that its 
suppositions imply, such as technological orientalism and technological messianism, which 
both designate the deterministic and encompassing perspectives of representational 
technologies. While these views are a throwback to colonial era, they persisted into modern 
times, where speed and ubiquity of representation predominate. These reified views produce 
aporias, dissonances, and injustices within an uneven development, shaped by the logic of 
capitalism and neoliberal ideology that sustains it, as the case of the Philippines has shown. 
However, given the level of technicization, the effects of spectres also grew in intensity and 
variability. Spectres inflect politics in general, and representation in particular, and iteration 
have made it possible for technological orientalism and technological messianism to be 
undermined by their own claims. As spectres return with intensity, the haunting requires new 
responses and political intervention.  
In societies where control and injustices are the norm, spectres are the hope for democracy as 
they open up innumerable political resources for those who have little or no access to power. 
This hope is essentially the faith in the messianicity of spectres, or the latters’ capacity to 
prefigure a humane future. While this vision of a future appears impossible to be realized, the 
groundwork has been laid out in the present, as shown by forms of representations and the 
struggles of subalterns in the Philippines throughout history. It is not that these political 
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interventions are singularly attributed to the effects of new media technologies; rather these 
actions are unimaginable without the presence of new media technologies that have made it 
possible to foreshadow a future that could be worked out in the present. How this future 
becomes possible in other contexts, in another time, depends on how a society considers 
political events (this could be anything) as presaging a future, that despite the uncertainties, 
they still are worth a wager. Thus, to return to the question of embracing spectres, it remains 
an aporia that requires enactable political judgments.  
If this work sounds more of an awkward rumination about a particular postcolonial condition, 
and less of a provocation as intended, it is because spectres remained the ungraspable 
phantoms of our political life. And yet, they have kept alive the hope for change. I believe that 
it is only by keenly engaging with new media technologies and being watchful of their effects 
that hope, in times when none is present, can be teased out. Spectres, to emphasize their 
metaphorical sense, are traces and a mirage, fleeting and ephemeral, something which can be 
everything and simultaneously an “other.” They are ungraspable because they slipped through 
our fingers, and yet they never slip away from us.  
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